This time, our five questions go to Padraig Lysaght, Head of the Confucius Institute at the University of Vienna. We asked the China expert how relations between Washington and Beijing could develop under President Donald Trump.
Mr. Lysaght, China is seen by the USA as the major opponent in the global market for economic and military influence. What are the current main conflicts between the two superpowers and could this change under Trump?
On a military level, there is currently no real competition between the US and China. Even though the Chinese state has increased its defense budget and changed its military doctrine – simply put, away from quantity towards higher quality – there is still a very large difference between the capabilities currently available. China’s international military presence is limited to a single base in Djibouti, which is a supply post, in addition to its own region. This military presence bears no strategically meaningful relation to the comparatively overwhelming US military presence in the world, with officially around 750 bases in some 80 countries.
However, it should also be noted that China is nevertheless active in international military affairs – with almost 2,000 soldiers, China provides the largest contingent of UN peacekeepers in six current missions and the second largest financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions within the P5. In comparison, the USA currently provides 24 soldiers for UN peacekeeping forces, but pursues a different strategy, which in most cases involves unilateral or bilateral or NATO-missions in most cases. From a military perspective, there is no doubt that China is not currently in a position where it would want to challenge the US militarily.
With the current debate on AI technology, China has proven that the US sanctions in the chip sector have not had the desired effect of blocking Chinese research progress. This makes it necessary to reassess the situation in the field of AI. The side effect of the EU being back in the race for leading AI capacities should not go unmentioned.
Economic policy under “Trump 2” cannot yet be conclusively assessed. The early impression is that there is less interest in win-win situations and more in the maximum current benefit for the USA, even if the respective trading partner loses out. There seems to be a particular focus on the “privilege” of being able to trade with the USA. A circumstance which, according to current media reports, not only annoys China, but also other countries and interest groups, including the EU. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that rapid changes of direction in US policy are more than possible under “Trump 2”, which makes forecasting quite difficult.
To what extent is cooperation with Moscow useful for China to be able to assert itself against the USA?
Cooperation between China and Russia is not a new invention, but has a long and sometimes eventful history. For China, cooperation with Russia is particularly interesting for three reasons. Firstly, Russia is a large neighboring country of China. Secondly, the Chinese economy requires large quantities of raw materials, which are currently particularly cheap for China thanks to cooperation with Russia. Thirdly, cooperation with Russia has a potentially deterrent effect on a possible conflict with the USA. China alone does not have the military potential to deter the USA from intervening/attacking. In combination with Russia, however, the outcome of a conflict with the USA would be more uncertain. Especially with the current statements from Washington about what the USA would not use its military for if necessary, it can be assumed that China will currently stick to a partnership with Russia. China would also like to move closer to the EU again, but the signs from Brussels are not particularly constructive at present. China is therefore concentrating its efforts primarily on the “global South”, of which China sees itself as the champion.
What would an agreement between Trump and Putin in the Ukraine war (-> current news from the Ukraine war) and a possible détente between the two countries linked to it mean for China?
China would certainly welcome such an agreement. It is in China’s explicit interest for the war in Ukraine to end as quickly as possible. This would free up a lot of resources for the economy, especially in the EU, but also in Russia, which would greatly benefit all economies.
“In the event of a conflict, Greenland is so far away from Chinese supply lines that such a base would be untenable.”
Does Trump’s plan to bring Greenland under US control have anything to do with his fear that China could use the resources of the world’s largest island for itself?
The aim of US foreign policy in relation to Greenland is probably to make the Arctic region militarily visible to Europe and thus at least motivate the European NATO partners to increase their military budgets as desired (-> What does Donald Trump want with Greenland?). In terms of military strategy, Chinese economic influence on Greenland or in the port of Hamburg is not important. In the event of a conflict, Greenland – even if there were theoretically one or more Chinese military bases on Greenland – is so far away from Chinese supply lines that such a base would be untenable.
Of course, things are different in the economic sphere. However, we need to consider whether we are in favour of a free economy and an open global market with as few trade barriers as possible and conflict resolution based on consensus, for example through the World Trade Organization (WTO), or whether we are aiming for a renaissance of mercantilism with the highest possible protective tariffs at the expense of global trade.
If the aim is a free market, the rules of the free market should be adhered to. If unilateral protectionism is the aim, we should not be under the illusion, at least in Europe, that it is a free market. Economic solutions based on the threat of coercive military measures do not cast the best light on those who implement them and, from a historical perspective, are always doomed to failure in the long term.
“The US and Chinese economies are still closely linked.”
During the election campaign, Trump announced tariffs against China of 60 percent. Now it seems that he is being cautious towards China. While he is threatening Mexico and Canada with 25 percent import tariffs, the figure for China is just ten percent. Why is that?
Despite certain “decoupling efforts” on both sides, the US and Chinese economies are still closely linked. Many large US companies manufacture products in China and a) cannot or do not want to afford to bring production back to the US and b) cannot guarantee consistent quality and capacity, particularly in the high-tech sector, if they were to relocate production to another low-cost producing country (such as Vietnam).
This means that although various high tariffs imposed by the US would affect China, they would also affect a number of large US companies. However, we can currently see from the examples of Mexico and Canada that the tariffs are apparently being used as a motivational tool to obtain other less drastic concessions. It remains to be seen what the “Trump 2 government” expects from China and what “deal” both sides are prepared to strike with each other.
Click here to read the other articles in our “5 questions to” series.
