“Italian theater of war: On the entire southwestern front, combat activity increased considerably. At Flitsch, near Tolmein and in the northern part of the Bainsizza-Heiligengeist plateau, Austro-Hungarian and German infantry broke into the Italian lines after powerful artillery preparation. The Chief of the General Staff.”

@Archive RauchenbichlerOn October 25, 1917, the front page of the newspaper Neues Wiener Tagblatt reported the official announcement of the start of the breakthrough at Flitsch. This breakthrough was the last of twelve battles on the Isonzo. After eleven defensive battles, this was the only Isonzo offensive of the Imperial and Royal Army. Army. With the support of the German ally, this battle was a great tactical success, but the Habsburg Monarchy paid dearly for it. The first eleven battles on the Isonzo
On May 23, 1915, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. Italy’s Chief of Staff Cadorna pursued a plan to advance into the Ljubljana Basin via the cities of Gorizia and Trieste in order to reach the center of the Habsburg Monarchy from there. On the Isonzo River, the main forces were the 5th Imperial and Royal Army under General Boroevic and the Habsburgs. Army under General Boroevic and the Italian 2nd and 3rd Armies. In these eleven battles, the Italian troops attacked while the k.u.k. troops were on the defensive throughout. The war year 1915
On June 23, 1915, a heavy artillery barrage from Italian guns on the Austro-Hungarian defensive positions opened the first of four battles. defensive positions opened the first of four Isonzo battles that year. The focus of the Italian attacks was in the area around the town of Görz. The war-tested k.u.k. soldiers managed to hold their positions for the most part. The focal point of these battles was Monte San Michele, which was a cornerstone of the defense of Görz. The onset of winter caused the Italian command to halt the attacks of the 4th Battle of the Isonzo on December 11, 1915. The war year 1916
The 5th Battle of the Isonzo consisted of a short offensive from March 11 to 16, 1916. The Italian troops tried unsuccessfully to storm Monte San Michele. Afterwards, the k.u.k. Army moved the bulk of its forces to South Tyrol and attempted to attack the Isonzo Front from the Dolomites. This undertaking failed in the spring of 1916, mainly because General Cadorna succeeded in exploiting the inner line and quickly moving his troops from the Isonzo to South Tyrol.

@Archive Rauchenbichler
Group of soldiers in a position in the Karst.

After the failure of this k.u.k. South Tyrol offensive, Cadorna succeeded in redeploying the majority of his troops – unnoticed by the k.u.k. General Staff – back to the Isonzo. When the Italian troops opened the 6th Battle of the Isonzo on August 6, the Austro-Hungarian troops were surprised by the force of the attack. The k.u.k. The Austro-Hungarian army was thrown back in several places and after the Italian conquest of Monte San Michele, the defense of Görz collapsed. The battle ended on August 17 with the capture of Gorizia by the Italians. The long-awaited conquest of Gorizia was a considerable morale boost for the Italian army. It was therefore decided in the fall of 1916 to launch a series of further attacks on the positions of the k.u.k. Army positions. The city of Trieste and the Karst heights around Gorizia were at the center of the 7th to 9th Isonzo battles. Although the Italian army once again attempted to break through the front of the Austro-Hungarian army with massive pressure. Army’s front, but it only managed to make insignificant territorial gains. While these terrain losses in the 3 autumn battles were not so significant for the k.u.k. Monarchy, their personnel losses were almost irreplaceable. The war year 1917
After a break of almost half a year, the Italian army took part in the 10th Battle of the Isonzo on May 12, 1917. This battle ended on June 4 with the conquest of the Kuk Heights in the karst region north of Gorizia, which provided a good starting point for further attacks on the Ljubljana Basin. A remarkable aspect of this battle was the enormous number of Italian prisoners, which can be explained by the already declining fighting morale. On August 18, 1917, the Italian barrage on the Austro-Hungarian troops began, marking the start of the 11th Battle of the Isonzo. Until September 13, the Italian troops attacked with deadly disdain, effectively supported by deadly artillery fire. A cornerstone of these battles was Monte San Gabriele, the loss of which would have made the situation on the Isonzo untenable for the Imperial and Royal Army. Army would have been untenable. The ruthless defense of this mountain made it go down in war history as the “Mountain of Death”.

@Archive Rauchenbichler
Contemporary photograph of the village of Tolmain (Tolmein).

