D-Day: Deadly correction over Omaha Beach

For readers interested in military history and familiar with English, Militär Aktuell can recommend the excellent softcover books in the Osprey book series series. On the occasion of the D-Day anniversary, the following title caught our eye: D-Day 1944 – The Deadly Failure of Allied Heavy Bombing on June 6.

The author Stephen Bourque, who after 20 years in the US Army Stephen Bourque, who received his doctorate from Georgia State University until 1992 after 20 years in the US Army, teaches European, American and military history at several colleges and universities, including California State University-Northridge, Norwich University and the US Army Command and General Staff College. He addresses a hitherto unknown detail that he says has been “buried” in USAF historiography: The real reason, based on his research, why thousands of US soldiers died on Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944. In his opinion, this should not have happened, or at least not to this extent.

Joint fire plan was agreed

On the eve of the long-awaited invasion, the staff of the German 7th Army could read maps just as well as the Allies. It developed defensive belts of bunkers and resistance nests with anti-tank guns, mortars and machine-gun positions to prevent access to the beach and thwart any landings in this section. These critical points had been reconnoitred by the Allies dozens of times by air and were the focus of the target request from the commander of the 1st US Army, General Omar Bradley, to the unified headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF).

„Ohne digitales Fundament bleibt Europas Verteidigungsfähigkeit Stückwerk“

He also called for attacks on two more groups of enemy positions on both flanks that could interfere with the landing. Under “Field Order 727”, General Courtney Hodges (Bradley’s deputy) was to deploy 75 squadrons of six aircraft each – a total of 450 aircraft – to attack and eliminate these 13 targets immediately prior to the initial landing. This plan was approved by the combined air, ground and naval commanders and coordinated all supporting fire for the ground attack on all Normandy beaches.

The joint fire plan had been in the works since January 1944, after General Dwight D. Eisenhower (-> the Whos Who of the Imperial War Museum’s D-Day) had taken over the leadership of COSSAC planning (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander). By April, representatives of all three branches of the armed forces had developed a general outline for the coordination of supporting fire on the various sections during the major attack. Target selection was based on the requirements of the army and corps commanders for capturing their beach sections. The final fire plan, published on April 8, 1944, and signed by the chiefs of staff of all component commanders, established the guidelines for air and naval fire support during the invasion.

The staff of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group (consisting of the 1st US Army and the 2nd British Army) took the lead in identifying enemy positions to be destroyed or neutralized. The planning groups of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay (commander of all Allied naval operations) and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory (commander of all Allied air operations) determined which German defenses had to be attacked or destroyed to support the landing.

The first target were the heavy, bunkered German artillery batteries, for example in Merville, Longues-sur-Mer and Crisbecq, which could fight the invasion fleet at a distance. RAF Bomber Command was therefore to attack them first from midnight. The plan then concentrated on the prepared German positions, in particular on 97 so-called resistance nests (WN). “The neutralization of the beach defences requires that they be combated by air attacks, even if, due to their nature, complete destruction can only be achieved in a few cases,” the plan stated. In separate annexes, the planners listed which enemy positions were to be bombed and when:

• A: Batteries for air raids before D-Day
• B: Cover targets for air raids immediately before D-Day
• C: Attacks on batteries by bombers on D-Day before the H hour
• D: Beach targets for daylight bombing raids on D-Day, immediately before the attack
• E: Further targets for air strikes during D-Day
• F: Targets for naval bombardments
• G: Targets that were particularly suitable for fighter-bombers

Not included was Montgomery’s call to slow the movement of enemy reserve forces onto the battlefield. Although senior commanders and staff officers were in agreement, the Joint Fire Plan was still far from being implemented at this point and now became the “intellectual property” of planners at subordinate levels. These officers had to distribute hundreds of targets in France and Belgium to over 678 air squadrons with 12,600 aircraft of all types. They had to plan the flight routes in such a way that the planes did not interfere with each other on take-off and return and that the dropping of parachutists was not disrupted.

Schweiz prüft weitere Vorgehensweise bei F-35-Beschaffung

On May 26, less than two weeks before the landing expected on June 5, Professor Solly Zuckerman, scientific advisor to Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, presented an analysis of the previous attacks on the German coastal batteries. At the end of May 1944, the US 8th Air Fleet reported that only 37 percent of all bombs dropped hit within 300 meters of the target. Zuckerman noted that Allied bombers had already dropped 8,700 tons of bombs on fortified targets in the “Neptune” (naval component of Operation Overlord) and “Fortitude” (deceptive front opposite the fortifications at Calais) areas. Of 51 guns attacked in the Neptune area, only 18 were partially damaged, and only 26 of 101 in the Fortitude area. Not a single gun was completely destroyed.

