Through military diplomatic channels, Militär Aktuell recently had the opportunity to interview the commander of a Ukrainian helicopter squadron about his experiences and current daily challenges on the battlefield in Ukraine. For security reasons, it was requested that the officer’s full name be kept confidential.
Lieutenant Colonel, the Ukrainian helicopter crews became known in 2022, after the start of the Russian attack, primarily for their supply flights to the encircled Mariupol and subsequently also to the Azov Valley steelworks. How do the events of that time look from today’s perspective?
In the so-called “Operation Corridor”, some heroes were born in our ranks, some of whom have unfortunately had to make the ultimate sacrifice. The aforementioned evacuation flights of the wounded and supply flights with ammunition, equipment and medicines into the cauldron all took place between March and May 2022. The weather was often poor during these days and the helicopters flew at very low altitudes, usually only ten to 20 meters high. This made it difficult for the enemy to fight, but power lines and trees posed constant dangers. In total, 45 crews with 15 helicopters flew almost 30 rescue missions in pairs or fours. Almost 100 seriously wounded were flown out of the Azov Valley steelworks alone. Unfortunately, we also lost three Mi-8 helicopters and their crews to enemy fire and accidents. However, we are still involved in similarly delicate missions, most recently and currently at Robotyne and Avdiivka, for example.
What is the most dangerous part of typical missions?
Typically, almost nothing happens, but the risk usually increases on the return flight. If our mission was “painful” for the Russians, then their defenses are on alert throughout the area and the risk of enemy fire increases dramatically. At the same time, our crews tend to be exhausted and in such situations the countermeasures we carry are often only available to a limited extent or have already been used up. On our side, Mi-8s and Mi-17s are mostly affected; the losses of Mi-24/P combat helicopters are more than manageable in comparison. The situation is different for the “aggressor”, who has almost exclusively lost combat helicopters to our air defense. Ka-52s in particular, 30 aircraft are said to have already been lost.
How does the Ukrainian air force protect its aircraft on the ground? And at what levels are deceptions used to prevent reconnaissance of and attacks on the aircraft as far as possible?
Good question, but you’re right: our helicopters are at their most vulnerable when they’re on the ground. That’s why we are constantly changing our bases of operation. After all, helicopters can be used from any location that is suitable for temporary deployment. These do not have to be fortified bases; it is enough to be able to bring weapons, fuel and other control and communication equipment to the often forward, but in any case concealed and sometimes camouflaged base. We usually manage to keep the location unknown to the Russians – at least as long as we are there. However, depending on the frontline situation, this is usually not for too long.
Since the beginning of the war, both sides have also been shot down by their own forces. How can it be ensured that this does not happen – after all, the aircraft are also deployed in the immediate vicinity of or even above the battlefield.
To avoid this “friendly fire”, we rely primarily on national “friend or foe” detection systems, which, however, cannot be used extensively in our own infantry brigades for technical reasons. The brigades are often equipped with foreign MANPADS air defense systems but these cannot be combined with our detection systems. That’s why we also use visual recognition signs, i.e. larger markings, on our machines. We also warn our own forces using conventional communication and increasingly automated battle management systems, which our forces are beginning to use more and more.
Can you tell us more about this? For example, how the system works in practice?
Our helicopters are painted with yellow and blue flags and roundels on the sides, belly and tail boom. MANPADS operators should be able to recognize these easily in normal visibility conditions. The thick white stripes on the stern have also proved to be very useful. If the Ukrainian flags on the helicopters are not visible due to poor lighting and visibility conditions, the MANPADS operators can recognize the number of white stripes and thus identify the helicopter. This is important because a MANPADS operator does not normally listen to the radio while preparing to fire.
And how does it work the other way around? How can helicopter pilots avoid hitting their own infantry?
We use secure communication systems for this purpose. When a helicopter is deployed against the enemy, an automated coordinate reference system is activated in advance to show where our troops are located. Each battalion and brigade commander has a radio station from which he can communicate directly with our crews. If there is an operational movement of our own forces and equipment, the battalion or brigade reports the location of their own forces and the enemy forces they have detected, giving the coordinates. This actually works very well.
Is there an optimal balance between the use of manned and unmanned systems?
The changing situation on the battlefield actually dictates this balance, although the trend is of course clearly moving in the direction of unmanned. The capabilities of the various drones are growing and we are using them more and more frequently – but we also need other means of deployment. If the terrain is not saturated with air defense systems and we can assume that we can carry out a mission with a manageable risk of 20 to 30 percent, we use manned equipment because it allows us to carry out missions more effectively. If the risk is higher, we always choose unmanned systems.
What do you think this ratio should ideally look like for the battlefields of tomorrow?
Today, it is no longer possible to conduct combat operations, especially offensive operations, without air support. The battlefield of tomorrow should therefore look like this: Manned and unmanned systems should – ideally – destroy up to 100 percent of the enemy’s firepower and fortifications from the air, and then infantry and mechanized equipment should be used to clean up, clear and secure the area. This means that future wars will be decided in the sky.
