The controversial topic of Sky Shield is bringing missile and air defense in Austria into the public eye. Militär Aktuell sheds light on why the Armed Forces never had such a system – and why it is now urgently needed. An analysis in ten points.
Point 1: The INF Treaty
When US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in Washington on December 8, 1987, this remained more of a side note for Austria. Although the ban on ground-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers improved the international security situation – and thus also that of Austria – politically and technically, events were far beyond the reach of the Alpine republic. Austria does not possess any medium-range missiles with corresponding ranges, let alone nuclear ones. But the Austrian Armed Forces are also completely unequipped to defend against such weapons systems.
Point 2: Special weapons ban for Austria
Article 13 of the State Treaty for the Restoration of an Independent and Democratic Austria is partly responsible for the ban on special weapons. This prohibits the country from possessing “special weapons” – including not only nuclear weapons, torpedoes and even submarines (!), but also “self-propelled or guided projectiles”.
The result: for decades, Austria’s air defense has relied exclusively on tube weapons, not missiles. Although these can be used to combat fighter bombers and helicopters, the system remains largely ineffective against modern threats.
This only changed after the 1991 war in Slovenia, when the Austrian government declared in the Wiener Zeitung on November 8, 1990 that the ban on special weapons was obsolete.
In June and July 1991, it becomes clear that the deterrent effect of Austrian air defense is insufficient: Yugoslavian military aircraft cross Austrian airspace unhindered. This marks the starting signal for the first procurement of air defense missiles.
In 1995, the Austrian air defense regiments received 72 launchers for Mistral short-range missiles, while the Draken fighter planes were retrofitted with Sidewinder missiles. But that is essentially how it remains today. In view of the end of the Cold War, the further expansion of air defense was neglected. Today’s Iris-T missiles of the Eurofighter are also only short-range air-to-air missiles – there has been no real further development of air defense.
Point 3: The end of the INF Treaty
What does not stand still is political and technical development.
In 2013/14, the USA and Russia accuse each other of INF treaty violations. The USA catches Russia testing systems in the banned range category. The designation “9M729” ends up on the negotiating table as evidence.
Russia sees the US attack drones as systems whose performance is “100 percent equivalent to ground-based cruise missiles”. Russia is also stationing 9K720 Iskander-M missiles in Kaliningrad. The USA is deploying the Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Romania and Poland.
On February 2, 2019, the first Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the INF Treaty with six months’ notice.
Point 4: More and more rockets
Ultimately, all of these are merely symptoms of technological progress that cannot be halted, neither in the countries bound by the INF Treaty nor in those that are not.
While NATO and the Warsaw Pact are bound by the INF Treaty, Israel initially develops the Jericho 2 together with Persia, and later with South Africa – a medium-range missile that is ready for use at the end of the 1980s. In 1993, North Korea launches the Hwasong-7, the first missile to fall into the INF category. Iran followed in 1998 with the Shahab-3, Pakistan achieved this range from 2003 with the Shaheen-I, and India followed suit in 2010 with the Agni-I.
However, not only ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles and drones increasingly dominate the INF range category. In the 1990s, Israel developed a new generation of weapons with the IAI Harpy loitering ammunition. In 2010, Iran presents the Karrar cruise missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers and a payload of 230 kilograms.
They are the forerunners of a development that now accounts for the majority of distance guidance weapons: almost anyone can develop them. Everyone can afford them. More and more countries have them in their arsenal.
Point 5: More and more drones
Since the mid-1990s, highly efficient piston engines – originally developed for small and ultralight aircraft – have become increasingly important for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Engines from the Austrian manufacturer Rotax power MALE UAVs such as the RQ-1 Predator. These initially unarmed reconnaissance drones (-> To the current military drone focus topic) are later equipped with weapons and can remain in the air for up to 24 hours as unmanned motor gliders, covering hundreds of kilometers and operating partly via satellite control.
The latest evolutionary stage are flying unmanned bombs such as the Shahed-136. Powered by an unlicensed copy of a Limbach piston engine, they carry warheads weighing 30 to 50 kilograms over distances of well over 1,000 kilometers. They are controlled via civilian satellite navigation networks, WLAN or mobile communications in the target area.
Compared to cruise missiles, which cost around ten million euros each, these UAVs are extremely inexpensive at around 50,000 euros. This technology is no longer just reserved for states and the military – rebel and terrorist groups now also have such systems, which is why the number of countries and groups that have these weapons systems or produce them themselves is constantly growing. Austria is now within reach of over a dozen non-European countries that have procured such armed UAVs.
