The Austrian Armed Forces are planning to procurement of a total of twelve Advanced Jet Trainers of the type M-346FA from the Italian manufacturer Leonardo. Opinions differ widely in the security policy debate: while some consider only six inexpensive, unarmed training aircraft to be sufficient, others are calling for supersonic trainers – or even the complete abandonment of trainers in favor of the procurement of up to 36 supersonic fighter jets, if necessary from used stocks.
A second Saab 105 fate also torments some. Procured in two tranches of 20 aircraft each at the end of the 1960s, the jets postponed the German army’s supersonic project for two decades.
The fact is, the Austrian Armed Forces is planning to buy the M-346FA, a subsonic jet trainer with sensors and weapons, so that it can also be used as a light combat aircraft. One wonders what Austria is planning to do in the middle of Europe with a subsonic, fast, light, allegedly overpriced training and combat aircraft?
Air war theory
So let’s start with Adam and Eve, the “theories of aerial warfare”: there are five levels at which control over airspace can be exercised. And since there are at least two sides in a war, there is a yin and yang between these levels.
That is
- the “dominance” (air dominance) in the air for one, and for the other therefore the complete “incapability” (incapability)
- to consider air superiority and its opposite, denial, in terms of time and place.
- and the “equivalence” (parity).
“Gnothi seauton”: “Know yourself!” or “Know what you are.”
Thinking honestly about the air war capabilities of the Republic of Austria: Where does the Austrian Armed Forces stand on the air war performance scale?
The Austrian Armed Forces have 15 Eurofighters whose ground organization, infrastructure, equipment and armament are exclusively geared towards airspace surveillance in peacetime – to put it bluntly: an air police force.
With the exception of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, Austria is surrounded by the NATO and the EU. We are neutral towards all but the EU. Our neutrality towards the EU is limited: the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the so-called “Irish clause” apply. Austria decides for itself to what extent and in what way it provides assistance to other EU countries.
Back to the air: With around 20 military overflights a day – even in peacetime – the active airspace surveillance of the Austrian Armed Forces would very quickly be overwhelmed in the event of a conflict, if only because of the almost permanent monitoring that would then be required.
Even if all personnel are barracked and their private lives are cut short: After four weeks in which two Eurofighters are permanently in the air, the entire flight hours budget planned for a year is completely used up in purely mathematical terms.
In practice, however, it ends much earlier – because even with 16-hour shifts, the work of an entire year cannot be squeezed into four weeks with the best will in the world. Spare parts and personnel are at their limit. The available ammunition is only sufficient for self-defense – not 24 hours in a war.
Air war and neutrality
The air power potential of the NATO and EU countries surrounding us is overwhelming, and the gap is even greater in terms of types and quality. Switzerland has had real experience of this. In 1940, it tried to maintain its neutrality by fighting in the air. Around ten aircraft of Göring’s Luftwaffe were shot down over Switzerland. The matter then landed on Hitler’s desk.
As a result, Switzerland was threatened so severely that the Swiss commander-in-chief Henri Guisan had to back down in the face of the unfolding air battle for England. He banned his pilots from border surveillance flights and active air combat and only allowed them to use self-defense if they themselves were attacked. The Swiss Federal Council apologized in Berlin.
This results in – according to the five levels: The Republic of Austria is currently incapable of even actively continuing to control the airspace in the event of a conflict. Let alone fight in it, because equipment and weapons are only available for the task of “air policing” and not for 24/7.
War in Europe
Any potential NATO/EU conflict will first take place on their external borders. So not directly on our border. So we are in the hinterland, in the space in the depths of a conflict.
Predicting the progress or outcome of a military conflict is about as easy as predicting the match results and the winner of a soccer World Cup. Here, as there, proven experts reach their limits and have to calculate with many variables and unknowns.
As far as the European NATO component is concerned, victory in the air is likely. On the ground, however, things are much more difficult. And you can win a war in the air and lose it on the ground. Want some examples? Both the USA and the Soviets had absolute air dominance in Vietnam and also twice in Afghanistan. They still lost the war on the ground.
