It is absolutely understandable that politics, business and society are fully focused on coping with the second Covid wave and the still incalculable further consequences of the virus. However, the world has continued to turn in this ominous year 2020 and some trends can be identified before the turn of the year.
From a European perspective, five findings are of particular importance and will continue to have an impact well into the coming year:
- China took off its mask and insisted on world leadership
- President Trump alienated partners and isolated the USA
- Russia consolidated its foreign positions and President Putin appeared stronger
- Turkey tried to become a regional power at all costs
- Cohesion in the EU increased (also) as a result of the fight against coronavirus
On China: Beijing’s success in its rigorous fight against the deadly Covid virus has probably led it to completely abandon its foreign policy restraint and go on the offensive. For head of state Xi Jinping, the questionable role played by Beijing in the outbreak and spread of Covid-19 is irrelevant.
As a result of the ongoing conflict with the US, China’s leadership has shifted its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia. The latest coup came at the end of November with the announcement of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade agreement. 15 countries – from Japan, South Korea and Vietnam to Australia and New Zealand – want to reduce tariffs, and in ten years they could jointly account for around 50 percent of global trade. However, some partners in other regions are now warning of Beijing’s harsh and demanding approach. Czech politicians, for example, were openly threatened with “consequences” because they made a trip to Taiwan. Beijing is also making blunt demands of the Australian government – indirectly via local media. An embassy official announced that China was furious and listed 14 points that particularly bothered Beijing. China could also be turned into an enemy. Even in the EU, people believe less and less in “change through trade” and see themselves in a systemic rivalry with China. In addition, many at the UN headquarters in Geneva are uneasy about China’s growing influence, where Beijing is increasingly succeeding in occupying important leadership positions. The so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy”, in which official Chinese representatives are particularly brash and demanding in expressing China’s superiority and claim to leadership, should also be mentioned in this context. This also includes the repressive approach in Hong Kong, where the slogan “one country, two systems” is increasingly becoming a hollow phrase. There is a consensus across all wings of the unified party CCP that China is entitled to a leading role in world affairs. For many, the time now seems ripe to help this claim achieve a breakthrough. After all, the Chinese system has proven to be superior, especially during the pandemic, and Beijing is also claiming moral leadership.
“As a result of the ongoing conflict with the US, China’s leadership shifted its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific and the Eurasian region.”
On the USA: The USA, which was hit particularly hard by Covid-19, was increasingly preoccupied with itself. The trade war with China, the presidential election campaign and the fight against the pandemic left little room and attention for foreign policy projects. It was still enough for a disruptive fire towards Germany, with the commissioning of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline being prevented for the time being and confidence being put to the test once again by the surprising withdrawal of a large contingent of US soldiers. On the other hand, an initiative in the Middle East was more successful, bringing about a rapprochement between Israel and the UAE and Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, this could ease tensions between the historical adversaries and, on the other, enable the formation of a strong front against the common enemy Iran. However, the effectiveness and durability of this rapprochement remain to be seen.
In the Indo-Pacific region, Washington is endeavouring to counter China’s growing influence by revitalizing old alliances and forming new formats. In a “quatrilateral security dialog” (Quad for short) with Japan, India and Australia, the goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order is being jointly pursued. However, the US partners are clearly trying to avoid putting up an open front against China. It is therefore also emphasized that this is by no means a military alliance. In general, however, it should be noted that US President Donald Trump has succeeded in shaking up many countries, especially in Europe, with regard to China’s power-political ambitions. There has been no substantial improvement in transatlantic relations, and the uncertainty within NATO over the US President’s erratic approach remains. This also includes Trump’s announcement after the elections that he would significantly reduce troops in Afghanistan and Iraq – without consulting his partners, who are heavily dependent on the US protective umbrella. Relations with Russia have remained close to freezing point, presumably with a conscious decision to keep their distance in view of the fierce accusations of interference against Moscow during the last presidential elections in 2016.
“There has been no substantial improvement in the transatlantic relationship; the uncertainty within NATO over the erratic actions of the US president has remained.”
On Russia: Despite the pandemic and economic weakness, 2020 has played into the hands of President Vladimir Putin. The developments in Belarus, where his power politics games drove long-term President Alexander Lukashenko into Moscow’s arms, deserve special mention. It is probably only a matter of time before he becomes unacceptable. By then, the Kremlin will certainly have done everything it can to secure its influence in its strategic brother country. This will guarantee access to Kaliningrad and the buffer towards NATO states. The surprising restraint shown for the time being in the resumed war over Nagorno-Karabakh is also likely to lead to Armenia orienting itself more towards Moscow than Europe in the future. The deployment of Russian “peacekeepers” offers the opportunity to control developments on the ground and to increase its military presence almost at will.
In Donbass in eastern Ukraine, the conflict is increasingly freezing, while covert support for the separatists guarantees the Kremlin leadership that it can turn the escalation screw at any time. The annexation of Crimea has disappeared from public perception and the associated sanctions imposed by Western states are manageable, as suitable alternatives have now been found for many economic sectors.
