Marc Rivière knows both sides: He served for over two decades as an officer in the French Air Forceand was later responsible for the digital strategy of international aerospace projects. Today, as Global Advisor Aerospace & Defense at the software and technology company PTC, he advises governments, OEMs and suppliers worldwide.
In an interview with Militär Aktuell, Rivière explains why Europe’s biggest bottleneck in armaments capability is not material, but digital interoperability – and what a common digital foundation would have to look like in order to secure technological sovereignty in the long term.
Mr. Rivière, your professional career combines military practice and digital strategy consulting. What was the first moment that made you realize that the real bottleneck in European armaments capability is not material, but digital interoperability?
The defining moment came during my time on the A400M program when I saw how much operational success depended on the ability to use data consistently across system boundaries. It was not so much the physical platforms that limited us, but the lack of digital interoperability. Systems from different nations were unable to exchange information, maintenance data could not be synchronized and a common situational picture often remained wishful thinking. National silos still dominate in Europe today. Since then, it has been clear to me that the bottleneck is not in the material, but in the lack of a digital foundation. If you want to implement modern, networked deployment concepts, you have to think about interoperability right from the start in engineering – with shared data models, consistent configurations and secure interfaces across the entire life cycle.
What do you mean by “digital connectivity” – and why is it now a key strategic success factor in safety-critical industries such as defense?
Digital connectivity means that military systems are not only technically compatible, but also capable of exchanging operational data, software statuses and commands securely, in real time and across system boundaries. In practice, this means that a sensor on a drone must be able to transmit data to a manned aircraft and simultaneously to a combat command center without media disruptions, time delays or room for interpretation. This is precisely where the strategic difference between a capable system and a pure platform network lies today. If, for example, a partner country rolls out a software update or a new threat scenario is identified, the connected systems must be able to respond without months passing or manual adjustments having to be made. In defense, connectivity is therefore not just an efficiency factor, but the key to the ability to be jointly operational. Anyone who does not master this digital feedback channel will not only lose time in an emergency, but also sovereignty.
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In which specific areas do you currently see the biggest systemic fractures in Europe’s defense industry – and how can these be bridged?
A central systemic break lies in the lack of consistency between national development and procurement processes. Each country optimizes for itself, for example in terms of data models, standards and certifications, making joint system capability more difficult. This is particularly critical in the area of software: different development environments, security requirements and update cycles prevent systems from being truly interoperable. A common digital foundation is also often lacking in simulation and training. We talk a lot about cooperation in Europe, but the technical architecture behind it is rarely designed together.
How can this be better organized and optimized in the future?
This gap can only be bridged with clearly defined, binding reference architectures that are already applied in the concept phase. A kind of “digital backbone” is needed that overcomes system boundaries, similar to the digital thread in the civilian industry. In order to strengthen defense capabilities in Europe, technological sovereignty must run together – not in parallel.
“To strengthen defense capabilities in Europe, technological sovereignty must run together – not in parallel.”
But there are political and industrial efforts to establish common digital standards – for example within the framework of FCAS(-> Dassault & Airbus: Has the FCAS project failed?), NGWS or NATO-STANAG. How do you rate these efforts?
Although the initiatives mentioned show a political will for standardization, key weaknesses remain in their practical implementation. One concrete example is the lack of a common data model in FCAS. France, Germany and Spain work with different MBSE tools that are not compatible. This means that even in the design phase, simple system components such as sensor or communication modules cannot be consistently coordinated. The software also lacks a common architecture for modular updates or standardized certification processes. In the Combat Cloud, it is still unclear how data sovereignty, access control and encryption are to be regulated across countries.
And NATO STANAGs?
Although they provide a common language, they often do not provide a technical basis that is ready for implementation, for example for AI-supported systems or real-time data processing. What Europe needs now is an operational body that not only formulates technical standards, but also applies them in a binding manner in the development process – with access to real architectures and systems, not just documentation.
You mentioned model-based systems engineering (MBSE) earlier. This is seen as a forward-looking approach for integrating complex platforms. In your opinion, what role does it play for interoperability across OEM and national borders?
