At the beginning of January, Ukraine expert Colonel of the General Staff Service Markus Reisner in an impressive essay a sober outlook on almost two years of Ukraine war and the current European security environment. The British analyst Professor Justin Bronk from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London now sees the situation even more bleakly. “The next two to three years will be decisive for Europe’s security in the coming decades.”
In his contribution, Reisner stated that the population in the West still secretly wished that “everything would go back to the way it was as quickly as possible”. And this is mainly out of convenience. The war that Russia unleashed on the edge of the EU almost two years ago is highly unpleasant for many Europeans and their politicians, but the fighting is still often seen as an annoying and hopefully temporary distraction from other challenges and “from enjoying the prosperity to which we are entitled”. Reisner went on to say that developments in recent years have not taken this into account, which is why we in the West are now facing a dilemma. According to the analyst, it is to be feared that the “good old days” as we see them are over for the foreseeable future.
British analyst Justin Bronk, with whom Militär Aktuell has been in regular contact since the Defence IQ Salzburg Security Conference in 2019 and who stated in his outlook on the war in Ukraine, also published at the beginning of the year: “I’d rather be alarmist than ambushed”.
Justin Bronk …
… on the military prospects for the further course of the war in Ukraine
“Yes, air defense systems are an important factor, especially for a defender with a weakened air force, straddled between covering the frontline units and protecting the rear. But this war is still an artillery war. 80 percent of the losses among the fighting soldiers – and this applies to both sides – are caused by artillery. If Ukraine tends to have fewer and fewer shells at its disposal, the current high Russian casualty rate will probably decrease. And this means that – leaving aside all moral nuances – the further course of the war will be decided by the question of whether the Ukrainians succeed in killing or seriously wounding enough Russians to ‘balance out’ and bind the new forces coming in from the mobilization. As long as Ukraine succeeds in doing this, as it did last year or in the first year of the war, it will be difficult for the Russians to prepare and deploy large offensive formations. For purely defensive operations, you need manpower and cover such as trench systems and bunkers, as well as systems that work in the enemy’s depths and, of course, ammunition. For offensive operations and a war of movement, however, you need large formations – at least at brigade level – with trained infantry, with EloKa and drones, armored personnel carriers and logistics and staffs that orchestrate the interaction of the forces. Providing all this takes time. The Ukrainians are finding it increasingly difficult to operate at this level – partly because their training and reserve areas are within the enemy’s missile range. And offensive operations are difficult for the Russians to initiate due to their high personnel losses. If the Ukrainians manage to keep the casualty rates among the Russian soldiers high, this is likely to remain the case and they could possibly take the initiative again in the spring and thus signal to their international partners that they will continue to support them.”
… on Western versus Russian capacities
“As long as they are so tied up in Ukraine and wear themselves out there, the Russians pose no direct conventional threat to us in Europe. However, after the surprisingly serious setbacks and embarrassing shortcomings at the beginning of the war, the country has now switched to a war economy and has seen massive increases in production of everything from missiles to artillery ammunition. Military spending rose by 68 percent last year to 4.5 percent of gross domestic product and Russia produced almost twice as much war materiel in 2023 as in the previous year. Added to this are supplies from North Korea and Iran, which makes it very likely that the Russians, who are gearing up for a long and grueling war, will take the initiative in the spring. In comparison, the West is not bringing its production up to a comparable level, many warehouses have already been emptied, making it increasingly difficult and costly for European and Western countries to provide sustainable support for Ukraine. In future, the discussion could no longer be about how to support Ukraine so that it can continue the war, but whether it would be better to replenish its own stocks in view of the growing Russian threat. Of course, the governments could have done this a long time ago, but they didn’t recognize the signs of the times and now they are surprised by the situation and are increasingly recognizing their own vulnerability – a feeling that they haven’t known for so many years.”
“sustainable support for Ukraine is becoming increasingly difficult and costly for European and Western countries.”
… on the general situation in the West
“If we continue to judge this war only from month to month and disregard the medium to long-term perspective, then I am concerned that the urgently needed investments will not be made or will not be made in time. Politicians must understand, or will have to understand, that this will be a long-lasting situation from a political point of view as well. And if they don’t take care of production and supplies, the war will still go on – but the situation will be much more dangerous in that case and we will have to invest much more later on to defend ourselves against a much more dangerous Russia. Furthermore, there is also the threat of escalation elsewhere in the world and this will not change any time soon – just look at the latest reports on China’s military build-up plans, for example. The US sees itself tied down by Beijing’s rearmament plans, mainly in the Indo-Pacific, and should something actually happen in the Indo-Pacific, the Russians could have a fresh incentive to take action. Moscow and the so-called “global South” are already benefiting from the new crisis in Gaza and the Red Sea. This is why we in Europe need to ramp up investment in more production capacity on the one hand, and on the other, those responsible need to make it clear to their voters that the investment is not going somewhere abroad, but is being used to promote their own industry and employment situation on a grand scale. If you consider the enormous resources that nations often use to stimulate the economy with subsidies and loans, then the same funds could also be pumped into defense-related production. But this must happen promptly. In my opinion, we only have two or at most three years to do this.” https://militaeraktuell.at/kommandouebergabe-beim-eufor-kontingent/ ... on his possibly overly alarmist or pessimistic views
“Yes, I know my outlook sounds very gloomy. But much of the political and public debate about defense and military matters in Europe and in the UK is still dominated by the attitude that the Ukraine war is an unpleasant and unwelcome distraction from other policy areas and tasks. Yes, the war is uncomfortable and inconvenient. And yes, supporting Ukraine is difficult and expensive and we did not choose this situation. But we must now make the best of it and finally understand that this is not a green table game. We are talking about a real war here, which requires swift and consistent decisions, and in many cases I do not yet see these. That’s why I prefer to be alarmist rather than cautious and why I see it as my job to point out the situation. Of course, there is a risk that people will tell me in two or three years’ time that I was far too worried and saw things too darkly. But I can live with that. It’s better this way than if, after the same period of time – and this is the time it takes to make substantial changes in the sector – we possibly have to recognize a “victorious peace” by Russia.
Then the situation would only have worsened, we would be facing a substantially stronger Russia and would be vulnerable to blackmail on many levels, and such a situation must be avoided at all costs.”