Zuckerman calculated that it would take around 97 sorties and 420 tons of bombs to hit a single gun. For a near miss, the heavy bombers would have to drop around 2,500 bombs. These findings worried the army and navy command, who wanted to see the targets destroyed before the landing troops arrived. In addition, the weather forecasts posed a problem for the air commanders.

Tedder doubted whether the landings could take place if the bombers did not find their targets. However, General Jimmy Doolittle, commander of the 8th US Army Air Force (USAAF), who himself flew reconnaissance in a P-38 on D-Day, assured the ground commanders that his bombers could neutralize the German positions on the beach, weather conditions permitting. His bold claim – backed by his reputation as the leader of the Tokyo bombing campaign – convinced the ground commanders. They trusted his assurance and assumed that the US 8th Air Fleet would effectively and forcefully neutralize most beach targets.

The change of plan

Doolittle relied on the relatively high accuracy of his bombers in 1944. If he had been allowed to carry out the mission as originally announced to his colleagues and superiors, the 8th Air Fleet would most probably have put many German positions in the target area out of action. Protected casemates might have survived, but trenches, supply depots, exposed artillery batteries and telephone lines in the rear areas would have been damaged or destroyed. In any case, the defenders would have been considerably weakened in the decisive phase.

However, there was still disagreement among the leaders and planners of the 8th Air Fleet about the danger of hitting their own soldiers in the landing craft on the way to the coast. Sometime after June 4, Doolittle’s staff therefore changed the concept. As it became apparent that the unfavorable weather conditions would necessitate the use of a method based on navigation via GEE fixes and bomb drops using H2X pathfinder instruments, it was apparently deemed advisable to take additional precautions to avoid bomb hits on friendly troops.

The time interval between the end of the bombing of the immediate beach sections and the landing of the first attack waves had already been extended from five minutes (according to the visual bombing plan) to ten minutes (according to the “revised bombing plan for overcast skies”). In consultation with AEAF headquarters, it was now decided that if cloud cover prevented visual target acquisition, the bombs would be dropped on the Pathfinder signal as usual, but with the proviso that the drop would be delayed so that the mean impact point of the bomb carpet was at least 1,000 yards (about 910 meters) from the foremost wave of landing troops.

US-Armee und Lockheed Martin erreichen Meilenstein bei RIG-360

The new plan therefore called for the H2X operator in the Pathfinder lead aircraft, sitting behind the pilot at a console, to delay the drop. This was done by giving the bombardier – who coordinated the dropping of the bomber group – the order not to release the bombs until five to 30 seconds after target acquisition, depending on the target. As none of the following aircraft had H2X devices, these aircraft were dropped a few seconds later anyway. The delay was supposedly intended to avoid casualties among the landing troops. At the same time, however, it inevitably reduced the damage that could be inflicted on the German defenders.

A delay of just five seconds meant that the bombers overshot their planned target by almost 300 meters. A delay of 30 seconds even shifted the bombing by around one mile (1.6 kilometers) south of the actual defensive positions.

Who specifically changed this?

Few details have survived about who ordered this change. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at the decision-makers of this planning cell in the command. Brigadier General Orvil A. Anderson, Chief of A-3 (Operations), began his career as a balloonist, spent time in the Air War Plans Division, and was instrumental in developing the basic American doctrine of strategic air power. As an operations officer under Doolittle, he oversaw the plans and operations for the so-called “Big Week” in February, which inflicted heavy losses on the German fighter force even before the invasion (1,000 German fighters killed or wounded). Anderson was most likely at the center of this decision. After the war, he became the founder and first Commandant of the Air War College.

His deputy, and another key figure, was Col. Walter E. Todd. Todd had previously been deputy chief of the air element of the Strategy and Policy Group in the War Department before joining the command in May. There he was involved in the decision to change bombing schedules. He later wrote a detailed operational report for General “Hap” Arnold in Washington in November, outlining the role of the US 8th Air Fleet. In doing so, Todd attempted to conceal responsibility for the inadequate performance. Whether by coincidence or not, Todd later took on assignments in Moscow, Japan and Korea and eventually also became commander of the Air University War College at Maxwell.

Col. Chester P. Gilger, Chief of Tactical Research on the Operations Staff, was also involved in the process. He had previously flown 15 missions with the B-17 in the 95th Bomb Group (including Regensburg in 1943) and led a team to Normandy in July 1944 to inspect the drop sites and assess the damage to German defenses.