However, current conflicts in the air are now characterized completely differently. Instead of streams of bombers, hundreds of “stand-off weapons” are fired into the enemy’s hinterland every day. Flying projectiles with very long ranges over thousands of kilometers.
These are
- relatively few – because they are very expensive and complicated – ballistic missiles,
- less expensive and simpler and therefore more frequent are cruise missiles and
- Flying bombs with piston engines – known as “mopeds” – are comparatively cheap and simple and hundreds of them are on the road every day. They are now also available with jet engines.
Austria’s neutrality in the air
There are only four ways in which other states deal with our neutrality.
- It is meticulously observed,
- she is accidentally injured,
- it is deliberately injured or
- it is completely disregarded by also shooting at Austria.
The experience of 70 years of neutrality shows that it is deliberately violated. Whether it was the Soviets or the Americans, the East Germans, the Czechoslovaks or the Yugoslavs – they simply flew if they wanted to, and of course Austria did not shoot at them. At most, they were photographed, and it was not uncommon for people to argue about these photos in diplomatic channels afterwards. Not only Switzerland, but also Austria has already apologized for the fact that others violated our airspace.
As long as nobody shoots at Austria – at least until then – Austria is guaranteed not to shoot back. Fortunately, we have never gotten beyond that, and how politicians would decide in an emergency remains pure speculation until then.
The air power surrounding us is gigantic compared to what Austria would have to oppose. So what is left for the Republic if the legal requirement to “maintain and defend neutrality” cannot be fulfilled by air combat?
Focus on the essentials!
The result, when the Austrian air force knows that it cannot take military action against NATO/EU air power – and NATO/EU air power knows that it will not take military action against the Austrian air force unless it is forced to do so – is a kind of uncontested parity in airspace.
Politically, the documentation of airspace violations – as practiced by the Second Republic since it has possessed military aircraft – remains the central means. This means that the NATO/EU air force surrounding us will simply fly if it deems it necessary, and the Austrian Armed Forces will document these flights in order to provide politicians with diplomatic room for maneuver. For comparison: Switzerland counted Second World War 6,501 border violations.
From a military perspective, however, protecting the Austrian population from the effects of war is even more important. The Austrian Armed Forces are deployed to protect the population and keep the consequences of a conflict as far away from Austria as possible. Example: Slovenia 1991 – they stood at the border.
But what does this look like in a modern air war scenario in the depths of space?
It must be expected that stand-off weapons will reach Austrian airspace – whether intentionally, accidentally or due to a technical defect is ultimately irrelevant. Example: On March 22, 2022, a Tu-141 jet-powered unmanned aerial vehicle launched in Ukraine crashed in Zagreb, Croatia.
Countries closer to the Russia/Ukraine war (-> Latest news from the Ukraine war) are currently affected more often. Poland, Romania and even neutral Moldova have already been overflown by flying bombs several times, and some have crashed in these countries.
And on the ground? As I said, the front is a long way off. Nevertheless, you have to expect actions by commando forces or “sleepers” – after all, that’s what they’re there for. And we have also already read about military sports groups, suspected conspirators or separatists who are building huge caches of weapons in remote hunting lodges.
So let’s move on to the M-346FA
The M-346FA is not a supersonic fighter aircraft. It flies at most half as fast as a Eurofighter, climbs only about a quarter as fast and carries only light armament. This puts it at a massive disadvantage compared to a high-performance fighter jet. For example, the aircraft cannot achieve the same weapon ranges because it lacks the dynamics to give the missiles the same momentum as a supersonic fighter.
It is also not stealth-capable and therefore not capable of remaining within the range of enemy air defense systems or penetrating these areas. The aircraft is therefore not suitable for scenarios in which someone exercises military air or land dominance over the Republic of Austria. Even 36 supersonic jets would not change this very much – given the potential for dominance around us.
One of the positive features of the aircraft is that it costs only a third of a modern high-performance fighter jet to procure and only around a fifth of that to operate.
Instead of just a few days with the Eurofighter, in the event of a conflict the Republic will be in a position to de facto have aircraft in the air for several weeks at a time – if necessary. What for?
