When a Russian warship began to list more and more off the coast of Ukraine in the Black Sea on April 14, 2022, Moscow initially tried to play it cool. There was talk of a “fire accident”, a little later, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea fleet sank. however. The “Moskva” was history – sunk by the Ukrainian army.

In the days, weeks and months that followed, the search was on for explanations for the sinking of the Russian warship. Many questions and variables arose: How was Ukraine able to locate and attack the “Moskva”? What means helped the Ukrainians to do so? Did they have support during the attack? And was the attack planned long in advance or “just” the result of fortunate circumstances? https://militaeraktuell.at/da-war-die-welt-der-moskwa-noch-in-ordnung/ Shortly after the sinking, we published an initial analysis of the sinking of the “Moskva” in collaboration with experts. an initial analysis of the sinking of the “Moskva” was created. In the meantime, however, some new findings have emerged, which we would like to summarize below. Let’s start with our new analysis a few hours after the attack, on the morning of April 14, when the Russian news agency Ria Novosti reported that the source of the fire had been contained and the explosion of the ammunition had been stopped. The cruiser “Moskva” remained afloat, the crew had been evacuated and measures had been taken to tow the cruiser into port.

On the same day, however, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian state news agencynd the Russian state news agency TASSthat the cruiser had suffered damage to the hull “after an ammunition explosion as a result of a fire” and had sunk “in a heavy storm” while being towed.

“During the towing of the Moskva cruiser to the designation port, the ship lost stability due to hull damage, sustained during the detonation of ammunition because of a fire. Amid the heavy storm, the ship sank.

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Russische Nachrichtenagentur TASS am 14. April 2022

Both generally accessible weather appsas well as reports from other ships and photos and videos of the “Moskva” shortly before it sank show no “heavy storm” and no high/low pressure eddies and clearly prove that there was a fire on the ship.

@Archive
The damage to the hull of the “Moskva”, which was heavily shrouded in smoke, is clearly visible.

It did not fit in with the above description that the day after the sinking of the ship was described on Russian state television as a “casus belli” – and therefore the status of the “special military operation” would have to be changed accordingly. Incidentally, a detail in passing is significant: the dead of the “Moskva” are still not considered war casualties in official Russia and their survivors are therefore not entitled to the compensation payments awarded for those killed in the “special military operation” (Moscow’s official name for the war of aggression in Ukraine). war of aggression in Ukraine).

@Ukraine State Border Guard Control
A few weeks before the sinking of the “Moskva”, Captain Kuprin criticized its poor readiness status.

Report by Captain Anton Kuprin dated 10 February 2022
On 28 April, the Russian Ministry of Defense officially confirmed the death of the commander of the “Moskva”, Captain of the 1st rank Anton Valeryevich Kuprin. Of course, the report on the inadequate readiness status of the “Moskva”, which Kuprin had signed and which was leaked at the end of April and dated February 10, 2022, remained unconfirmed.

Of course, as already written in our article from April 26 of last yearships or systems of this size are always likely to have defects or malfunctions somewhere. For good reason, such ships therefore have maintenance facilities and corresponding personnel organically integrated into their structures. However, the report published 14 days before the start of the Russian attack on Ukraine cites problems with various systems that require support from the manufacturer. The aforementioned defects in the air defense systems are of particular importance. The question is whether, due to the limitations described in the report, the theoretical capabilities of the “Moskva” to defend itself on the night of 13 to 14 April 2022 were also available in practice. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHTG6NB8b3o The Admiralty Trilogy Chat
The Admiralty Trilogy has made a name for itself among experts as a family of related simulations covering tactical naval warfare in the late 19th, 20th and 21st centuries. In the episode on the sinking of the “Moskva”, the chat goes into all the aspects responsible for this – right down to a written damage analysis and many other areas:

  • The development history of the “Project 1164 Atlant Cruiser” and its original objective.
  • The air surveillance capabilities of the cruiser and its related task in the course of the attack on Ukraine.
  • The Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship missile system and the only two Ukrainian target detection systems capable of detecting the ship – the Mineral-U mobile coastal radar system and the Bayraktar TB-2 drone.
  • NATO activities in the Black Sea,
  • the operational area of the “Moskva” and
  • the technical condition of the “Moskva” and
  • an assessment of the crew reported in Captain Kuprin’s report.

