After Israeli aircraft destroyed an annex of the embassy in Damascus on April 1, which Iran described as a “consulate”, killing five Syrian civilians, five members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and two generals of the Al-Kuds Brigades, the widely publicized Iranian retaliation followed at the weekend: Tehran sent 185 Shahed drones, 36 Soumar cruise missiles and 110 ballistic missiles towards Israel – but only very few of them reached their target.
But first things first, let’s start with the Al-Kuds Brigades, which are a kind of elite unit of the IRGC for foreign missions – primarily for operations against Israel and the USA. The brigadier generals killed were Mohammad-Reza Zahedi (commander of the IRGC-QF in Syria) and Mohammad-Haji Rahimi (chief of operations of the IRGC-QF in Syria); Hossein Amanollahi (deputy chief of staff of the IRGC) was also among the dead. For Israel – and incidentally also for the USA – the IRGC leaders had long been legitimate targets and Israel took the opportunity to eliminate Zahedi, Rahimi and Amanollahi at the beginning of April. Tehran strongly criticized the attack and saw it – the attacked building was described as a “diplomatic facility” – as a violation of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention, from which it derived its right to self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter). Tehran threatened Israel with retaliation immediately after the attack on its generals.
A promise fulfilled
On the night of April 13-14, the time had come: for the first time ever, Iran attacked Israel directly from its own territory. At least four waves of 185 – some from Ukraine (-> current news from the Ukraine war) were sent towards Israel, taking between six and eight hours to fly over Iraq and Syria, depending on where they were launched. In addition, 36 Soumar cruise missiles (a copy of the Soviet Kh-55 type illegally procured by Iran from Ukraine in 2001), whose trajectory was first detected near the southern Iraqi city of Al-Basra (all fairly flat terrain), were sent on their way – they took between 90 and 120 minutes. In order to saturate Israeli defenses as much as possible, a total of 110 Fateh-110, Rezvan, Haj Qasem and Khaybar-Shekan ballistic missiles were also fired from Tabriz, Kermanshah, Qom, Tehran (al-Momenin), Shiraz and Isfahan – their flight time: 12 to 15 minutes. It is striking that really large models such as Sejil, Kheibar and Shabab-3, with ranges of 1,500 to a maximum of 2,200 kilometers, were apparently not involved in the attack.
Two ballistic missiles are believed to have already exploded in Iran, one directly during the launch in al-Momenin and another shortly after the launch over Kermanshah. A third missile crashed in Iraq, another was fired over Jordan (the wreckage crashed in Amman), the others are likely to have functioned as planned. Since some missiles had multiple warheads (or multiple re-entry-vehicles, MIRV) (see also picture on the right), and many missiles are now also equipped with decoys, the Israeli armed forces and their allies had to detect and engage more targets than were actually in the air. As a result, during the first wave of the Iranian ballistic missile attack, the operational defensive missiles appear to have run out and some batteries could not be reloaded in time before the second and third waves – in line with the intended oversaturation.
Almost completely neutralized
To make matters worse for Israel, the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon, Kuds-led militias in Iraq and the Iranian-armed Houthis in Yemen also took part in the attack. Nevertheless, according to Israeli army spokesman Daniel Hagari, all kamikaze drones, 103 of the 110 approaching ballistic missiles (warheads) and all cruise missiles were intercepted or destroyed. The seven ballistic warheads (or their MIRVs) that got through fell on the Israeli air force bases in Ramon and Nevatim, but reportedly did not cause any damage there that would affect operations. F-35I Adir are stationed at both bases, Nevatim is the training base for the latest type, from where Heyl Ha’Avir (IAF) also flew the aforementioned attack on the Iranians in Damascus.
Extensive support
All in all, Jerusalem claimed a remarkable defensive success. However, this was only possible thanks to the support of various allies, such as the USA. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III emphasized in a statement on 13 April, when the launch of the drones and first missiles was announced, that on the instructions of President Joe Biden, the US armed forces in the Middle East “are on hand to protect US troops and partners in the region and to continue to support the defense of Israel”. On behalf of the US government, he condemned “the reckless and unprecedented attacks by Iran and its proxies” and called on Tehran to “immediately cease all further attacks, including by its proxy forces, and de-escalate tensions”. According to Lloyd J. Austin, the US does not seek conflict with Iran, but “will not hesitate to act to protect our forces and support the defense of Israel if necessary”. Thanks to the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), Washington knows exactly when ballistic missiles are being launched somewhere. It will probably also be possible to detect cruise missiles at an early stage, even though they have a different infrared signature profile to ballistic missiles.