“In Donbass in eastern Ukraine, the conflict is increasingly freezing, and the covert support for the separatists guarantees the Kremlin leadership that it can turn the escalation screw at any time.
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Russia’s intensified relations with China since 2014 (annexation of Crimea) continue to bear fruit, although Moscow is well aware of its role and dangers as a “junior partner”. With the development of the Arctic, including shipping routes, Russia believes it is in a strong position vis-à-vis China, as it has additional raw materials and infrastructure along the Arctic routes. Economic and scientific cooperation and Chinese investment have therefore increased significantly. Russia also continued to be the central external player in Syria, ensuring that it remained in the country in the long term. It was undoubtedly also a foreign policy coup to sell Turkey the S-400 air defense system, which was already being tested at the end of 2020. In Libya, on the other hand, Moscow seems to have backed the wrong horse with General Khalifa Haftar. However, Moscow will continue to be able to exert influence, primarily due to its forward-looking energy policy commitment. The fact that there are sometimes fierce controversies with Turkey in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh has so far been accepted due to an overriding geostrategic interest. https://militaeraktuell.at/die-arktis-eine-neue-geopolitische-arena/
Turkey: Turkey has undergone a particular development under President Reccep Tayip Erdogan, and its aspirations to become a regional power are unmistakable. Since the military intervention in northern Syria, an increasing militarization of Turkish foreign policy can be observed. For example, Turkish drones and mercenaries turned the tide in the Libyan civil war in favour of the internationally recognized government of Al-Sarraj. This “success model” also came to fruition in Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of 2020. After all, support for the Azerbaijani offensive was a decisive factor in the defeat of the Armenian side. In the fall of 2019, Ankara publicly declared its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the eastern Mediterranean in cooperation with Libya – contrary to international practice and in contradiction to applicable law. The Turkish president is questioning the current maritime border with Greece and is insisting on a new regulation – presumably primarily because of the gas reserves in this area. Turkey is also not afraid to have its exploration ships escorted by the navy in order to demonstrate its determination. The conflict also has a regional and institutional dimension, as Greece and Turkey are NATO partners and Cyprus and Greece are insisting on EU support. Both sides are holding military maneuvers with the potential for an unintended escalation. The “successful” drone missions in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh also show that the ambitious development of a Turkish arms industry is increasingly bearing fruit. Arms production is intended to generate foreign currency and help increase the country’s strategic autonomy.
“Since the military intervention in northern Syria, an increasing militarization of Turkish foreign policy can be observed.”
On the EU: Although the EU faced additional challenges due to its heterogeneous composition and national approaches to Covid-19, it is likely to gain cohesion as a result of Brexit and the fight against the pandemic. For example, there are increasing attempts to counter the multiple supply dependencies with focused strategies in the medical and energy sectors. This ranges from joint purchasing, for example for vaccines (“European market power”), to diversifying suppliers and strengthening Europe as a production location. The Brexit negotiations are also proceeding calmly and in an orderly fashion, without any significant disruption from individual EU states. Even China had to take note of the EU’s new unity and determination at this year’s summit and in the negotiations on an investment agreement. A differentiated view of China (“partner and system rival”) now forms the basis for further activities, which should be supported by fair competition and reciprocity. Relations with Moscow remain frosty and marked by suspicion, as evidenced by the extension of sanctions.
A strong sign of cohesion was the agreement on a substantial recovery fund of 750 billion euros, which means that funds can be raised and distributed by the EU. This extraordinary measure undoubtedly represents a significant step towards deepening the Union. Further progress was even made in the area of security and defense policy. For example, the establishment of a “strategic compass” is intended to achieve greater capacity for action and coordination in the military sector. Rising defense budgets in many EU countries could also indicate that Europe is increasingly willing to take on more responsibility for its own security. Although the final decision has yet to be made, anchoring the commitment of all EU member states to the rule of law (actually a matter of course!) could also mean a substantial step towards rapid decision-making and increased EU capacity to act.
“Europe would do well to finally adapt to the changed geopolitical conditions and become aware of the necessities, its strengths and opportunities.”
What does all this mean?
While the main global focus in 2020 was on fighting the pandemic, the geopolitical parameters have crystallized more strongly. It is becoming increasingly clear that there is already a bipolarity between China and the US, but this leaves plenty of room for the power ambitions of regional players. In recent years, the USA has significantly lost influence or deliberately withdrawn, which China, Russia and Turkey have been able to exploit. Many European capitals therefore seem to be coming to the realization that Europe – especially in the form of the EU – must take on more responsibility if it does not want to become the playing field of other powers. Although the change of power in the USA is raising hopes of a comeback to the “good old days” and an improvement in transatlantic relations, the experience of fighting the pandemic has clearly shown that politics, especially in times of crisis, is driven exclusively by interests and not by sympathy. Europe would therefore do well to finally adapt to the changed geopolitical circumstances and become aware of the necessities, its strengths and opportunities.
