The war in Ukraine shows once again that the answer to “selfies” and videos from the front are now often grenades and rockets.

The widespread dissemination of social media and their customary use on the front line represent a relatively new challenge for armed forces. Virtually every soldier deploying today is technically equipped with a smartphone for the global distribution of image, sound and video recordings as well as voice and text messages in real time and uses these possibilities not only in times of peace but also in times of war. The problem with this is that users are not only putting themselves at risk, but also their comrades in their immediate vicinity, as recent reports from Ukraine show. There is a fine line between public relations, information and the understandable – and to a certain extent necessary – need of the troops to maintain at least some of their usual social contacts despite the war on the one hand, and the careless disclosure of security-relevant information on the other, as the destruction of a 240mm 2S4 Tyulpan (“Tulip”) grenade launcher illustrates.

The Tulip at Rubischne
The “Tulip” is the heaviest system of its kind. It can fire 130-kilogram shells at distances of 800 to 9,500 meters or 228-kilogram rocket-propelled grenades at a distance of up to 18 kilometers. Before the attack on Ukraine began, there were only a few of them in the official inventory of the Russian armed forces, so it is likely that quite a few soldiers pulled out their cell phones when they actually saw a “Tulip” in Rubishne in mid-May. After several images and videos of the system in action against Ukrainian positions and infrastructure in Severodonetsk appeared on several Telegram and Twitter channels as well as on Russian television on May 20, the “Tulip” was tracked down by a Ukrainian drone in its firing position the very next day and destroyed by precise artillery fire.

Shells in and on ExpoDonbas
The fact that Ukraine has not only gained some experience in the meantime, but has also built up functioning structures to use information from social media channels, becomes obvious in the review of the shelling of ExpoDonbas in mid-June.

@ArchiveAs early as 2015 and 2016, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was informed that the ExpoDonbas building, in the middle of the city of Donetsk and barely 500 meters from the Donbass Arena, the home stadium of the well-known soccer club Shakhtar Donetsk, which opened in 2009, was being used as a warehouse for military equipment and ammunition. The photo evidence is provided by a “selfie” of a young man who is apparently busy storing ammunition in the ExpoDonbas hall. Shortly afterwards, the hall was destroyed by Ukrainian artillery fire according to a photo comparison (see marked areas on the picture). The musicians’ quarters
The “Wagner Group”, also known as “PMC Wagner”, is a private company that sells “military services” to the Russian Federation. It is generally regarded as “Putin’s private army” and is owned by the oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, also known by the nickname “Putin’s cook”. The formation takes its name from the famous composer and playwright Richard Wagner (1813-1883), which is why its members like to refer to themselves as “musicians”. The mercenary group is known and notorious for its excessive use of violence far beyond any legal framework, be it civil or martial law.

In mid-August, Yevgeny Prigozhin personally visited an apparently important command post of the “Wagner Group” in Popasna in the far west of Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine. The selfies, souvenir photos and group photos taken during the visit quickly found their way into Telegram channels, where they revealed the location of the command post. The address of the building was clearly recognizable in the background of one of the photos. Only hours passed between the publication of the photos and the impact of HIMARS missiles on the site. Just how effective the strike was is shown not only by the fact that the whereabouts of Yevgeny Prigozhin himself remained unclear for several days. Wagner’s own telegram channel “Grey Zone” also remained unattended for a week (completely unusual) and the group’s military activities slowed down noticeably, at least for a few days.

Numerous other examples
If you are looking for more timely examples of how the thoughtless use of smartphones and social media in conflict zones can jeopardize your own safety, the Twitter channel of Mark Krutov (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) is recommended. Selfies of positions with activated geomarkers in the photo are not uncommon.

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