With its military intervention in Syria in September 2015, Russia demonstrated that it can no longer be ignored as a player in the Middle East and North Africa. However, it remains to be seen whether Russia will take on the role of the USA as a regulatory power in the region, as some observers claim. An analysis by Christoph Bilban & Hanna Grininger.
The roots of Russia’s current policy in the Middle East and North Africa (known as the MENA region for short) run deep. The Soviet Union has maintained good relations with some states in the region since the 1950s, particularly with Syria, Egypt and Libya. The USSR mediated diplomatically in crises and conflicts in these countries (such as within the UN during the Suez Crisis in 1965) and was involved in supplying weapons (such as to Iraq during the First Gulf War). During Putin’s first presidency, relations were even expanded – old allies were joined by new ties with Iran, Turkey and, most recently, Saudi Arabia. However, Russia’s network of relations with MENA states must always be seen against the backdrop of regional conflicts (e.g. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran) and global geopolitical disputes (with the USA). Russia’s foreign policy in the region is dominated by economic interests. Around a third of all exports from the military-industrial complex go to the region. The USSR was the main supplier alongside the USA for a long time, but today the EU is in second place. Russia is trying to make a name for itself here again. Between 2007 and 2011, arms imports from Russia in the Middle East rose by 86 percent. Major deals were recently concluded with Egypt (MiG-29M fighter jets and Ka-50 combat helicopters) and the NATO country Turkey (S-400 air defense system). Saudi Arabia was recently promised an arms supply contract worth more than three billion US dollars (just under three billion euros), including S-400s to compete with the US THAAD system. Moscow’s aim is also to strengthen Russian export products from other economic sectors such as oil and gas, food and nuclear goods. In early December, Putin and Egyptian President al-Sisi signed an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in northern Egypt. In return for the Egyptian signature, air traffic between Egypt and Russia will be resumed. Cairo is hoping for the return of Russian customers who have been absent since the attack on a tourist flight in 2015. Efforts are also being made to increase the attractiveness of the Russian Federation for investors from the region. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia is particularly important here, although relations in the past can be described as rather chilly. Rivalry on the oil market, the Iran issue and the Islamization of post-Soviet Central Asia supported by Riyadh continue to be points of conflict. However, the first visit by a Saudi monarch to the Kremlin at the beginning of October can be seen as a sign of the start of more pragmatic relations between Riyadh and Moscow. Another of Moscow’s priorities is to consolidate its military influence, particularly in Syria, where Russia is supporting the government forces of President Bashar al-Assad. The naval base in Tartus plays a key role in Russia’s Syria strategy for geopolitical reasons, as it secures long-term access to the Mediterranean.
At the beginning of December, an old agreement between Cairo and Moscow was also revived to give Russia’s air forces access to Egyptian military airfields. The fight against the terrorist organization IS and opposition groups in Syria has also facilitated increasing cooperation with Iran, Hezbollah and Turkey. Although relations with Turkey have improved again since the downing of a Russian fighter jet in 2015, they still harbor a certain potential for conflict, as different actors are supported in Syria and Moscow could play the Kurdish issue off against Ankara.
Internationally, the Kremlin is attempting to position itself as a relevant player by intervening in the Syrian conflict. During the trilateral peace talks in Astana, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. Moscow is interested in the stability of the region, which was shaken by the upheavals of 2011, and is gearing its economic, political and military involvement towards this. For example, it supports General Haftar in Libya, where both military and economic interests play a role. Politically, the Kremlin would achieve a major victory by consolidating Libya under a “pro-Russian” leadership. The Western intervention in Libya in 2011 was not in the interests of the Russian leadership, although Moscow abstained from voting in the UN Security Council. Today, Libya is regarded in Russian military circles as a prime example of color revolutions that can plunge stable states into chaos in a short space of time. However, Russia’s actions in the MENA region could also end in a long-lasting operation, as the USA is experiencing in Afghanistan. Of course, the domestic political factor must not be forgotten here. Russia has a large proportion of Muslims (Sunnis). Battle-hardened returnees from the conflict zones in the region could strengthen radical Islamic tendencies in the North Caucasus and Central Asia, or radicalize Muslims throughout Russia. This is another reason why Moscow is interested in stabilizing the regimes and fighting terrorism (especially in Syria, Libya, the Sinai Peninsula and other regions of Egypt) as well as violent Islamism in the region. Putin’s announcement about the withdrawal of troops from Syria should therefore not be given too much weight for the time being. Although the number of personnel has been reduced, there is still no indication of a withdrawal of heavy weapons systems. Not all terrorist forces in Syria have been defeated either. “If the terrorists raise their heads again, we will fight them as they have never seen before,” Putin reserves the right to intervene again. The announcement of the victory over IS and the planned withdrawal also coincides with Putin’s announcement of his renewed candidacy in the 2018 presidential elections. How much of this will remain campaign rhetoric and what will be implemented remains to be seen. In summary, it can be said that the US withdrawal from the region has enabled Russia to take a more active stance. Donald Trump’s announcement to move the US embassy to West Jerusalem has also severely damaged US relations with the region. Russia will continue to focus on pragmatic relations with all relevant actors and try to increase its regional influence. The inclusion of important regional players such as Iran shows that Russia is committed to a multipolar world order. Economically, Moscow is trying to make up for lost ground from the Soviet era. It should also be emphasized that the Kremlin is securing its access to the Mediterranean through its involvement in the Syrian conflict.
The planned expansion of Tartus should enable maritime operations as far as the western Indian Ocean in the future. Russia is thus creating an advantageous position for itself in a region that remains contested and is also becoming increasingly interesting for China.
Please also read the commentary “Russia’s reactive strategy in the Middle East” by IFK Head Brigadier General Walter Feichtinger.
