Vladimir Putin is striving for a Russian renaissance in Africa. Around 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow wants to move closer to the continent again politically, economically and militarily. An analysis by IFK expert Gerald Hainzl.
At the end of October, the first Russia-Africa summit in Sochi was about billions of euros. 40 heads of state and government and around 10,000 participants from 54 countries came to the Olympic city in southern Russia to discuss the supply of machinery and commercial vehicles. Investments in chemicals and space technology
were discussed and possible tourism agreements were explored. The agenda also included the construction of joint industrial zones and, last but not least, closer military relations between Russia and African countries. It was clear what Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to achieve with the mega conference: closer political, economic, humanitarian and cultural cooperation between his country and African states. His ambitious goal: to double economic exchange within the next five years. The great international media interest in the conference and the accompanying analyses suggested a “return” of Russia as an international player on the continent. But after the close ties during the Cold War, did Russia ever leave? And what exactly is meant by Africa? The whole continent? The largest parts of it? Or just some of the more than 50 different states and regional organizations?
Let’s start our explanation in 2014, where the Russian “rediscovery” of Africa originated: Driven by Western sanctions following the annexation of Crimea, Moscow began to increasingly seek new economic opportunities and geopolitical friendships around the world. The search for new sales markets for Russian goods (not just military) and the simultaneous need for raw materials almost inevitably led to Africa. Russia already had very intensive relations with many countries there during the Cold War. In addition, from the perspective of African countries, Moscow’s involvement offers the opportunity to reduce existing dependencies and act with more self-confidence in the face of other geopolitical players such as China and the USA. In a first step towards intensifying and revitalizing Russian-African relations, Vladimir Putin has received twelve African heads of government for talks in Russia since 2015. In Sochi, the aim was to put down on paper as many Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and other agreements as possible on cooperation in a wide range of areas – from agricultural development to military cooperation – and thus create the conditions for smaller projects, including the construction of nuclear power plants. However, most of these MoUs are not legally binding and therefore only represent a preliminary stage to potential cooperation. This has certainly caused criticism in Africa, where many heads of state fear that MoUs will not be filled with life and could remain mere declarations of intent. What’s more, compared to China’s current annual trade volume with Africa of around 184 billion euros, Russia’s ambitions are still quite modest at just over 16 billion euros. Nevertheless, in the oil sector, Lukoil has gained new partners in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. From a European perspective, the increased Russian involvement in the oil and gas sector in North Africa could also pose a challenge, as Europe could become even more dependent on Russian goodwill for gas and oil supplies. However, should alternative energy concepts become more prevalent in Europe in the medium to long term in the face of advancing climate change, as appears to be the case, Russia would have literally put its investments in the sand.
Despite this, the Russian nuclear industry also sees Africa as a promising market for its products and an opportunity to further diversify its own activities. Rosatom expects good sales opportunities for its nuclear reactors there and is already working with almost 20 countries. Further contracts were signed with Rwanda and Ethiopia in Sochi. While costs are still the biggest obstacle to actual implementation for most countries, Africa’s largest nuclear power plant with a capacity of 4.8 gigawatts will be built in El-Dabaa in Egypt. Rosatom is also trying to use intergovernmental loans and build-own-operate models to invalidate the cost argument and convince African governments to build new reactors. In addition, the company is also pursuing interests in uranium mining – corresponding projects are already underway with Tanzania and Namibia. In the military sector, Russia was able to find a new customer for armaments in Nigeria around the time of the conference in Sochi. In a first tranche, twelve combat helicopters are to be delivered to the West African country. Other countries – including Namibia, Madagascar and Uganda – are also interested in Russian tanks, aircraft, helicopters and rifles. Russian military advisors could also be sent to these countries. According to Dmitry Shugaev, Director of Military-Technical Cooperation, promising talks are also underway with South Africa regarding close cooperation in the military-industrial sector. This is likely to involve the joint development and production of weapons and military equipment for the armed forces of both countries as well as for interested third countries. In total, Moscow has concluded military cooperation agreements with around 20 countries. According to Military Africa, the African business, which is worth around twelve billion euros, already accounts for 30 to 40 percent of total Russian exports in the military sector. That sounds like a lot, and it is, but according to the Swedish research institute SIPRI, Russian exports to the region fell by 17% in the period from 2014 to 2018 compared to the previous period. The gap between Russia and the market leaders, the USA and China, has even widened. However, the continuity of military cooperation since the end of the USSR should not be underestimated: many of the military equipment procured during this period can only be serviced by Russia or Ukraine. Due to its geographical location as a possible starting point for further engagements in Africa, the Central African Republic in particular is of great strategic interest to Russia. The country is therefore involved in the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSCA with seven staff officers and two experts and also maintains its “own” military presence. In addition, Russia supplies weapons to the country and is also responsible for their maintenance. In summary, it can be said that although Russia cannot flex the economic muscles of Western states or China in Africa, it certainly has opportunities to gain influence, particularly in authoritarian states.
One example of this is Guinea, where Russia’s tacit approval of violent action against demonstrators can be assumed. At the same time, there are repeated rumors that Russia could actively interfere in election campaigns in African countries and manipulate public opinion. With the so-called “Wagner Group”, which is said to be active as a private military company in various conflicts and has excellent contacts to many top African politicians, Moscow also has a foot in the door of many African heads of state, which should not be underestimated, in order to be able to play a better role in the concert with other external players both economically and politically in the future.
Please also read the commentary “Russia in Africa? by IFK Head Brigadier Walter Feichtinger.