The chat then goes on to discuss the attack itself, linking the findings from the Kuprin report with the photos of the “Moskva” that was hit. Both the Top Dome radar, which is the target tracking system for the S-300F long-range air defense missile system, and the radar system for the Osa-MA medium-range air defense missile system, known as the Pop Group, were in the idle position at the time the photos of the “Moskva” were taken. In this context, the damage to the ship must also be examined more closely. The “Moskva” lost its propulsion due to the alleged hits – i.e. the explosion of ammunition claimed by the Russian side – and the fire. In this area of the ship are the magazines for the AK-630 turret guns of the short-range defense system, but also the forward and aft engine room and in between the electrical control center and the damage control. The Admiralty Trilogy Chat focuses on the layout of the propulsion and damage control systems. A major damage event – and this has undoubtedly taken place there – and the entire propulsion system and with it the electrical and hydraulic systems fail. But what was the point of bringing the aforementioned radar systems back into the idle position after the damage if all that failed? The hangar door for the on-board helicopter – far too heavy to be moved manually – remained half-open. A possible indication that the report on the readiness status of the “Moskva” was not a fake.

@Ukrainska Pravda
This is how the editorial team of “Ukrainska Pravda” imagines the sinking of the “Moskva”.

The involvement of the USA/NATO
It is undisputed that the USA/NATO is conducting intensive reconnaissance along its eastern border and in the Black Sea area and is also making this data available to Ukraine. The alliance offers everything that is good and expensive to secure the NATO Black Sea states. Fighter planes, of course, and elite troops such as the US 101st Airborne on the ground. And a wide range of powerful airborne reconnaissance elements. AWACAS take off from Geilenkirchen, Lockheed P-3 Orion and EP-3E Aries II from Crete and unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk and Boeing P-8 Poseidon high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft from Sicily, as shown on flight radar can be clearly seen again and again. It can be assumed that information about the position of the ship was transmitted to Ukraine by NATO. However, Pentagon press spokesman John Kirby has deniedthat the USA had supplied “specific targeting information” to Ukraine and that the USA had been involved in Ukraine’s decision-making process that led to the attack. According to Ukrainian media reports, the Ukrainian secret service had registered the deployment of the cruiser “Moskva” in the sea. And Kiev sent a request to NATO’s European intelligence center to confirm the presence of “a specific object” at a specific location. NATO intelligence is said to have confirmed the coordinates of the cruiser in response and Ukrainska Pravda writes further “Several Bayraktar drones distracted the air defense of the ‘Moskva’. At the same time, two Neptune Lfk were fired at the coordinates received from a US P-8 Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft.”

@Ukrainian Navy
The Bayraktar TB2 is a combat and reconnaissance drone designed for medium altitudes and long flight times.

Bayraktar TB-2
The Bayraktar TB-2 unmanned reconnaissance and combat drone is also repeatedly mentioned. Although the range and power of its weapons are not suitable for fighting large ships such as the “Moskva”, the TB-2’s sensor capabilities could have played a key role in the sinking. As various images show, the Wescam MX-15D is capable of delivering good images from a distance of 20, 30 or 40 kilometers. In any case, it is sufficient to identify the “Moskva” from a great distance and thus determine the exact position with which the anti-ship Lfk could find the ship with its radar. The weather
Another detail becomes known in mid-December: Ukrainska Pravda reported that the weather had helped the Ukrainiansto determine the position of the “Moskva”. An anomalous radar wave propagation – a so-called “tropospheric tube transmission” (ducting) – can occur when there is an “inversion weather situation”. In other words: the clouds hang low and there are significant temperature layers in the atmosphere. And this is exactly what happened on April 13 in the Black Sea between Odessa and Sevastopol. The radar waves are said to have been reflected by the clouds and the sea, enabling the “Moskva” to be detected above the radar horizon, as has happened before with other ships and vessels. as had previously been the case with other ships and occasions. was the case. If you now think this is “hunter’s gossip”: the well-known phenomenon of the “mirage” is based on similar assumptions – only in the optical wavelength range. https://militaeraktuell.at/emp-waffen-die-etwas-andere-nukleare-bedrohung/ The Neptune anti-ship missile system(Lfk)
According to the Russian version, it was only a fire that led to the sinking of the “Moskva”. However, all other sources speak in unison of two Neptun anti-ship Lfk. Based on the old Ch-35/SS-N-25 Switchblade, the Ukraine put the system into service practically at the start of the war after almost ten years of development. Such missiles do not require a position accurate to the meter in order to hit the target precisely at launch. They are simply fired into the assumed sea area and use their on-board radar to search for the target themselves. Whether the missiles are at least able to classify a target on the basis of the radar echo, and possibly even identify it, is unknown. However, such solutions are technically feasible today. It is also unknown whether the missile has a data link to obtain further target information from external sources during flight. This would not be a technical problem today either. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzQPAZc5lsw&feature=youtu.be

