The sluggish rapprochement with Europe, growing nationalist movements and ongoing disputes between Serbia and Kosovo are jeopardizing regional stability in the Western Balkans. An analysis by IFK staff member Predrag Jurekovic.
After almost 20 years since the end of the “Yugoslav Wars of Disintegration”, the Western Balkans remain prone to nationalism. Regional relations are even worse than they were ten years ago. At that time, there was still confidence in the consolidation policy of the European Union (EU) in this part of South Eastern Europe, which held out the prospect of EU membership for the Western Balkan countries as a “reward” for constitutional and democratic reforms and cooperation with neighboring countries. Although the so-called prospect of accession is still upheld and was even formally confirmed by an EU strategy paper in February 2018, enthusiasm has faded on both sides. In view of the difficulties faced by the British in implementing Brexit and the strengthening of nationalist and populist movements in the EU, key states such as France are more reluctant to support a rapid enlargement of the Union.
The declining interest of key EU states in the challenges in the Western Balkans is encouraging the hardening of nationalist positions and the development of authoritarian and clientelist power relations in the region. In Serbia, for example, which, like Montenegro, is conducting accession negotiations with the EU, a dangerous polarization of relations is currently underway between President Aleksandar Vučić and the political opposition. The latter accuses Vučić of acting in an increasingly authoritarian manner and transforming Serbia into a feudal state. The Serbian president, in turn, refuses to engage in any dialog with the opposition. If the EU turns a blind eye to these undemocratic developments, the influence of other international players, such as Russia and Turkey, will increase as they seek to win the sympathy of the Christian Orthodox and Muslim populations of the Balkan countries. In addition, China’s interest in integrating Southeast Europe into its European transportation and infrastructure projects is clearly visible. However, the greatest potential risk to regional stability in the Western Balkans continues to come from the tense relations between Belgrade and Priština. The political dialog under EU mediation has been in a permanent crisis since 2016. Since 2017, Belgrade has also been issuing military threats – despite the presence of the KFOR peacekeeping force – in the event that the Kosovar government uses force against the Serbs in northern Kosovo. Belgrade is particularly critical of the Kosovo parliament’s decision to transform the Kosovo Security Force, which is tasked with civil protection, into an army. In return, the Kosovan government imposed high punitive tariffs on goods from Serbia at the end of 2018. These are a response by the Kosovo Albanians to Belgrade’s policy of preventing Kosovo’s admission to international organizations and persuading UN member states to withdraw their recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Despite the lack of trust between the two neighbors and the military sabre-rattling, EU representatives are hoping for an early breakthrough in the “normalization” of relations between Belgrade and Priština. This hope is based on as yet vague hints from Vučić and Kosovan President Hashim Thaci that the bilateral conflict could be “resolved” by dividing Kosovo and ceding territory in southern Serbia. In the as yet unconsolidated state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in particular, there is growing concern that the greater acceptance of ethnic partition options in Europe could fuel Serbian secessionist tendencies in multi-ethnic BiH. Even the optimistic government of North Macedonia, which was able to successfully end a decades-long diplomatic conflict with its neighbor Greece by implementing the Prespa Agreement of 17 June 2018 in February of this year and whose NATO and EU accession negotiations were thereby unblocked, is concerned about collateral damage from the current Kosovo developments.
Following ethnic conflicts in 2001, North Macedonia successfully managed to rebuild a cooperative relationship with the Albanian ethnic group by integrating the Albanians (25 percent) into state institutions, expanding their language rights and local self-government. The propagation of ethnic division variants in relation to Kosovo could jeopardize this successful model in Macedonia. In the case of Kosovo, too, the agreement signed by Serbian and Kosovar government representatives in Brussels in April 2013 would in principle offer the opportunity to slowly normalize bilateral relations without compromising the stability of the neighbouring countries. This agreement, most of which has not yet been implemented, provides for the integration of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions on the one hand and the establishment of a Serbian association of municipalities within Kosovo on the other. In light of the ongoing tense regional situation, the presence of the EUFOR ALTHEA peacekeeping forces in Bosnia (currently around 670 soldiers) and KFOR in Kosovo (currently around 3,500 soldiers) represents an important stabilizing factor. With its participation in the two operations (EUFOR around 290 and KFOR around 430 soldiers), the Austrian Armed Forces are making a substantial contribution to this and, since the end of March 2018, Major General Martin Dorfer has also been the commander of the entire EUFOR mission.
Please also read the Commentary “Light and shadow over the Western Balkans” by IFK Head Brigadier General Walter Feichtinger.