In any case, the sensor technology is capable of recognizing, identifying and tracking contacts in the air and on the ground over long distances – and in a quality that was previously unavailable to the Republic of Austria. In 1991, the Saab 105 was still taking photos of events on the other side of the border in Slovenia. The strip of land and airspace that the M-346 can capture and deliver to the evaluators will be much wider and much more detailed thanks to the latest technology. This will enable the General Staff to plan ahead and provide sound political advice.
In the field of airspace monitoring, this sensor performance partially compensates for the lack of speed. Airspace violations can thus be documented over dozens of kilometers instead of just a few hundred meters away. The requirements therefore only apply to the high subsonic range and medium altitudes. A second interceptor was never planned.
As far as the aforementioned stand-off weapons are concerned, which are no longer an abstract threat, the flight performance, sensor technology and planned armament of the M-346FA are certainly sufficient to detect, identify, intercept and shoot down aircraft of the cruise missile, jet and moped drone families. Should someone actually fire on Europe, it is almost certain that Austria will also be affected – even if it is not the actual target. The sheer volume of these aerial warfare assets must lead to a statistically clear risk analysis.
It is precisely this threat that the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is addressing. The mutual transmission of data between the Gold Hood radar system, the air defense systems with their sensors and the M-346FA and Eurofighter aircraft will significantly improve the air situation picture of the Austrian Armed Forces. However, this also requires aircraft to be in the air – and here the M-346FA can provide many times more flight hours than the Eurofighter at an affordable level.
As far as an internal Austrian ground scenario is concerned – military sports groups, conspirators, separatists and terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure were mentioned – the corresponding mission type is COIN, counterinsurgency. This also does not require supersonic speeds and the M-346FA is therefore very suitable.
If necessary, the M-346FA can be used to quickly and extensively monitor restricted areas in the air and on the ground around critical infrastructure using multispectral surveillance and, if necessary, effectively combat the relevant threats in a targeted manner or support its own forces on the ground. Even in low-threshold conflict scenarios, Austria’s soldiers on the ground can currently hardly expect the air force to make a significant contribution to land operations. The M-346FA is a clear step towards making up for decades of neglect in this area.
The M-346FA therefore also fits in very well with the security island concept that has been pursued since 2017, in which twelve infrastructurally efficient barracks are to be operated as self-sufficient bases for the Austrian armed forces.
If you want to deploy forces to specific locations, you need the best possible situational awareness. With its sensors, the M-346 will be able to provide this assistance to the civilian authorities if critical infrastructure such as the telephone network fails, see Spain on April 28.
A few more words on the future of fighter aircraft
With the material and personnel situation described above, we are practically a generation away from achieving anything that could be described as a robust air warfare capability.
Even if the Republic – in view of the second edition of the Cold War, whose proxy conflict is no longer taking place in distant Asia, but only a few hours’ drive away on our doorstep – should decide to procure larger numbers of supersonic fighter aircraft, it will take a long time.
In many cases, the personnel who join the armed forces today to operate the future jet trainer and possibly subsequently take the step towards a modern fighter aircraft yet to be procured will already have children – and they will attend eighth grade until tangible results and callable military performance emerge.
The armed forces have not played at this level for several generations – and apart from the money (and the foreseeable political turbulence surrounding such a project), it will above all need time to learn.
The M-346FA is currently the fastest way to equip the armed forces with capabilities that they either do not yet have or no longer have – for military deployment scenarios that are much more likely in Central Europe for the time being than an air war with supersonic jets over our heads.
Apart from that, there is no indication that the M-346FA will cause the Austrian Armed Forces to abandon their goal of putting a fully-fledged fighter aircraft into service as a replacement for the Eurofighter in the next decade (-> See also Militär Aktuell interview with Air Chief Major General Gerfried Promberger).
And it will not be possible to simply open the NATO air warfare manual to define the tasks. Austria’s security policy embedding in the European landscape is too specific to simply adopt the recipes of others.
Questions that need to be clarified include: Is it still possible to defend oneself purely defensively – i.e. exclusively in the event of an attack on Austrian territory – or do the ranges of modern long-range weapons common today require a defense with comparable capabilities?
Even if some of the ingredients are similar: They will probably have to be cooked differently so that the result suits Austria both militarily and politically.
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