Open Skies: Difficult times for arms control

When the US and Russia quarrel, Europe loses The victim of America’s short-sighted decisions is once again Europe. The Europeans’ interest in the treaty is great, but their chances of convincing Russia to stay in the treaty are not so great. Above all, Germany, which usually mediates with Russia, has limited options at the moment. Since Navalny’s poisoning, German-Russian relations have reached a new low. Where Europe should nevertheless make an attempt to delay a Russian decision is the OSCE. Sweden will take over the chairmanship next year. Apart from the Open Skies Consultative Commission and the Forum for Security Cooperation, where issues relating to the Open Skies Treaty are discussed, Sweden could initiate a broader debate on confidence-building measures in relations between the West and Russia. As a non-member of NATO, Sweden is increasingly concerned about Russia’s ongoing arms build-up and should therefore be particularly interested in preserving the treaty. Moscow’s subjective interpretation of the treaty in its own favor cannot be denied. However, the USA’s withdrawal is not an adequate response to Moscow’s actions. Rather, a way should be found through compromise solutions to eliminate the points of contention. By withdrawing, the USA will not persuade Russia to respect the treaty. On the contrary, there is a risk that Russia will react in the opposite direction and the treaty will ultimately collapse. An end to the treaty would not only deal a further blow to the already strained relations between the West and Russia, but would also jeopardize a hard-won milestone in the European security architecture. The Open Skies Treaty remains one of the most important agreements on European security and stability and one of the last remaining instruments of arms control in the Euro-Atlantic area. Its benefits are obvious: the knowledge of mutual military activities and potentials gained from the control flights serves to assess the state of affairs at first hand and to ensure that the remaining contracting parties actually implement the arms control agreements. An adequate assessment of the situation in crisis situations helps to avoid miscalculations that could ultimately lead to a military conflict. The OH Treaty has proven to be an important crisis management instrument, particularly in recent years against the backdrop of increasing tensions surrounding Russia’s actions. For example, following the incident in the Kerch Strait in December 2018, representatives from the USA, Germany, Canada, Ukraine and other countries carried out flights to monitor the situation. https://militaeraktuell.at/die-expertenschmiede-des-bundesheeres/ However, the added value of the treaty does not only lie in the collection of military data. On the one hand, the joint observation flights create transparency and thus minimize the potential for escalation in relations between the West and Russia, which are already highly tense and characterized by mistrust. Secondly, they are one of the last remaining forms of direct cooperation between the two sides, as arms control experts from both the observing and the observed state take part in the flights. It seems illogical that cooperation mechanisms should be dismantled and multilateral treaties terminated at a time of increasing global threats and challenges. The withdrawal of the USA from the treaty is therefore a strategic mistake. Apart from the clear benefits of the treaty for European security and intergovernmental political and military relations, the US is sending the wrong signal by withdrawing and risks a domino effect for arms control as a whole. The New START Treaty, which reduces the nuclear arsenals of the USA and Russia to 800 delivery systems and 1,550 operational nuclear warheads each, expires in February 2021. If the USA demonstrates a disinterest in arms control, it is unlikely that the Russian side will be fully committed to extending New START. The withdrawal of the USA should be used as an opportunity for a broader debate on future security policy issues. Because even if the treaty is saved, many fundamental questions and differences regarding European security and relations between the West and Russia remain unresolved.

The crisis surrounding the contract is basically a sign of a much deeper problem; a symptom of a serious illness that affects the body almost unnoticed and often insidiously. At first, the symptoms are barely noticed by the sufferer or even consciously suppressed until they become so noticeable and distressing that it is almost impossible to ignore them. At this stage, it is also so advanced that it is not possible to do more than alleviate the symptoms. Preventive measures might have prevented the disease from breaking out in the first place. The situation is similar with arms control. Here too, prevention is better than cure. There must be ongoing talks between the contracting parties, contentious issues must be addressed and resolved, transparency and verification measures must be modernized and implemented. All of this creates trust and predictability. It is an irony of history that those who initiated the treaty are abandoning it today. In 1955, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s proposal for “mutual aerial observation” was met with hostility from Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, who suspected it was nothing more than an attempt at American espionage. In the end, Mikhail Gorbachev was persuaded of the advantages of such a project by George H.W. Bush, who revived the idea in 1989. If history repeats itself, there remains a glimmer of hope that even today the skeptics – this time the USA – will be convinced of the importance of the treaty.