The widespread and successful use of combat drones in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh caused a worldwide sensation and should also be seen as a wake-up call by the European armed forces.
Until recently, military confrontation between the armies of different countries seemed to be a thing of the past. In practically all conflicts in recent decades, a (mostly) state actor or an alliance with air superiority took asymmetric action against irregular forces, militias, rebel groups or terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State. The Caucasus conflict in 2008 and the armed conflicts in Ukraine in 2014 were exceptions, which ultimately only seemed to confirm the rule in terms of outcome. Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan’s recent attempt to recapture the seven territories it has occupied since 1994 can certainly be seen as a turning point. In just 44 days, Baku’s army achieved on the battlefield what had not been possible in decades at the negotiating table. However, the military conflict, which ended on November 10, 2020 with a ceasefire brokered by Russia, can also be seen as a turning point due to the way it was conducted. Videos disseminated via social media showed destroyed tanks and radars, burning combat vehicles and soldiers frantically but hopelessly seeking cover. The images did not show the hundreds of armed drones, which were responsible for the destruction and attacks and whose brutal effectiveness ultimately left the Armenian army little chance.
It was not that the soldiers of Yerevan did not fight bravely, were poorly trained and equipped or had to make do with outdated war material. On the contrary, they often cut off and destroyed Azeri units that had advanced too far. The crux of the matter was rather that they were practising warfare that had been overtaken by the technological developments of recent years and which had a major weakness in one central area in particular: a non-networked air defence screen of ground-based air defence systems could not withstand the massive drone assault and was overwhelmed surprisingly quickly. Baku then used its Turkish and Israeli drones not only to monitor and individually eliminate the Armenian positions and heavy weapons, but also to shape and dominate the entire battlefield. Demonstrated on a large scale, the reality of a deliberate, highly coordinated and networked approach of electronic warfare, reconnaissance and surveillance and, of course, the deployment and logistics of the weapon delivery systems became apparent. The unmanned systems alone, with their miniature radar reflection the size of a small bird – and above all the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 twin hull design and the Israeli IAI-Harop “kamikaze drone” – accounted for 85 T-72A/AV/B tanks, 30 other armored combat vehicles, 32 artillery pieces, 25 multiple rocket launchers and 25 surface-to-air missile and radar systems. The latter are particularly interesting, as the Harop even destroyed three of the Russian S-300 air defense launchers 5P85S (NATO: SA-10), which are well respected in the West, as well as one 5N63 (Flap Lid) and two ST-6U/UM systems (Tin Shield). Also twelve SA-8 (Osa) and one SA-15 Tor air defense missile system, whose radar had apparently failed to detect the small, slow and barely heat-emitting signature of the Harop and was therefore unable to produce a fire control solution. In addition, Baku was aware of the locations and frequencies of the Armenian air defense system at an early stage. These had been well reconnoitred using “drones” converted to remote control from old Antonov-2 biplanes and when several of these systems were shot down at the beginning of the war, they had long since done their job. https://militaeraktuell.at/drohnenabwehr-vernetzung-geht-ueber-alles/ The massive and successful use of drones is also interesting from a European perspective, as the approach could also serve as a blueprint for future conflicts and disputes elsewhere and most European armies would probably be overwhelmed and overwhelmed just as quickly as Armenia with a similar drone scenario. This does not necessarily require billions to be invested in new ground air defense systems; most of the Russian systems in Karabakh were not completely outdated. The problem was that their sensors were no longer up to date and, above all, they were not part of a networked, integrated air situation and air defense picture. Provided that this was the case, classic anti-aircraft guns, such as the 3.5 cm used by the German armed forces, would also be suitable for combating drones, even with their Skyguard fire control system. The prerequisite for this is, of course, a Skyguard adaptation with an AESA sensor or a network with learning intelligence and so-called time-detonated fragmentation or “airburst” ammunition with a kinetic fragmentation effect.
