Is Europe’s fighter jet of the future facing an early end?

According to a guest article by Claudia Major and Christian Mölling in the FAZ on September 30, the largest joint EU armaments project for the French-German-Spanish 6th generation fighter aircraft (FCAS, Militär Aktuell reported) is threatened with failure. This would be a declaration of bankruptcy for Europe in terms of security policy for many years to come. First of all: the two authors are not just anyone. Claudia Major heads the Security Policy Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and Christian Mölling is Research Director at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Although both defense ministers only just delivered images full of harmony on 18 September, when they praised their cooperation projects at the Évreux-Fauville military airfield and the Airbus site in Manching, according to the authors, the Franco-German cooperation projects that have been enthusiastically agreed since 2017 are dragging along birth defects that are now on the verge of escalation.

FCAS is one of a total of eight joint projects, including battle tanks – with leadership roles shared between the two partners (Militär Aktuell reported) and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. Although FCAS is essentially about an aircraft, it is also developing the next generation of a flying network system in which manned and unmanned systems, clouds and various sensors and weapons work together. There is hardly a joint armaments project with a greater future, i.e. more innovative technological developments – but the authors also identify a lot of potential for bilateral conflict here. In fact, both sides are making life difficult for each other. Germany is straining its French partners with its national characteristics: Where the French armaments department DGA has virtually complete freedom in the implementation of the project, the principle of multiple federal responsibilities applies in Germany: The Ministries of Economics and Defense as well as the Chancellery have to coordinate with the Bundestag and a private industry. This takes time, is difficult and often leads to unsatisfactory compromises. And it is precisely the key role of the Bundestag that irritates Paris. It refuses to simply release development funds for the FCAS for years without proof of success. It only releases them gradually, sets targets and asks questions. This approach is completely alien to France – where, in addition to Europe in general, defense is also a matter for the president. It appears to Paris as a constant questioning of trust and the German commitment to the project – and as a less subtle attempt to control the French partner based on mistrust. Is this why the FCAS is failing – in England, the comparable Tempest project (Military News reported) with Sweden and Italy does not have such “predetermined breaking points” – the other projects could hardly be saved either, as they are interlinked. The damage would be immense. It would not only be a bitter setback for Franco-German relations, but also a declaration of bankruptcy for Europe as a leading location for technology and innovation and as an ambitious and independent player in terms of military, security policy and industry. Germany and France would also lack key weapons systems. But above all: the idea of European sovereignty, i.e. an autonomy that arises from the cooperation of several nations that want to shape their future together, would be refuted in a key area. https://militaeraktuell.at/the-next-generation-2/ Germany and France account for around 40 percent of the defense industry in Europe. In France, this sector is a key instrument for preserving national sovereignty and is therefore worthy of protection and even national pride. In addition, the state has a significant stake in this economically important industry. Germany’s defense industry, on the other hand, is private, economically insignificant and political circles tend to avoid it. As a result, they basically distrust each other and, above all, the other should not gain any economic advantage from the production and further utilization of the new technologies developed in the projects. Clearly, the key question is not just who produces, but above all who develops which technology. And who can then use this valuable knowledge to create further products from it in the coming decades – and also export them. Anyone who wants to produce large-scale weapons systems in an economically viable way today must be prepared to export them if necessary – and in view of Germany’s restrictive export policy, a (permanent) dispute is inevitable. The problem is that such a failure in the arms industry could cause a rift in European integration. Officially at least, this has not yet been discussed; the article does not provide any facts as to why the project should “fail”. Instead, it outlines what it would mean if it were to fail. What is also not mentioned is the fact that, according to the FCAS contracts, the main value added is generated by the French state-owned companies Dassault and Airbus. Germany is left with the engine development part, while the German taxpayer is mainly responsible for paying for the whole thing. The reverse is true for unmanned sensor carriers and main battle tanks. This was negotiated by Ursula von der Leyen, who at the time had her back to the wall due to a consultancy affair. Shortly after the FCAS contracts, she was appointed to Brussels by Emanuel Macron – EU candidate lists or not – and thus escaped the investigation and possible dismissal. Her successor Kramp-Karrenbauer is – officially – standing by this.

Readers and commentators of the “Warning Call” – and the guest article is just that – consider the sluggish German financial commitments to be the cause of an “expedient rumor”. It seems much more obvious to them that it has become increasingly clear to the French development partner over the past two or three years that armaments cooperation with this German nation is the very last thing they want to do to themselves. A highly complex weapon system, indeed an entire family of systems, and therefore inevitably immensely expensive, is something that not even an economically strong superpower like the USA can afford these days – unless it can spread the development costs over many units built. See the F-35, which even for a major customer like the USAF only “works” through additional successful exports of the finished weapons systems. In the case of “medium-sized dwarf states” such as Germany and France, even more would have to be produced and then sold worldwide. And that is completely out of the question if the nation of notorious imperial objections can put the brakes on everywhere. According to the view expressed several times below – and probably not unfounded – all these backgrounds surrounding the “incompatible genome of these politically conceived chimeras” are ultimately irrelevant. A foreseeable change of government in Germany in 2021 – coupled with the coronavirus-induced highest level of new debt in Berlin since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany – will exacerbate the situation anyway. If the Greens were to be involved after that, the project would probably be stopped anyway, as no long-term arms and defense policy perspectives could be expected from them. So the question remains as to whether what is obviously already foreseeable is now being strategically delayed long enough, or whether the politicians are simply squandering the 85 million euros each for a technology demonstrator by 2026 – the three air force chiefs have already formulated ten capability priorities in parallel – to feign action before the “real” billions are due. But when Germany, with an annual shortfall of more than 40 percent of its defence budget, fails to meet its NATO alliance obligations and the USA – rightly – criticizes Germany for this, the same German politicians across the colors defiantly call for “more European independence in military capabilities!” Nobody can take them seriously anymore, they say. The decisive factor for the FCAS and what is at stake behind it is therefore likely to be how long the French do this.