Since Monday, Russian and Chinese soldiers have been practicing together as part of “Sibu/Interaction 2021”. The maneuver is taking place at the Chinese army’s Qingtongxia training ground in the autonomous province of Ningxia Hui in northwest China and is the first Russian-Chinese military exercise on Chinese territory; previously, Russia always hosted the joint exercises.
A total of 10,000 soldiers are taking part in “Sibu/Interaction 2021”. Units from the eastern military district of the Russian army are taking part, while units from the western military region of the People’s Liberation Army are participating. Tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and drones are deployed during the exercise, including Russian Su-30SM fighter aircraft, Chinese Mi-8/17s, the HQ-17 missile defence system and the Y-20 transport aircraft. The exercise is being carried out under a joint command, with Russian soldiers also using Chinese equipment. Pictures and videos from the exercise show Russian soldiers training on Chinese ZTL-11 wheeled tanks, ZBL-09 armored personnel carriers and ZBL-08 armored personnel carriers with an 8×8 wheel drive, among others.
The exercise consists of two phases. The first is about testing joint planning, decision-making and coordination of operations. During the second phase, counter-terrorism actions are played out, including saturation attacks, the destruction of enemy operational systems and offensive attacks. The aim of “Sibu/Interaction 2021” is to test and improve the capabilities and interoperability of the armed forces of both sides in the fight against international terrorism. The aim is also to strengthen military cooperation and friendship between the armed forces of both sides, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry. The aim is to work together to strengthen peace and stability in the region. The strategic importance of the exercises was emphasized during the opening ceremony on 9 August by the deputy commander of China’s western military region, Lieutenant General Liu Xiaowu. The maneuver shows that the strategic partnership between China and Russia, their mutual trust and pragmatic cooperation has reached a new level, said Liu. Brothers in arms
Moscow and Beijing have repeatedly expressed their desire for closer defense cooperation. At the end of July, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoygu and his Chinese counterpart Wie Fenghe emphasized the growing importance of the Russian-Chinese partnership on the sidelines of the meeting of the defence ministers of all member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SZO) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Russia and China are a stabilizing force in today’s world, said the Chinese Defense Minister. A few weeks earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping had reaffirmed their intention to further deepen the bilateral relationship by extending the friendship treaty signed in 2001.
The Russian-Chinese rapprochement is certainly not a mere staging. In fact, Moscow and Beijing have moved closer together economically, politically and militarily in recent years. Joint military maneuvers have been taking place for more than 15 years, but in recent years they have become much more frequent and extensive. In September 2018, China took part in the major Russian manoeuvre “Vostok”; in 2019, they practised as part of “Tsentr” and also in a naval exercise together with Iran in the Indian Ocean; this was followed by “Kavkaz” in 2020. The two countries have also been practising together at sea since 2012, including in the South China, Yellow and Japan Seas. Moscow and Beijing have also intensified their cooperation in the field of armaments. Since 2016, Moscow has been supplying the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with Su-35 fighter jets; in 2018, it received the first unit of the S-400 air defense system. Another significant step that went largely unnoticed by the public was the bilateral agreement on “information security” signed by Moscow and Beijing in May 2015. In this agreement, both sides pledge not to carry out cyber attacks (“pledge not to hack”) against the infrastructure of the other state and to combat technologies that could “destabilize the internal political and socio-economic situation of the countries” and “disrupt public order”.
Pragmatic motives
The fact that Moscow and Beijing are working together more closely at all levels has to do with the alienation of both sides from the West and the United States’ claim to global dominance. By closing geopolitical ranks, both sides want to curb the influence of the USA. In addition, Russia is forced to look for other economic partners due to Western sanctions. The cohesion of Moscow and Beijing is also intended to send a message to their own population and the rest of the world: we are not isolated and dependent on the West, but have alternative strategic partners at our side.
The authors of an analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace emphasize the practical advantages of defence cooperation for both sides. They note that the joint military maneuvers of Russia and China relieve both sides of the need for a large-scale troop presence on their 4,000-kilometer border, as was necessary during the Cold War, a time of mutual mistrust. What seems important to the authors in this context is the fact that the relaxed situation allows both sides to allocate their defense resources differently and to focus their defense planning on the competition with the West. In military terms, China seems to be the main beneficiary of the joint military maneuvers. In recent years, Russia has gained significant combat experience, most recently as part of its intervention in Syria. China itself, on the other hand, has hardly any operational experience and is using the joint exercises to learn from Russia and improve its own capabilities for conducting operations. An ambivalent and asymmetrical relationship
Despite common interests, the Russian-Chinese relationship is by no means free of differences. On the contrary: the relationship is asymmetrical and harbors potential for conflict. Beijing’s constant emphasis on the strategic relevance of the relationship cannot hide the fact that China sets the tone, not least due to its economic weight. China is Russia’s second most important trading partner. The Chinese economy is almost ten times the size of the Russian economy. The fact that Moscow therefore has little room for negotiation became clear when it sought economic proximity to China in 2014 as a result of Western sanctions. Beijing made demands and Moscow had to meet them. It lowered the barriers for Chinese companies that existed before 2014 and sold China oil and natural gas at more favorable conditions.
Above all, however, Moscow fears one thing: that China could use its economic weight to expand its political influence. Moscow is also concerned about China’s growing presence in Central Asia, a region that Moscow has historically regarded as its backyard. In recent years, China has invested heavily in the region – the geographical heart of China’s “One Belt One Road” infrastructure project. Russia sees this as a threat to its strategic interests. Moscow sees China’s expansion of its military presence in the region as confirmation that Beijing’s plans for the region go beyond economic cooperation. In February 2019, for example announcedthat China has been operating a secret military base in the autonomous province of Nagorno-Badakhshan on the border with Afghanistan for three years. Chinese-Tajik maneuvers and China’s support for Tajikistan in the construction of military infrastructure underline the importance that China attaches to the country, which is also strategically relevant for Russia. The partnership with China is a dilemma for Russia from which there seems to be no way out. After all, not cooperating with China is not a long-term alternative. However, Russia is trying to balance out the asymmetry in its relationship with China as far as possible, for example by supplying modern weapons to countries that rival China or have unresolved territorial conflicts, such as India and Vietnam. Hanoi, for example, has received six submarines from Moscow, which it intends to deploy in the South China Sea claimed by China. In addition to the MiG-29 fighter jets, New Delhi also agreed the purchase of S-400 air defense systems with Moscow in 2018, which are to be delivered soon. However, Moscow probably does not have much further leverage against Beijing.