Watch IDF Chief of the General Staff LTG Herzi Halevi thank ???????? @CENTCOM, ????????Armed forces, ???????? Armed Forces and other partners for their participation in Operation Iron Shield and address the Iranian attack: pic.twitter.com/YIlAQBXdjY
– Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) April 15, 2024
Israeli F-35Is and F-15Is, together with the Jordan-based USAF F-15Es of the 494th and 335th Fighter Squadrons in the air-to-air role over Iraq and Syria (the Russians in Hmeimim/Latakia were probably notified and remained inactive), staged a major “drone shootout”. In addition to Jordanian jets and US destroyers with SM3 interceptor missiles, a French ship and, according to the British Royal Air Force (RAF), Typhoons from RAF Akrotiri (Cyprus) were also involved.
Previously, the UK government of Prime Minister Rishi Sunak had also issued a similar statement to the US. It is noteworthy that all interception maneuvers took place in airspace outside Israel and were coordinated with the US Central Command (CENTCOM). As an effect of Israel’s new alliances with former enemy states in the Middle East that have emerged since President Donald Trump, these states – for example Saudi Arabia – have closed their airspace to civilian aircraft for the duration of the attack and thus cleared it for Israeli and coalition jets. Saudi jets are also said to have engaged the targets approaching from the south of Yemen.
The drones and missiles that did get through were then – as can be seen in many agency and private videos – almost completely destroyed by the three layers of Israeli ground-based air defense (Iron Dome, Davids Sling and Arrow III). According to Israeli TV reports, the casualty figures are manageable, with one seriously injured 7-year-old Bedouin girl in the Negev region and twelve lightly injured.
Further escalation?
Although the failure did not stop numerous people in Iran from calling loudly and ecstatically for the “punishment” and “destruction” of the Zionist arch-enemy in front of Western embassies and celebrating the attack, Israeli and neighboring airspace was reopened to civilian air traffic just seven hours after the attack, and air raid sirens sounded the all-clear.
In an initial reaction, official Tehran spoke of a “great success”, and although an army general described the attack as over in a TV interview, the question for the international community is whether Israel now wants to further escalate the escalation spiral with a reaction. In any case, US President Joe Biden signaled to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by telephone on 14 April that the USA does not want or support a direct retaliatory strike on Iranian territory. Although Prime Minister “Bibi” Netanyahu did not rule out “reactions” from his war cabinet immediately after the attacks, he did not explicitly announce them.
This is what a 99% interception rate looks like. Operational footage from the Aerial Defense System protecting the Israeli airspace: pic.twitter.com/eAwcUPUDw2
– Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) April 14, 2024
According to security policy analyst Wolfgang Pusztai, however, an Israeli counter-attack seems “very likely”. The Senior Advisor of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) and former Austrian military attaché in Arab countries said in an interview with the Salzburger Nachrichten“The Iranian airstrike on Israel – even if it was not really successful – is a completely new dimension in the Middle East conflict. From Israel’s point of view, we must not lose the respect of the Islamic world and Iran in particular. If Israel does not make it clear after these Iranian attacks that this is no way to deal with the country, it is only a matter of time before the next missiles are launched towards Israel.”
In any case, one lesson that can already be learned is that missile and missile defense works if it is available on a large scale (which is probably expensive) and deployed with determination. There is no doubt that the attack – and the defense against it – will lead to far-reaching and profound military and strategic insights.
False repetition is therefore no truer
It is also important to clear up a still-present misinformation: On April 14, a major domestic daily newspaper reported that “Israel will contribute a central component of the Sky Shield air defense system with the Israeli-American long-range air defense system Arrow III (which, by the way, according to IDF spokesman Hagari, also functioned in action for the first time on the night of the attack) and will thus secure the airspace of 15 countries, including Austria, in the future”.
No. Firstly, there are now 21 countries (-> Switzerland also recently joined the Sky Shield Initiative) and as previously explained on this pagethe – so far only planned for export by Germany from 2025 onwards – Arrow III system has nothing to do with Sky Shield. Lieutenant General Lutz Kolhaus (deputy inspector of the German Air Force) made this clear once again last December to the German Society for Security Policy: “The necessary political constellation around the German Arrow III with Israel and the USA is not feasible with (note: at that time) 19 ESSI nations.”
In the Austrian Armed Forces on the other hand, plans are currently only being made for medium-range ground-based air defense (GBAD-MR) on the basis of approved project intentions. The approximately two billion euros earmarked for this had already been planned before the German ESSI invitation – but will now probably be invested as part of the Sky Shield purchasing group. In addition, there is currently only a basic decision by the Council of Ministers from autumn 2023 for long-range missile defense, including exo-atmospheric long-range missiles. Procurement – initially purely national – could begin in 2027 at the earliest. Assuming appropriate agreements are reached with Israel and the USA, Arrow III will then also be on the table, although a different system may also be chosen.
