Micro and mini drones will play an important role on the battlefield of the future. At the moment, however, armed forces have few options to combat them effectively – the Austrian Armed Forces are relying on their ELDRO element.
Drones are like the little man’s air force. They are relatively cheap, commercially available to everyone and are true all-rounders in terms of their effectiveness: the micro and mini aircraft can bring down airplanes and paralyze the flight operations of entire airports. But they can also reconnoitre and fight troops, track convoys, drop explosives, endanger critical infrastructure or steer kamikaze-style directly into enemy positions. The problem with this is that their size and low altitude make the systems difficult for defenders to locate and therefore difficult or impossible to combat. In addition, they are easy for small rebel groups to acquire, require little expertise to deploy and make it possible to attack far beyond the actual area of effect.
As Frank Sauer, a lecturer at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, recently explained in an interview with NDR, armed forces are at risk of losing their air sovereignty in at least one area. In the Middle East, Islamic State fighters repeatedly succeed in carrying out air strikes with simple DIY store helicopters by throwing small grenades from the air at positions and vehicles. In Afghanistan, in the Syrian civil war, most recently in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and in many other conflict situations, drones are also changing the situation and creating new threat scenarios. Shiite Houthi rebels, for example, have used drones to attack airports, cities and even oil fields and oil processing plants in Saudi Arabia on several occasions, and even Western prisons, nuclear power plants and airports are not safe from the small aircraft. There have been repeated attempts to supply prison inmates with illegal devices or substances from the air using drones, and just before Christmas 2018, London Gatwick Airport was forced to shut down due to drone alerts and remained paralyzed for several days. Thousands of flights were canceled, hundreds of thousands of passengers were affected and the economic damage was estimated at more than 50 million euros.
But how can we combat a system that can be deployed unconventionally, is difficult to locate and yet can cause comparatively great damage? This is a good question, which is answered in different ways around the world, but usually not very satisfactorily, and which has also given rise to some bizarre ideas. Several years ago, for example, the authorities in several countries tested the use of birds of prey to combat drones. However, armed forces also have cannons with trapping nets in their inventories, research has long been conducted into high-energy laser defence systems and the US Department of Defense recently launched a pilot program with the Israeli drone developer XTEND to establish the Skylord defence system (Military News reported) within US special operations forces. This is a so-called C-UAS solution (note: Counter-Unmanned Aerial System), which is itself based on a drone system and brings down enemy objects by placing a net attached to its own drone over the aircraft to be fought. The German Bundeswehr, on the other hand, relies on its Mantis close-range protection system for drone defense, which is actually designed to fend off mortar attacks on military camps, but can also target the smallest helicopters with its rapid-fire cannon. However, the system is not mobile and is difficult to deploy due to its size, and the Bundeswehr only has two complete systems of this kind. https://militaeraktuell.at/us-militaer-setzt-israels-skylord-drohnensystem-ein/ The German Armed Forces take a different approach, using electromagnetic waves to disrupt micro and mini drones and force them to land if necessary. Against the backdrop of the Austrian EU Council Presidency, the C-EAT (Countering Emergency Air Threats) project was set up at the Command Support School in the second half of 2018 alongside the ELDRO drone detection and defense element (short for electronic warfare for drone defense), which is based at the Air Force and Air Defence School. Necessary preparatory work such as the evaluation of existing drone defense systems and the formation of a core element with KIOP/KPE soldiers was already carried out in 2017. Since the first half of 2018, the growth of the element has been accelerated and, following the necessary testing, training and education phase, provisional operational readiness has been achieved. The core of ELDRO is the Aartos DDS detection and defense system from the German measurement technology manufacturer Aaronia. While other jammers prevent a flying object from entering a no-fly zone by interrupting the radio link between the transmitter and receiver and thus paralyzing all radio traffic in the immediate vicinity, the Aartos DDS acts in a much more targeted manner, as ELDRO commander Lieutenant Stephan Kraschansky explains in an interview with Militär Aktuell. “The system uses its 3D antenna to monitor the entire radio spectrum in question within a radius of several kilometers. If we detect a suspicious signal, we can detect it using cross direction finding and thus not only find the location of the drone and follow it, but ideally also determine the location of the drone pilot.” However, this is much more complicated than it sounds, as Kraschansky explains that despite certain system automatisms and an underlying database with the signatures and patterns of known drone types, it primarily depends on the know-how and skills of the operators.
Depending on the type of drone, the armed forces have several options for defense: For example, some drones can be targeted and knocked out of the sky with jamming guns. The Aartos DDS can also electronically disrupt the radio link from the controller to the unmanned system, causing the pilot to lose control of his aircraft. Cheaper models then simply fall out of the sky, while more expensive models have a “home function” and return to the navigator. If the GPS signal is disrupted at the same time, the drone cannot navigate back and remains in the air until the battery is empty. It then initiates a safe landing. “If the threat scenario allows, we can also just observe the drone and direct emergency services directly to the drone pilot’s position in order to apprehend them,” says the ELDRO commander. “The decision on the specific measures to be taken depends on the situation and must be made on site.” There are several areas in which ELDRO can be deployed: The unit can be part of property protection and the security of a military facility, but deployments are also conceivable as part of an assistance service at the request of the authorities – for example to monitor a state visit or major events. This also includes the Armed Forces’ own events, such as the exhibition on National Day or Airpower, where the element was part of an interministerial tracking network led by the Armed Forces Command last year.
Every mission begins with reconnaissance, as Kraschansky explains. This involves recording and documenting any interference signals and obtaining as clear a picture as possible of the electromagnetic spectrum. “In an emergency, this phase can also be omitted and we are ready to defend ourselves immediately after setting up the system.” In an emergency, every second counts. “Even modern drones can only be controlled over distances of a few kilometers, and with flight speeds of up to 70 km/h, there is not much time left for detection and engagement. According to the officer, this is particularly difficult in urban areas, where thousands of signals make it difficult to find the specific control signal of a drone and buildings repeatedly create radio shadows that are difficult or impossible to “see”. “Basically, the ELDRO system only deals with the defense of individual drones. Under certain circumstances, however, it is also possible to defend against a ‘swarm of drones’ – namely when this is led by a so-called master drone. This master drone is responsible for the ‘backward connection’ to the pilot. However, it is precisely this connection that we are trying to disrupt, so that it is irrelevant whether another drone in the swarm suddenly becomes the master drone. We prevent the entire backward connection.” Naturally, the Austrian Armed Forces believe they are well positioned for the current threat situation with ELDRO. The element, whose equipment, procedures and techniques are still in an advanced testing stage and are constantly being improved, is also registered as potential camp protection for the current EU Battlegroup. “We are one of the few, if not the only military element in Europe that can implement effective electronic drone defense without relying on civilian players and has tested its procedures to such an extent that we are ready for deployment in the shortest possible time,” concludes Lieutenant Kraschansky.
