The “European integration” of the Western Balkans is far from complete. However, regional conflict issues persist and pose a security risk. In addition, authoritarian tendencies are intensifying and geopolitical lines of conflict are also emerging in the Western Balkans. An analysis by IFK expert Predrag Jureković.
More than 25 years after the end of the so-called Yugoslav wars of disintegration, the question arises as to what extent the central peace policy goals of the EU and the USA have been implemented on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The sobering answer is that the glass has remained half full at best, or at least half empty. Only Slovenia and Croatia – now EU and NATO-full members – have so far managed to free themselves from the main burden of the Yugoslav conflict legacy. All the other successor states of Yugoslavia, which together with Albania are now grouped together by the EU under the regional designation “Western Balkans” (WB), still seem to be prisoners of this legacy in one way or another. However, they are not solely responsible for this.
The main objectives of Western support measures for the region have officially included and continue to include the settlement of open conflict issues, the strengthening of regional cooperation and cooperative security, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law as well as the integration of the WB states into the European Union and, if desired, into NATO.
The accession of Albania (in 2009), North Macedonia (2020) and Montenegro (2017) to NATO has reduced the risk of violent conflicts and generally strengthened regional security. On the other hand, the continued necessary presence of the international peacekeeping missions EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (current contingent size around 1,600 soldiers) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR, currently around 4,300 soldiers) in Kosovo shows that risks to regional security nevertheless remain. This is due to the renewed strengthening of nationalist policies among some of the ruling WB politicians, who are also relying on nepotism, corruption and undemocratic measures, thus preventing constructive conflict resolution.
This political pattern explains, at least in part, the persistently separatist policy of the current rulers in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state of Republika Srpska. But it also explains the “dead end” into which the fundamentally sensible EU plan for the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina from 2023 has already fallen during the first attempts at implementation. Its implementation would result in the de facto recognition of Kosovo as a state by Serbia, while at the same time increasing local self-government for the Kosovo Serbs. However, neither Belgrade nor Pristina are currently prepared to take these steps. Instead of a political breakthrough mediated by the EU and the US, relations between Kosovo and Serbia are still characterized by mistrust and security-related incidents.
The main victims of this situation are the Kosovo Serbs. They are increasingly caught between the political fronts of Belgrade and Pristina and are confronted with a rigid “integration policy” by the Kosovo government, particularly in the north of Kosovo, where they form the majority of the population. The latter is the consequence of a Serbian terrorist attack on Kosovar police officers that took place in northern Kosovo in September 2023. The members of the paramilitary group responsible for the attack, some of whom escaped to Serbia, are living on the territory of the EU accession candidate without being prosecuted.
Constructive conflict resolution on the WB is made more difficult by the geopolitical disputes that have characterized the international situation at least since the beginning of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine (-> current news from the Ukraine war). Although all WB states are officially pursuing EU accession as a strategic goal, Russia and China in particular have succeeded in building up a close-knit network of political allies in this part of south-eastern Europe. Serbia, which is not prepared to go along with the EU sanctions against Russia, plays a key role in this. Its foreign policy seesawing between East and West was noted by the last EU Commission without major criticism, as was the increasingly authoritarian political course within Serbia.
The problematic treatment by some EU representatives of authoritarian Balkan politicians, who are mistakenly perceived as guarantors of stability and partners, has increased Moscow’s strategic influence in the region. Through its allies in politics and the media, Vladimir Putin’s Russia is attempting to discredit the West through propaganda, particularly in Republika Srpska and Serbia, but also in the NATO states of North Macedonia and Montenegro. This affects both Western mediation efforts to settle conflicts and NATO and now also EU enlargement policy.
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Even if it is no longer possible to speak of enthusiasm when people’s attitudes towards the “prospect” of their countries’ EU accession are surveyed (the same applies to surveys in EU states), from a peace policy perspective there is no alternative to the successful completion of EU enlargement in South Eastern Europe. Abandoning this perspective would also go against the security policy interests of Austria and the EU. Its probable consequence would be to resign oneself to the existence of an only half-peaceful region in the middle of Europe, on which international actors, some of whose interests differ considerably from those of the EU, would exert ever greater influence.
A credible and predictable EU integration policy also seems necessary in view of some question marks that have arisen following Donald Trump’s recent election victory regarding the future direction of US foreign policy.
From the author’s point of view, the following elements would be of central importance:
- The creation of a concrete “roadmap” for the conclusion of accession talks with the three candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, which are “unproblematic” in terms of open conflict issues, by 2030.
- The implementation of the facilitated access to EU cooperation programs for all EU accession candidates from the WB prior to full accession, as already announced by the EU. However, the prerequisite for this – as well as for financial support from the EU – should be strict compliance with democratic standards and the rule of law, as well as cooperative behavior on the part of the candidate country towards its neighbors.
- An EU accession scenario for Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia that is as concrete as possible could create a positive regional spill-over effect. The chances of finding constructive solutions to outstanding conflict issues affecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia with the support of the EU would then probably increase.
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