The NATO is celebrating its 75th anniversary this year, but what does its future in Europe look like? We spoke to political scientist Herfried Münkler about opportunities and security policy costs and why it is important that Putin is prepared for his war in Ukraine (-> current news from the Ukraine war) is paying an infinitely high price.
Mr. Münkler, in your book “World in turmoil” you describe how the USA, once the world’s policeman, is beginning to withdraw and wants to hand over security responsibility for Europe to its European NATO partners. Is this the wrong time in view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine?
From a European perspective, any time will be the wrong time. If Donald Trump wins the election, the turning away from Europe could happen abruptly. Be it through the withdrawal of US troops, be it through the questioning of Article Five of the NATO treaty. But even if the Democrats win, there will be a gradual dismantling, because the decisive challenge facing the USA lies in its global hegemonic position in the Indo-Pacific. In this respect, they must focus their attention and capabilities on this region. This is a question of grand strategy, so to speak, but something always comes up. First the Russian attack on Ukraine and now the developments in the Middle East, so that parts of this grand strategy have to be delayed for the time being.
What would the USA’s departure mean for the European NATO states?
The Europeans would be well advised to build up their own defense capabilities, at least in the conventional area. In principle, this should not be difficult for them if they cooperate, as the combined expenditure of the European NATO states far exceeds that of Russia. But the important thing is to reduce the bureaucracy of the individual armies and invest in the effectiveness and interoperability of the armed forces. And of course, sooner or later, the cost-cutters in terms of security, such as Switzerland or Austria, will also have to be told that you can’t spend hardly anything on the military or have hardly any combat troops available, but expect NATO to ensure your security.
Is the reorientation of US security policy possibly an opportunity for Europe to strengthen its geopolitical position?
Yes, you can at least see it that way. But the EU will have to go through changes that lead to the strengthening of a center, whatever that looks like, and the flattening of the edges. In a sense, a two- or three-tier membership, consisting of a group that leads and those that can go their own way much more. In other words, lowered rights, so to speak, but also lowered duties. It also needs something like a fortified periphery that stretches from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and could encompass the North African coast from Egypt to Morocco. Defined by agreements similar to the one between Turkey and the EU, only in the form of fixed relations and extended to the entire area.
Is it currently realistic to set up such a periphery?
Of course, this presupposes that the EU is manageable and that a political charlatan like Hungarian President Viktor Orbán cannot play a global political role that would otherwise not fall to his country because he happens to be President of the Council. So yes, it is an opportunity for the EU, but it is not immediately clear how it intends to use it.
In your book, you outline Russia’s attack on Ukraine as a threat to Europe. Do you still see this as a realistic scenario, that Moscow could attack further to the west and thus threaten the EU?
If one says that the geostrategic goal of the Russians was to turn the Sea of Azov and, in tendency, the Black Sea into their territory, then it is obvious that the Russians are also looking to the Baltic Sea, which was a Russian-dominated sea until 1990, at least in the eastern area. What risks they are prepared to take for control of this inland sea is another question. However, NATO’s position has changed significantly since Finland and Sweden joined. Because without the two countries, this narrow strip had no strategic depth and the three Baltic countries would hardly have been defensible. The situation is different now.
“Everything speaks in favor of not letting Putin
win this war, or that he will have to pay an infinitely high price for what he wins.”Herfried Münkler
What other consequences could a Putin victory in Ukraine have for Europe?
If peace is made in Ukraine, with Putin walking off the field with the fat spoils of Crimea and parts of Donbass, then some others will consider that a war of aggression may not be a legitimate means of international politics, but it is an effective one. And these others could be Erdoğan, or perhaps Vučić. Moscow’s success could therefore lead to unrest in terms of security policy, which would require the EU and NATO to keep things reasonably stable. Furthermore, we would have to reckon with migration movements in the region of ten million in Europe if Ukraine were to be cut off from the sea by a dictatorial peace agreement. That would be another challenge for the Europeans that could not be solved by pushbacks, but would pose challenges that endanger the internal stability of the European area.
Shouldn’t that alone be reason enough to maintain support for Ukraine?
Everything speaks in favor of not letting Putin win this war, or that he will have to pay an infinitely high price for what he wins. It should be a cautionary tale, so that it is clear to everyone: this is not how it works.
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