The commander of the 4th Armored Infantry Brigade in a major Militär Aktuell interview: Brigadier Siegwald Schier on the necessity of ground-based air defense, investments in armored engineers, anti-tank defense and electronic warfare as well as notable successes in personnel recruitment.
Brigadier, in view of the latest security policy developments in Europe, there is a renewed focus on military national defense. What does this mean for your 4th mechanized infantry brigade? Even if military national defense is now back in the foreground, the protection operation remains the dominant theme for the Austrian Armed Forces (-> current news about the Austrian Armed Forces). For the 4th Panzergrenadierbrigade, this means that in addition to this main mission, we also have to focus increasingly on classic military national defense, i.e. defensive operations against a regular, conventionally fighting enemy. The fact that we have been able to maintain the reconstruction capability of the mechanized troops as the hard core of the Austrian Armed Forces has proven its worth. 
For example, you are referring to the retention of armored forces, although investments in this area have been widely criticized. The Ukraine war shows that modern conflicts are still about combined arms combat: coordinating fire and movement, fighting with steep fire and ultimately fighting tank against tank. In my view, it was therefore right to retain the capability for mechanized combat. As a result, we can now continue to build on the existing capabilities and the service life extension of the Leopard 2A4 main battle tank and the Ulan Ulan infantry fighting vehicle infantry fighting vehicle is of crucial importance. In addition, the aim now is to close capability gaps. Which ones would that be specifically? The main focus here is on direct combat support for the mechanized troops: anti-aircraft defence, i.e. ground-based air defence, and armoured engineers to support their own movement and hinder enemy movement with armoured recovery vehicles, armoured bridgelayers and other systems. Both types of weapon were previously available in the brigade, but were cut due to cost-cutting constraints and now have to be rebuilt. We have also started to develop electronic warfare, the first systems have already entered the brigade and this capability will also be expanded in the future. It is also important to strengthen anti-tank defense, especially at long ranges, and to move from area effects to pinpoint effects with high-precision artillery ammunition. The aim must be to be able to cover the entire range of capabilities of an armored infantry brigade in the future. https://militaeraktuell.at/unser-grosses-plus-ist-die-gelaendegaengigkeit/ The bottom line is that hardware is also needed for this. If we are correctly informed, the procurement of new Ulan infantry fighting vehicles is also currently being discussed. I cannot confirm this, as I am not deeply enough involved in the relevant planning. These are currently being driven forward under the leadership of the Capabilities and Basic Planning Directorate. What I can confirm, however, is that we need additional support systems for our heavy systems. This involves command support, grenade launchers, air defense, medical services and the like, and for reasons of economy and simpler supply, we should of course strive to base all the required support systems on one system family. Are you referring to a vehicle that can be operated in a wide range of variants and versions? Exactly. In the field of medium infantry, this system family can, for example, be the Pandur which is already being used as an armored personnel carrier and which is to be supplemented by variants for anti-tank defense, anti-aircraft defense or command support. However, I am currently unable to say which system family is being considered for the 4th mechanized infantry brigade. 
You are talking about more long-term projects. Are there also procurements that are already being felt by the troops? These include the new night-vision goggles and our heavy-duty systems, which have already been introduced. In addition, the modified 77 A1 MOD assault rifle has been added to our squad presence units and militia, and three units have already been equipped with the new camouflage suit, with another unit about to receive it. We are also currently testing the new Armour 23 including new combat vests and new flame-retardant clothing for mechanized forces. The bottom line is that your brigade is facing an enormous gain in capability, isn’t it? I am very optimistic that we will have an immense influx of new capabilities in the coming years compared to the lack of investment in recent decades. However, this will also require a significant increase in personnel and hopefully a reduction in assistance within Germany in order to be able to train and practice with modern equipment.
“I am very optimistic that we will have an immense influx of new skills in the coming years compared to the lack of investment in recent decades.”
The situation on the labor market is challenging. How confident are you that you will still be able to find the necessary staff? My soldiers recruit whenever and wherever they can and have achieved remarkable success. For example, of our last enlistment date to date, October 2022, a third of all basic military service personnel have decided to serve longer. Be it because they started with us as young cadre members or signed up for a cadre presence unit, because they joined the militia or signed up for the “6+3 model”. A third sounds extremely high – how high is this figure usually? A third not only sounds like a lot, but is also very good in my view. However, it is difficult to give specific comparative figures because this year we did not send all of our conscripts on the assistance deployment Instead, for the first time in a long time, we were able to provide roughly half of all conscripts with high-quality training with a correspondingly high experiential value, and of these 50 percent, an above-average number of conscripts have continued to enlist. https://militaeraktuell.at/die-naechste-pandur-generation/ So the assistance deployment is a disadvantage for your efforts to increase personnel? I will only be able to motivate soldiers to remain in the military if they actually experience the military. And for me, experiencing the military means carrying out challenging basic training in the respective branch of the armed forces and providing a correspondingly high level of experience. To what extent does the training in your brigade need to be adapted in light of the current developments in Ukraine? We are constantly drawing our lessons and conclusions from international conflicts, and the war in Ukraine confirms our adherence to the battle of combined arms. New weapons systems such as drones, electronic warfare, new reconnaissance equipment and the like influence this battle, but they do not fundamentally change it. We are therefore sticking to our fundamental approach to training, but adapting where necessary.
“We are constantly drawing our lessons and conclusions from international conflicts, and the war in Ukraine confirms our adherence to combined arms combat.”
Can you give an example of this? Let’s take Tank Battalion 14 as an example, which, in addition to fighting with main battle tanks and the interaction between tanks and armored infantry, is now increasingly dealing with the threat posed by drones and the necessary passive protection measures. On the one hand, this involves new camouflage that minimizes upward heat radiation to make it more difficult to detect by aerial reconnaissance. On the other hand, it is important to get into the habit of only operating with closed hatches or with protective mechanisms above open hatches when stationary in order to prevent active agents from being dropped into the open turret. You mean nets or grids like the ones you see in Ukraine? Yes, exactly – nets that can be stretched out like sunshades and at the same time serve to minimize heat radiation and as a safety net upwards. 
Would you have thought two or three years ago that such developments would be on your radar? Perhaps not in this area, but for decades there has been a constant competition between tanks and anti-tank systems to find the better weapon and the better means of protection. This development has led to top-attack guided weapons, tandem shaped charges and explosive reactive armor – and now to new considerations. Ukraine also shows that staying on the move is crucial for survival on the battlefield. To what extent does training need to be adapted to this? This principle is correct – but it is nothing new for us and we have already trained it. Our artillery has already acted accordingly in previous years in order to undermine rapid return fire, and we have also been on this path in the area of command and control facilities with the remote deployment of antennas. In the event of rapid enemy fire, the antennas are lost, but the rest of the command and control equipment is retained and can continue to be used. And that is precisely what makes mechanized forces so special: Acting quickly and agilely – both in defense and attack.