It is highly likely that Brigadier General John A. Samford, Doolittle’s Chief of Staff, was also involved in the decision. Any contact between the 8th Air Force and the AEAF staff required his approval. Samford later followed Anderson to Maxwell, where he commanded the Air Command and Staff School and the Air War College.

His deputy, Brig. Gen. John S. “Jack” Allard, one of Doolittle’s closest friends since flight school in 1918, took over as chief of staff in mid-June. Allard had been deputy chief of staff of the 8th Air Force since March, and there were few people – whether in uniform or not – whom Doolittle trusted more. This group and their subordinate colonels, none of them with combat experience on the ground, apparently made this momentous decision in the middle of the night before the invasion.

Later, when US Army historians were gathering information for the “American Forces in Action” series, the very late change in bombing times attracted particular interest. The historian of the 8th Air Fleet, Major Thomas R. Parker, wrote a summary of the events late in the evening of June 5. The so-called “Parker Memorandum” describes how, on the eve of the invasion, planners struggled with their calculations and were – quite understandably – worried about hitting their own troops: “These officers felt that the overall results of the heavy bomber attacks in the target area would be better if the number of bombs dropped along the coastline was reduced and a large proportion of them were dropped in the communications and reserve areas behind the beaches.”

Bosses no longer taught

However, these planners did not inform any of the senior commanders who were already at sea. In essence, Anderson and Todd, who are not named in the memo, overrode both Doolittle’s decisions and the specific targets set by Bradley and General Sir Miles C. Dempsey (commander of the 2nd British Army and the British and Canadian sections). Parker concluded his report by saying: “Further studies are being carried out at this headquarters and it is hoped that more accurate information will be available in the near future.”

However, these also failed to materialize later. No one in the USAAF or in the US Air Force (USAF), which existed from 1947, ever took responsibility for this decision. Written records that could shed light on the last-minute decision-making process do not exist. Thus, Parker’s “interpretation” of events, undoubtedly written with the support of the Operations Staff, became part of the official narrative and the USAF’s official history of the conflict.

For the most part, the memorandum accurately reflects the events, but one paragraph is a serious distortion: “This decision was discussed with the commanding generals, the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. This change in the original plan was made, although at the last moment, with the approval of the headquarters to which the Eighth Air Fleet was subordinate.” However, this is simply false for the 1st and 29th Division regiments on Omaha. Neither Eisenhower nor anyone at Leigh-Mallory’s headquarters agreed to this change.

After Eisenhower had decided to carry out “Overlord” and “Neptune” respectively, he spent the day watching the ships being loaded in Portsmouth Harbour, eating lunch and playing a checkers with his aide Harry Butcher. In the late afternoon, he visited the 101st Airborne Division, had the familiar, much-photographed conversations with the paratroopers and then prepared for a press conference with the journalists assigned to his headquarters. The central topics of the day concerned the French government, the role of Charles de Gaulle and the political aspects of the invasion. Neither his notes nor the thousands of surviving documents contain any indication that he had learned of the change in bombing times before the morning of June 6.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander of the AEAF, was killed in a plane crash in November, along with his wife and close associates, before he could write his memoirs. However, his deputy, Hoyt Vandenberg (later a four-star general and Chief of Staff of the USAF in 1952), kept a detailed diary. On the night of June 5-6, Vandenberg and General Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the USAAF in Europe, visited the AEAF battle room and noted that “everything was going according to plan”.

Due to his connections to Doolittle’s headquarters, Vandenberg could – and should – have known about the modification. Nevertheless, Doolittle, who had assured the ground troops that the bombs would be dropped precisely, only found out about the modification after the start of “Overlord”, according to his own statements. Omar Bradley, commander of the 1st US Army, expressed his surprise and anger days later when he found out about it.

Author Bourque calls the claim that the subordinate staff informed Eisenhower and the AEAF commander a bold-faced lie. No one at headquarters informed Eisenhower or his chief of staff, General Bedell Smith, of this fundamental change in the Joint Fire Plan. Only a copy of the field order that arrived shortly after midnight on June 6 proves that the AEAF staff was aware of the change. This “Field Order 727B” aimed to achieve “maximum destruction and neutralization of the targets in support of the assault forces landing in the target area”. It was essentially the same as the original, but contained the instruction to deliberately delay the bombing.

Accordingly, the bombs were to be dropped just behind the planned targets. The exact drop time depended on the arrival of the bombers at the target and the distance to the landing troops. Accordingly, the bombardiers had to delay the drop by five to 30 seconds in order to avoid endangering their own forces. At a speed of 210 to 240 km/h, a delay of 15 seconds meant that the bombs hit half a mile (800 meters) behind the target.