Point 6: The structural change in air warfare
While the air wars of Operation Desert Storm (Iraq 1990) and Operation Allied Force (Yugoslavia 1999) were still characterized by fighter planes flying over their targets and dropping unguided and guided bombs, the development of weapons technologies has fundamentally changed the way targets are attacked from the air.
More powerful ground-based air defense systems are forcing manned and expensive fighter aircraft to operate at greater distances. At the same time, ever smaller and more efficient guidance systems enable precise hits at very long distances. This is leading to more intensive use of so-called “stand-off weapons”, which can be launched from the ground, from fighter aircraft and from ships and submarines. Flight speeds range from around 200 km/h to the hypersonic range (Mach 6+), while flight altitudes vary from near the ground to high ballistic curves outside the atmosphere.
The aim of the attacker is to oversaturate the defender’s defensive capacities both spatially and temporally, so that a usually small proportion of the weapons launched reach the target in the end. This results in “attack waves” aimed at exhausting the opponent’s defensive resources.
Point 7: War in Ukraine
The Russian attack on Ukraine is causing a shock among Europe’s political and military leadership. The ongoing, untargeted bombing of civilian targets and the awareness of the poor state of ground-based air defense make it clear that there is an urgent need for action.
After the end of the Cold War, mobile weapon systems such as the Gepard anti-aircraft gun tank and the Roland anti-aircraft missile system were decommissioned in the German army air defense force. Entire regiments and battalions with hundreds of anti-aircraft systems were disbanded. Other countries are also facing similar problems. The need for retrofitting is therefore great everywhere.
In his speech at Charles University in Prague on August 29, 2022, Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz leads the way. He calls for better cooperation between defense efforts in Europe. The large number of different weapon systems in the EU is inefficient, according to Scholz. Training, maintenance and repair are more expensive and more complex than in the USA. “The uncoordinated shrinking of European armies and defense budgets in the past should now be followed by a coordinated increase in European capabilities.”
Point 8: European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)
Germany then initiates the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI). This defense industry initiative initially focuses on German systems and their requirements. Specifically, Germany is promoting the Iris-T system from Diehl Defense and the Skyranger system from Rheinmetall (-> The German Armed Forces become the first Skyranger customer). As Germany also has US Patriot systems, the joint purchase of these missiles is also being promoted. This leads to criticism from Paris, as the Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG system is not included in this framework.
The ESSI focuses on joint procurement, training and logistical coordination in the field of ground-based air defense. Within the ESSI framework, participating states can conclude separate program agreements for projects such as coordinated procurement, training and exercises as part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) without having to approach industry individually.
The members of the ESSI are predominantly NATO countries that will contribute the newly created capabilities to NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (NATO IAMD) in order to strengthen Alliance defence.
Point 9: Austria’s air and missile defense
As a neutral country, Austria cannot participate in the NATO IAMD. The National Defense Report therefore explicitly does not (!) mention the joint use of anti-aircraft missile systems as part of the European Sky Shield Initiative or the NATO IAMD.
The underlying defense strategy pursued by the Austrian Armed Forces is based on a system of “interception layers”, as is customary internationally. These layers are realized by various ground-based weapon systems and their sensors as well as by aircraft with their weapons and sensors.
The following are already being implemented modernization of the 35-millimetre anti-aircraft guns and the and Mistral short-range missiles as well as the procurement of Skyranger 30 anti-aircraft gun tanks. These systems form the innermost layer for the protection of objects and are referred to as V-SHORAD (Very Short Range Air Defense).
According to the national defense report, Austria is also initially planning to deploy two of its own anti-aircraft batteries with a medium-range anti-aircraft guided missile system. As also mentioned in the report, the focus here is on the Iris-T system. The missile has already been introduced on the Eurofighter and is available in a ground-based version as both a short-range and medium-range variant. This means that the SHORAD (Short Range Air Defense) and MRAD (Medium Range Air Defense) interception layers can be covered by a single system. This approach is already set out in the “2032+ build-up plan” (-> Lieutenant General Bruno Hofbauer in an interview with Militär Aktuell on the progress made with the “2032+ Reconstruction Plan”).
The issue of long-range air defense (LRAD) has not yet been decided. These systems would then also have limited ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. Since November 15, 2023, there has been a unanimous decision by the Council of Ministers to establish a Long Range Air Defense.
The flying forces used to defend against airborne threats are staggered according to speed and altitude.