MBSE is the key to not only enforcing interoperability during integration, but to systematically anchoring it as early as the system design stage. In traditional development processes, requirements, functions and interfaces are often maintained in text documents, which quickly leads to inconsistencies in multinational programs. MBSE, on the other hand, enables a consistent, digital representation of the entire system, with clearly defined interfaces, parameters and behavioral models that can be coordinated between OEMs, suppliers and countries from the outset. This is particularly crucial in projects such as FCAS.
“What Europe needs now is an operational body that not only formulates technical standards, but also applies them in a binding manner during the development process.”
In what way?
If, for example, a German sensor is to interact with a French carrier system and a Spanish communication component, it is not enough to harmonize data formats at the end. A common system model is needed that logically describes all subsystems, including states, data types, timing and safety requirements. This is the only way to automate tests, validate software functions on a modular basis and reliably track upgrades. MBSE also makes it possible to develop national sub-projects in parallel and still integrate them into a coherent, higher-level architecture model. This creates the prerequisite for genuine multi-OEM capability. In practice, however, this requires coordinated metamodels – based on SysML, for example – a common modeling standard and tools that are semantically interchangeable, not just syntactically. As long as every country and every OEM maintains its own system model, interoperability remains piecemeal. With MBSE, this can be broken up, provided it is consistently coordinated.
Small and medium-sized suppliers in particular are systemically relevant – and yet often digitally disconnected. What does it take to ensure that these players do not fail due to established standards or IT complexity?
Small and medium-sized suppliers need one thing above all: low-threshold access to clearly defined, practical standards, not hundreds of pages of specifications, but ready-to-use reference models, sample artifacts and certified toolchains. The major OEMs must make interoperable interfaces mandatory and create digital ecosystems in which SMEs do not have to build expensive special solutions in order to participate. It is also crucial that standardization comes with training and support, otherwise it will remain on paper. Only those who actively reduce complexity will create real supply chain capability in the digital space.
In the defense industry, every decision counts – not only economically, but also in terms of security policy. How can digital transformation be designed in such a way that it is comprehensible and sustainable in the long term?
For digital transformation to be sustainable in defense, it must be structured and technically comprehensible. This is exactly what the digital thread does: it links technical decisions, configuration statuses and operational data across the entire life cycle. For example, it is possible to document which software version was used in which system, under which conditions it was released and which changes were made and when. This is not only relevant for certification and maintenance, but above all for mission-critical decisions that require technical clarity – even years later.
“As long as every country and every OEM maintains its own system model, interoperability will remain piecemeal.”
At the moment, we have a patchwork of digital systems in many cases. In your opinion, what would a functioning, interoperable target image for Europe look like in ten years’ time?
The current situation shows that as long as each country sticks to its own tools, data formats and integration logic, interoperability will remain a laborious compromise – both technically and politically. In too many programs, I have seen how much energy flows into interface management and translation work instead of actual capability development. If Europe wants to be technologically sovereign in ten years’ time, it doesn’t need yet another system, but a common digital foundation. A target image in which architectures are open, interfaces are standardized and data spaces can be used securely but in a federated manner. This requires trust, yes. But it also requires a willingness to no longer fragment digital responsibility at a national level, but to organize it at a European level.
Do you see the will for this?
In any case, we have the know-how and the industry for it. What is missing is clarity in technical management. If we don’t take this step now, others will decide on our connectivity in the future.
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In conclusion, what three specific measures need to be taken today to ensure that Europe catches up in terms of its digital armaments capability?
Firstly, Europe needs binding reference architectures that contain clear technical specifications for interfaces, data models and certifications from the outset and are jointly supported by industry and states. Secondly, digital sovereignty must be implemented operationally, for example by establishing a European body with genuine technical steering authority that not only formulates standards but also enforces them in specific programs.
And thirdly …
… it is important to systematically integrate medium-sized suppliers into the digital defence architecture by means of practical toolchains, standardized interfaces and targeted qualification offers so that they can participate in complex platform projects without high hurdles.