 

According to the conventional wisdom of the “salvo model”, the two guided missiles should have little chance of penetrating the Moskva’s defenses – another indication of defective systems. Incidentally, another interesting theory can be derived from the “salvo model”: Calculating the salvo sizes required to overwhelm the defensive capacities of known targets and land a sure hit is effectively the 1×1 of missile soldiers. And the defensive shield of a fully operational Slava class cannot be breached with just two guided missiles, according to doctrine. These systems were built to defend against Harpoon and Exocet missiles, for example. However, if only two Neptune missiles were fired by the Ukrainians, then it is reasonable to assume that the Ukraine was possibly aware of the poor condition of the ship. Otherwise, the Ukrainians would have fired two missiles, knowing that there was no realistic prospect of success – and thus “wasted” these valuable defense resources with the order to fire. Also, two warheads weighing 150 kilograms each should not ultimately sink a ship of 11,500 tons.

@ArchiveThe causes of the enormous damage to the “Moskva” would therefore not only be found in the two warheads, each weighing 150 kilograms, but also in the ammunition for the 30 mm revolver cannon on the port side and – apparently a major factor in the serious fire on board the “Moskva” – the residual fuel from the two Neptune guided missiles. The two missiles are said to have hit the “Moskva” at less than half their maximum range. This means that around 200 to 300 kilograms of kerosene can be assumed for the two MS-400 cruise engines of the Neptun Lfks. Together with the hits to the propulsion and damage control systems, the crew was obviously no longer able to cope with the situation. Summary
There is a vidoe recording, dated April 10, showing the cruiser “Moskva” leaving the port of Sevastopol. Both Ukrainian and US sources confirm that there was communication between them on April 13, 2022 regarding the presence and position of the “Moskva” in the Black Sea.

@Archive
A view of the fire control post of the Neptune battery.

It is unclear from which source the specific position data originated on the basis of which Ukraine fired two Neptune anti-ship missiles at a position around 120 kilometers south of Odessa. Possible sources include a US P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which was in Romanian airspace at the time, Ukrainian Bayraktar TB-2 drones and the Neptune battery’s Mineral-U radar in conjunction with an inverse weather situation. The first known report that the “Moskva” had been hit and was on fire dates from April 13, 2022 at 8:30 p.m.

Ultimately, the report remained unconfirmed because Russia continues to officially state an accident as the cause of the loss, but there were probably two hits to port center. As mentioned, this area contains the magazine for the ammunition of the 30 mm machine gun, the main engine room, the central damage control and the ship’s main power distributor. Confirmed, both by official Russian sources and with pictures, is a severe fire with traces of smoke along the entire length of the hull. Also the evacuation of the ship. The first published coordinates based on a SAR (radar) satellite from April 13, 2022 at 18.52 (UTC+3.00) are 45°10′43.39″N 30°55′30.54″E. This position is about 150 kilometers south of Odessa and 90 kilometers east of Snake Island. The “Moskva” was subsequently taken in tow and sank – according to Russian sources due to stormy seas – on 14 April 2022. The wreck lies 50 to 60 meters deep at position 44°56′ N 31°44′ E. The only crew member confirmed dead by Russia is Captain Anton Valeryevich Kuprin. In addition, 27 crew members were officially listed as missing at the end of April 2022. The figures published in the media speak of 40 to 240 crew members killed and 200 injured.

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