Low and slow targets can be intercepted and engaged with the Black Hawk and AW169 helicopters and the Pilatus PC-7. For targets at medium altitudes and at high subsonic speeds, the Advanced Jet Trainer the Advanced Jet Trainer M-346FA to be procured.
The supersonic Eurofighter combat aircraft are ideal for high altitudes and fast reactions. The radar and infrared sensors of the M-346FA and Eurofighter jets are also of great importance, as they make it possible to illuminate the space behind hills and mountains, which forms a “radar shadow” for ground-based sensors.
The aim of this multi-layered “onion” is to detect all potential targets as early as possible and intercept them cost-effectively. If all upstream layers are nevertheless breached, the air target is to be eliminated by close-in defense on the final approach to a protected object. The persistence of such a mission is achieved when the most expensive and powerful means of defense are only used when the time and space available no longer permit more cost-effective means.
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Point 10: Neutrality and the limits of what is possible
It is in the nature of air and missile defense that you often have to deal with high and very high speeds, which requires short and sometimes extremely short reaction times.
A cruise missile with jet propulsion would cross the Austrian central area in 25 to a maximum of 30 minutes. A Shahed drone with a piston engine/propeller drive would take around two hours. The warning times are short. At best, the Gold Hood radar systems can detect low-flying aircraft within a radius of around 200 kilometers beyond the country’s borders. From this point onwards, the curvature of the earth becomes relevant, and in many cases the “radar shadows” appear much earlier behind hills and mountains.
Individual cases of drones and cruise missiles that crossed NATO airspace without being shot down show just how far NATO has reached its limits. Several Russian missile overflights and impacts were reported in Poland, Romania and the neutral Republic of Moldova. The most dramatic case to date was an apparently defective Ukrainian attack drone that flew at an altitude of around 1,000 meters over Romania and Hungary as far as Croatia and crashed in a park in Zagreb. All of this happened under the watchful eye of the Austrian Goldhaube radar system. This makes it clear that Austria cannot and must not simply rely on NATO in an emergency.
The probability that Austrian airspace will be affected, either intentionally or unintentionally, at least by flights of such weapons is increasing simply due to the ever-increasing spread and use of these long-range systems.
Last year, Walter Obwexer, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Innsbruck, explained what is still possible and what is no longer possible at a Sky Shield information event in Parliament. He made it clear that the authority to shoot down flying objects in Austrian airspace must in any case remain with Austria. However, cooperation in procurement and maintenance, as is already practiced in some cases with the aircraft of the Austrian Armed Forces, would be possible.
The exchange of air and space situation data with neighboring countries is only possible in times of peace. Austria has already concluded an international treaty on “Cross-border Airspace Surveillance” with Switzerland and an air security agreement on cooperation against non-military threats with Germany. In a declared war, however, the principle of non-alignment and equal treatment of the warring parties applies. An exchange of data with only one party to the conflict would contradict the principle of perpetual neutrality.
Neutrality is a self-imposed restriction here, which is also a de facto cost driver. Because, as the war in Ukraine shows, advance warning is crucial for the defense against such threats. Ukraine has the possibility, or receives information, about when Russian bombers take off from their operational bases to fly into areas from which they fire their stand-off weapons. The time window in which the missiles enter the airspace can then be calculated very precisely. This ability to gather information autonomously is associated with high costs.
However, it is also clear that the armed neutrality of the Republic of Austria entails the obligation to safeguard and defend the military use and “inviolability” of Austrian territory – including airspace – “with all available means”. This is why air and missile defense is becoming increasingly important.
The most important points in a nutshell:
- Until November 1990, Austria was subject to the “special weapons ban”, which also prohibited anti-aircraft missiles, among other things.
- The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War. Instead of rearmament with missiles, which the armed forces were not allowed to have until 1990, there was disarmament under the title “peace dividend” – throughout Europe, including in terms of air defense capabilities.
- While the INF Treaty banned ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers for NATO and Warsaw Pact states from 1987, various other countries developed weapons in these range categories.
- The INF Treaty between NATO and Russia, which had been in place since 1987, ended in August 2019.
- More and more weapons with very long ranges are being used in air warfare.
- Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of a turning point. In a speech at Charles University in Prague on August 29, 2022, he spoke of a “coordinated growth of European capabilities” after the “past uncoordinated shrinking of European armies”.
- The Austrian Armed Forces are redesigning their air and missile defense.
- Neutrality does not protect, but obliges.
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