The terrorist attack in Vienna’s city center, in which four people were killed, still raises numerous questions. Terrorism experts Nicolas Stockhammer and Peter Neumann attempt to answer some of them in a comprehensive analysis. Shortly after the terrorist attack, which took place in Vienna’s city center on November 2, 2020, Nicolas Stockhammer, a political scientist with a focus on security policy and an expert on terrorism, gave his initial assessment. Among other things, he stated at the time that the republication of the Muhammad cartoons in France had “gradually increased” the terrorist threat to the whole of Europe. Now the terrorism and politics expert, together with Peter R. Neumann, Professor of Security Studies at the War Studies Department of King’s College London, has presented a multi-page analysis of the attack, which, as the two authors emphasize, focuses on preliminary lessons. Based on the contextualization of the attack, the two experts develop their findings, which also contain suggestions for more efficient coordination and prevention. 
Local and international contextualization In the first section of their analysis, Stockhammer and Neumann explain that Vienna was classified as a secondary terrorist target for a long time. “Despite the increasing internationalization of terrorism, especially in the jihadist spectrum, the subjective threat perception of the Austrian population, but also to some extent of the security authorities, was rather optimistic,” the two experts write. At the same time, a less optimistic perception increasingly developed, which was related, among other things, to the advancing transnational networking of Islamist terror as well as the perception of Vienna as a comparatively “soft target” for terrorists. The two terrorism experts derive three key factors from these observations that have contributed to Vienna being increasingly targeted by IS terrorism: Firstly, since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, there has been increased propaganda activity by Islamist groups. As the two experts also note, there is a relatively strong Islamist scene in Austria, measured in terms of population, which has a transnational network. In addition, according to Stockhammer and Neumann, the fact that Vienna was the terrorist’s home base and that there was a wave of jihadist terror in Europe in the fall created an explosive combination. “Another factor was undoubtedly that with the victory over the supposed caliphate in Syria and Iraq in 2017/18, the topic of Islamic State (IS) had almost completely disappeared from the headlines – and thus from public consciousness,” the two authors say. However, this does not change the fact that Europe continues to play an important role for IS, which in turn is linked to the fact that “IS is trying to (at least partially) compensate for the loss of the caliphate through terrorist attacks in the West.” The tactic “In terms of the specific target, the current state of knowledge points to a deliberate selection of places of worship of other religious communities, which is also supported by the attempted entry of the attacker into the Ruprechtskirche”, can be read in the analysis. Based on the course of the crime, Stockhammer and Neumann conclude that the assassin had technical deficits, which mainly concerned the handling of the long gun. The two experts therefore classify the assassin as an opportunist, copycat or free rider. Nevertheless, it is likely that he was in direct contact with relevant jihadist groups and like-minded people at home and abroad without explicitly being part of a manifest terrorist network. 
Deficits and need for reform “The investigations following the terrorist attack on November 2 have revealed numerous inconsistencies and indications of possible systemic deficits in the authorities’ failed prevention efforts,” Neumann and Stockhammer continue. Public criticism initially focused on the deradicalization programmes in prisons. The two terrorism experts therefore suggest “realistically assessing this instrument and ensuring that it is used in a targeted and purposeful manner”. According to Stockhammer and Neumann, the programs are neither useless nor a “panacea”. However, there is currently a much more intensive discussion about what could have led to the fact that “the internal, inter-agency transfer (state constitution protection to federal constitution protection or public prosecutor’s office) of highly relevant information from foreign partner services did not function properly and why the large amount of evidence did not automatically lead to proceedings. “Above all in the area of communication and coordination between the authorities, there may have been considerable mistakes or omissions, as far as is known so far.” The available evidence leads to the conclusion that there must have been a gradual system failure on the part of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. “Above all, the area of ‘surveillance of dangerous individuals’ following detention must function better,” the authors clearly state. https://militaeraktuell.at/der-kreativitaet-der-terrorplaner-sind-fast-keine-grenzen-gesetzt/ “Against this background, the Austrian federal government has proposed a comprehensive anti-terror law package. One of the main measures it provides for is the so-called ‘preventive detention in the execution of measures’, also known as ‘preventive detention’, according to which dangerous persons may also be ‘detained’ for a longer period of time in legal analogy to mentally abnormal criminals. Whether this proves to be compatible with fundamental rights and can become law nevertheless appears questionable.” Coordination and cooperation The terrorist attack has shown that the coordination between the individual authorities has been inadequate. The simplest solution to improve this would be the “Fusion Center” model, as introduced by almost all Western countries over the past two decades. These are forums in which representatives of all relevant authorities and services meet weekly, network, exchange information, discuss cases and systematically coordinate their actions. A second possibility is the creation of a quasi-authority, such as the Dutch “Anti-Terrorism Coordinator” or the “National Counterterrorism Center” (NCTC) in the United States, which also serve to coordinate and exchange information. “The difference (to the ‘Fusion Centers’) is that representatives of these authorities are seconded to these structures for longer periods of time and that the decisions made there are binding for all participants.” Stockhammer and Neumann conclude that there is a need for improvement not only within Austria, but also at European level. According to the experts, this also includes a more focused EU anti-terrorism strategy.