As the other aircraft in a formation – up to 36 bombers – were guided by the lead aircraft, bombs could fall almost anywhere within a radius of half a mile or more around the target. However, under the weather conditions in May and June 1944, the technically highly developed Norden bombsight hardly achieved any usable accuracy.

Polen lässt 48 F-16 auf F-16 Viper-Standard modifizieren

The order came into effect at 1:00 a.m. on June 6. No one ever acknowledged this decision, and to this day no documents exist that reconstruct the decision-making and approval process. The result: although no German soldiers were hit, neither were the German defenders, whose elimination would have been the actual objective.

Sobering results

• On June 6, at 00:30, 200 Lancaster bombers of No. 1 Group of RAF Bomber Command attack the coastal artillery batteries at Crisbecq and St. Martin de Varreville.

• At 01:25, No. 6 Group of RAF Bomber Command bombs the coastal artillery battery at Merville with 88 Lancaster and Stirling bombers.

• Between 4.14 am and 6.15 am, Groups 3, 4, 5 and 6 of RAF Bomber Command with a total of 770 Lancaster, Halifax and Stirling bombers flew attacks on targets in Ouistreham, Maisy, Mont Fleury, St. Pierre du Mont, La Pernelle, Houlgate and Longues. However, the Longues battery with four 15 cm guns remains fully intact and is still a highlight of any Normandy tour today.

• Between 04:43 and 05:57, the IX Bomber Command of the 9th US Air Fleet bombed the coastal batteries at Houlgate, Ouistreham, Pointe du Hoc and Maisy with 39 B-26 medium-range bombers.

• At 06:00, the IX Bomber Command of the 9th US Air Fleet attacks the German defense positions on the Cotentin Peninsula over Utah Beach with 300 B-26 medium-range bombers. This is the most effective attack of the entire morning, as it is flown along the beach – and not head-on. At the same time, 16 B-26s attack an artillery battery near Montfairville.

• At the same time, the main fleet of the 2nd Bomber Division of the 8th US Air Fleet (2nd Bombardment Division) attacks German positions on Omaha Beach with 450 B-24 Liberator bombers. However, all bombs fall short of the intended targets. At 07:00, the 1st Bomber Division of the 8th US Air Fleet deployed 422 B-17 Flying Fortress bombers against the German defenses at Gold Beach and Juno Beach; here, too, the positions remained undamaged. 66 B-17s attempt to bomb Caen, but fail to find the target and return without having achieved anything.

• The 3rd Bomber Division of the 8th US Air Fleet attacks beach targets at the Juno and Sword sections. At 07:00, 366 heavy B-17s reach their targets, but miss all targets. At 07:46, 96 B-24s of the same division arrive over Caen, fail to identify their targets and drop no bombs.

• At 05:00, the naval task forces East and West arrive off the invasion coast. From 06:00, the naval guns open fire on German coastal defense batteries and pockets of resistance.

• From 06.30 in the American sector and from 07.00 in the Commonwealth sector, five Allied divisions land on the invasion beaches.

None of the targets were destroyed or neutralized as planned in the order. The fact that this part of the “Overlord” mission had effectively failed completely only became apparent when the landing craft ramps fell on the beaches: particularly devastating at Omaha, but also, albeit less drastically, at Gold, Juno and Sword. The consequences of the “Plan B” orders were catastrophic for the landing troops. As all defensive positions were missed, German infantry and artillery were able to keep the landing US troops under massive fire for hours. Missing the bases in Vierville-sur-Mer (WN 70s) and Colleville-sur-Mer (WN 60s) was particularly costly.

Persistent – but nevertheless incorrect

Another Air Force historian who worked with Parker during Operation Overlord was Robert H. George of the 9th US Air Force. He wrote the chapter on the role of the Air Force during the invasionwhich was published in 1951. Based on the Parker memorandum, George declared that the decision had been made “in the interest of greater security and with Eisenhower’s approval”. However, Parker himself never mentions that Eisenhower gave his approval, only that there were consultations between various staff officers. Was this George’s own addition, or did it reflect the influence of someone else in the Air Force chain of command?

All those involved were still in active service and influential in 1951. They could possibly have seen this part for themselves. Nevertheless, this false report has since appeared in numerous books and articles about the invasion. As recently as 2013, the renowned journalist and historian Rick Atkinson wrote that the purpose of the bombing by the US 8th Air Fleet was “to neutralize the German defenders under the weight of metal. […] And on the evening of June 5, Eisenhower authorized another abrupt change requested by the US 8th Air Fleet.”