In view of the eleven unsuccessful attempts to break through the Isonzo Front despite the superiority of the infantry and artillery, the Italian army and the Italian population were extremely disappointed and there was even unrest and open mutiny. The Austro-Hungarian military leadership developed the idea of pre-empting the enemy with an offensive of their own. They did not believe that they could successfully survive another defensive battle. The losses in the 11th battle due to illness deserve special consideration. This affected around 500,000 men on both sides. Even at the time, medical experts attributed these high losses to the poor care of the troops deployed. It was characteristic of all Isonzo battles that the Italian army outnumbered the Austro-Hungarian army in terms of personnel and equipment. Army in terms of personnel and equipment. This was particularly true of the high level of artillery ammunition. In addition, the Italian army had the advantage of only having to wage war on one front, while the Isonzo Front was a major challenge for the Austro-Hungarian army alongside the Balkans and the Russian army. Army, the Isonzo Front was already the third theater of war alongside the Balkans and the Russian front. In addition to the troops from what is now Austria, the South Slavic soldiers also fought with particular motivation to prevent the Italians from breaking into their homeland. The peculiarities of the battlefield in the Karst region included

  • the splintering effect of the substrate
  • the difficulties of building weatherproof shelters
  • the contamination of the few sources of drinking water by fallen soldiers
  • the logistical problems of supplying troops
approximate casualties with fatalities in the Italian army k.u.k. Army
1st Battle of the Isonzo (June 23 – July 7, 1915) 15.000 10.000
2nd Battle of the Isonzo (July 15 – August 10, 1915) 42.000 46.000
3rd Battle of the Isonzo (October 18 – November 5, 1915) 67.000 42.000
4th Battle of the Isonzo (November 10 – December 11, 1915) 49.000 25.000
5th Battle of the Isonzo (March 11 – 16, 1916) 2.000 2.000
6th Battle of the Isonzo (August 4 – 17, 1916) 51.000 42.000
7th Battle of the Isonzo (September 14 – 17, 1916) 17.000 20.000
8th Battle of the Isonzo (October 9 – 12, 1916) 24.000 25.000
9th Battle of the Isonzo (October 31 – November 4, 1916) 16.000 11.000
10th Battle of the Isonzo (May 12 – June 5, 1917) 160.000 125.000
11th Battle of the Isonzo (August 18 – September 13, 1917) 150.000 100.000

 

The breakthrough at Flitsch – October 24, 1917
After several weeks of intensive preparation, the 12th and final battle on the Isonzo began on October 24, 1917. Using the example of the 22nd k.u.k. Schützendivision and its rifle regiments Graz No. 3 and Marburg No. 26, the successful breakthrough of the combined German and Austrian divisions will be described.

@GM. Schöfer, Österreichs Volksbuch vom Weltkrieg, Vienna 1934
Course of the breakthrough.

Preparations and the deployment
While the Austro-Hungarian troops were still defending themselves in the 11th Battle of the Isonzo. troops were still fighting a defensive battle in the 11th Battle of the Isonzo, they began to consider an offensive of their own. The k.u.k. High Command asked the German Empire to transfer troops to the Isonzo Front. Although the German Empire had previously only taken note of this front as a secondary theater of war, this time it decided to transfer six divisions to the Isonzo. These were joined by selected mountain battalions, from which a further division was formed. In addition, numerous artillery units, including gas launchers, and aircraft forces were moved to the Isonzo. To transport the troops and war materials, Austria-Hungary improved its existing railroad network and expanded it extensively. By the time the offensive began, over 2,200 trains had been run to the deployment area. However, the mostly single-track railroad lines were quickly overloaded and the transport trains backed up far into the hinterland. The timetable for moving the necessary troops, weapons and ammunition to the Isonzo came to a standstill. For this reason, the offensive had to be postponed by two days. However, the consequences of this military deployment were unforeseeable in the civilian sector. From September to December 1917, two thirds of the freight wagons available in the Monarchy were used for the march on the Isonzo. However, these trains were not available to transport the harvest, especially the potato crop, from the fields to the towns. Much of the harvest rotted in the fields of the monarchy. The immense number of trains also consumed an enormous amount of coal for the locomotives. There was a shortage of this coal in people’s homes. For the civilian population, the winter of 1917/18 was not only very cold, people also had to endure it on an empty stomach.

@Archive Rauchenbichler
Relief by Flitsch.

The battle
On October 24, 1917, a short artillery barrage signaled the start of the offensive. A lack of ammunition did not allow for days of barrage fire, but only targeted shelling of the Italian positions, especially the recognized command posts. The use of poison gas played a particularly important role in eliminating large parts of the Italian army in this section. Thus it was the 35th (German) Gaswerferpionierbataillon, which the 22nd k.u.k. Schützendivision in its advance through the Italian defensive lines. The rapid Italian collapse and the enormous losses suffered by the Italian army in this area were mainly due to the lack of precautions (gas masks) against this type of fire. Rifle Regiment No. 26 was deployed in the front line, followed by Rifle Regiment No. 3 in the second wave of the attack. On the first day of the offensive, not only were all three Italian positions breached, but even two bridges over the Isonzo were captured undamaged. On the same day, the two rifle regiments took numerous prisoners: 54 enemy officers and 2,518 soldiers from five different Italian troop units. On the second day, the 22nd Rifle Division stormed the Stol, a mountain peak fortified with massive positions, from the Italians. A general and more than 5,000 Italian soldiers were taken prisoner in the process. From October 26, the 22nd Rifle Division pursued the fleeing Italians across Friuli and Veneto to the Tagliamento. Due to the unexpectedly rapid advance of the Central Powers, the Italian Chief of Staff Cadorna gave up all resistance east of the Tagliamento, which the Central Powers had already reached on October 30. The 3rd Italian Army was able to escape across this river, leaving its equipment behind, but the 2nd Italian Army disintegrated east of it and was almost completely captured.

@Archive Rauchenbichler
This photo from the combat zone immediately after the breakthrough shows the traffic difficulties.

The advance continued undeterred, and on November 13, Rifle Regiment No. 3 reached Feltre. After days of seemingly endless marching, Rifle Regiments Nos. 3 and 26 finally had a brief respite. The withdrawal of the attacking troops from the mountains to the plains caused some friction. The battle lines of the divisions became confused, which caused great difficulties not only for the advance itself but also for the supply troops due to the poor road conditions. The Austrian supply troops had enormous problems keeping the fighting troops adequately supplied. They only had a very small initial supply of rations and ammunition with them. It became apparent that the k.u.k. leadership was surprised by its own success. The majority of the k.u.k. command staff acted too cautiously and remained in their previous command positions for too long. As a result, they were soon no longer able to keep in touch with their storming troops. A lack of communications meant that orders either did not arrive at all, or they were already overtaken by a new situation. The fleeing Italian troops were able to retreat to a well-developed system of positions on the Grappa and Piave rivers. The Italian Chief of Staff Cadorna had already had this built as a precaution in 1916, and the Italian troops were now able to move into it. The Allies also moved divisions to Italy. Seven French and five British divisions supported the Italian army during these days. These measures played a decisive role in enabling the Italian troops to successfully build up a new defensive line on the Piave and rekindled the Italian fighting spirit. The wintry weather conditions in December brought the German-Austrian offensive to a halt. The main task was to secure supplies for their own troops. Fortunately, it was possible to fall back on captured Italian canned goods for the time being. The German troops, who were the mainstay of the offensive, were gradually transferred to the western front to take part in the German spring offensive of 1918. The consequences of the offensive
Although the Central Powers’ offensive became known through defections to the Italian troops, the Italian side did not react at all or reacted incorrectly. On the one hand, the Italian leadership did not believe in a possible imperial and royal offensive. On the other hand, it was not prepared for the massive use of poison gas. In addition, the superior infantry strength of the Italian army (238 Italian battalions faced 171 German and Austrian battalions) and their reserves were deployed incorrectly. This led to 10,000 dead and 30,000 wounded in the Italian army, while only around 5,000 soldiers were wounded or killed in the Central Powers. Over 290,000 Italian soldiers were taken prisoner and a further 400,000 simply abandoned their positions and fled backwards. The material losses of the Italian army were also enormous.

The Central Powers captured more than 3,000 guns, over 1,700 mine launchers, 3,000 machine guns and 300,000 rifles. The 12th Battle of the Isonzo was a vivid example of how successfully the German and Austro-Hungarian army command could work together. Unfortunately, the offensives of 1918 were not coordinated. For the Habsburg army, the success on the Isonzo was therefore only a Pyrrhic victory. Hunger, exhaustion and national unrest led to the collapse of the front in the fall of 1918 and ultimately to the downfall of the imperial and royal monarchy. Monarchy.

@GM. Schäfer, Österreichs Volksbuch vom Weltkrieg, Vienna 1934
Map of the eleven Isonzo battles.

Cultivating tradition in the First Republic
The founding of the Republic of Austria in the fall of 1918 marked a break with the defunct Habsburg monarchy in all areas. Due to domestic and foreign policy problems, the federal army established in 1920 could only cautiously approach the spirit of the imperial and royal army. Army. A first step was taken in 1924, when Federal Minister Vaugoin decided that all units of the Federal Army should have one or more traditional units from the Austro-Hungarian army. Army had to lead. The Styrian Alpine Infantry Regiment No. 9 with garrisons in Graz and Strass was assigned the Rifle Regiments No. 3 and No. 26 as traditional units, as it was recruited, at least in part, from the same area. In order to foster solidarity and togetherness between the new armed forces and the traditional associations, a traditional day was also to be chosen to commemorate a special heroic deed in the World War. The AJR No. 9 chose October 24, 1917, the day of the breakthrough at Flitsch. From 1924, the annual Flitsch celebration with the comradeship associations of the two rifle regiments was held on this day. On October 24, 1925, the ceremonial consecration of the regimental flags of AJR No. 9 and 10, donated by the Province of Styria, took place in the area of today’s exhibition grounds (Fröhlichgasse). In addition to the representatives of the traditional associations, numerous civilian spectators also attended this ceremony. Two banners with the inscription “Always vigilant and ready for battle” and “Always as with Flitsch” were also donated. The latter was donated by the wife of the then governor Anna Rintelen and is now in the museum in the Strass barracks. The publication of the two-volume regimental history of the Graz No. 3 Rifle Regiment in 1930 and a series of postcards for the widows’ and orphans’ fund represented a highlight of the preservation of tradition. The publication was issued by AJR No. 9 and the postcards were based on pictures by the war painter Wilhelm Thöny. From 1930, AJR No. 9 worked on a museum of tradition in the Alpenjägerkaserne in Graz, which was ceremoniously opened in 1933. The museum exhibited weapons, captured standards and other war relics from the years 1914 to 1918 in several rooms. On October 27, 1935, the flags and standards of the traditional troop units from the Imperial and Royal Army were assigned to the troop units of the Austrian Armed Forces. Army were assigned. The AJR No. 9 was given the regimental flag of the Rifle Regiment Graz No. 3 as its new regimental flag. @Archive RauchenbichlerCultivating tradition in the 2nd Republic
In the 2nd Republic, the cultivation of tradition was avoided for a long time. After the horrors of the Second World War, no renewed militarization of society or the new armed forces was desired. As a result, it was not until 1966 that traditional military units and commemoration days were resumed. As the units of the Wehrmacht were out of the question for obvious reasons, not only the Habsburg Army was used, but also the units of the First Austrian Army. On the national holiday in 1966, the maintenance of the tradition of the “Old Army” and the Federal Army of the First Republic was taken up by the Federal Army of the Second Republic.

The Styrian Jäger Battalion No. 17 in Strass was tasked with maintaining the traditions of the two rifle regiments No. 3 and 26 as well as the Alpenjäger Regiment No. 9. October 24, 1917, the day of the breakthrough battle at Flitsch-Tolmain, was again chosen as the day to commemorate tradition. The traditional march was the 3er-Schützenmarsch. The Jäger Battalion No. 17 therefore celebrates its regimental day every year shortly before October 24, which is still duly celebrated today. Another sign of the connection with the traditional troop units can also be found in the Strasser barracks today: there is both an “Alpenjäger No. 9 training room” and a “Schützenregiment No. 3 training room”. There are also two memorial plaques on the outer wall of the Strasser Kaserne commemorating the traditional troop units. On October 27, 1929, the 26er Schützen association donated a plaque to commemorate their own association. On October 25, 1972, a plaque commemorating the III Battalion of the AJR No. 9 was placed there. Finally, it should not go unmentioned that other military units of the First and Second Republics also commemorated the Battle of Flitsch. It was also commemorated at the military academy, as the name of the 13th year of the military academy also recalls: Flitsch-Tolmain.