That is simply not true. On the contrary, Bradley and Dempsey were determined to neutralize the German battle positions, and Supreme Commander Eisenhower would never have approved the decision of the 8th Air Force staff planners to make the change.

No one was injured, all weapons intact

Why was this so important? Well, this is how the Germans experienced these crucial minutes in modern history: shortly after six o’clock in the morning, 35 soldiers of the 352nd and 716th Infantry Divisions occupied their positions in Resistance Nest 62, one of three defensive positions blocking the road to Colleville-sur-Mer. Today, this complex is just a few minutes’ walk from the American military cemetery on the heights and is one of the best-known and best-studied defensive installations on the beach.

Particularly striking were the two R612 bunkers, each housing a 75-millimeter FK235 gun, which was aimed westwards along the coast. There were also two 50-millimeter anti-tank guns, several mortars and machine guns. The soldiers had been on alert since two o’clock and were on the lookout for the invasion fleet. A few minutes after taking up positions, 54 four-engine US bombers roared in. The defenders jumped into tunnels and concrete bunkers to seek shelter from the more than 130 tons of bombs that struck in their vicinity. There seemed to be no end to the detonations – shock waves rattled the bunkers, the noise deafened the ears, and dust and debris filled the air, nose and ear canals.

But just as suddenly it was over. The gray, dust-covered soldiers crawled out from their cover to assess the situation. Miraculously, no one was injured, no weapon damaged. Behind them, fields, hedgerows and individual farmsteads were ablaze, while the bombers turned to the west. Lieutenant Bernard Frerking, an artillery observer, picked up the phone and reached his battery commander a few kilometers inland. Despite the massive bombardment, the connection was intact and all 105-millimeter guns were ready to fire. “Nothing’s happened to us, Herr Leutnant – we’re ready, waiting for your briefing,” it croaked from the receiver.

With the exception of Utah Beach in the far west of the Cotentin Peninsula, the result was similar along the entire German defense line. The positions and bunkers were ten to 50 meters above sea level and offered excellent views of the beaches, which were up to 200 meters deep. If left undamaged, German machine gun, mortar and artillery fire – as depicted in the famous opening sequence of “Saving Private Ryan” – could kill around 2,400 US soldiers on Omaha Beach alone.

The two attacking US regiments (16th and 116th Infantry Regiments) and supporting troops entered the battle with around 6,200 men. Counting all the beaches together, the Allied losses at the end of the day amounted to a total of around 10,000 casualties. The “ordered failure” of the 450 B-24s of the 2nd Bomber Division under Hodges to neutralize the defensive positions contributed directly to these extraordinarily high losses.

In the meantime, even a video from the Imperial War Museum mentions this fact – but only in a subordinate clause. This is attributed to the bombardiers, who “triggered the firing a little too late due to poor visibility and concern about hitting their own forces”.

Counterexample Utah Beach

The most precise bombing raid on Landing Day took place on Utah Beach on June 6 and was carried out by the IX Bomber Command of the U.S. 9th Air Fleet under General Vandenberg. 300 medium B-26 Marauder bombers attacked three groups of German defensive positions along a several-mile stretch of open beach held by the 919th Grenadier Regiment of the 709th Infantry Division.

In this sector, Lieutenant Arthur Jahnke, platoon leader of the 3rd Company, commanded Resistance Nest 5. Shortly before six o’clock, Jahnke was standing on a sand rampart looking north when he saw a wave of twin-engine bombers approaching from the sea. Normally, he would watch bombers flying inland further west. This time, however, the leading formation of nine aircraft turned left and flew along the beach directly towards his position.

Jahnke, an experienced and decorated officer, immediately recognized that his position was the target of this bomber squadron. The planes flew low, and through his binoculars he saw the bomb bays open up and 250-pound bombs fall towards his defenses. Moments later, the first wave of detonations knocked him to the ground. The first wave hit the nearby row of bunkers, destroying a truck, and sand and debris nearly buried the officer alive. He managed to get to safety behind a concrete wall and saw bombs hit an ammunition bunker, triggering a huge explosion.

Everything that was not made of concrete was destroyed. The precise bombing damaged artillery pieces, buried trenches and destroyed two ammunition bunkers. Although bombs also hit the concrete bunkers, they were unable to penetrate them completely. Personnel losses therefore remained low.

Jahnke and his platoon prepared to repel the attack by the 8th US Infantry Regiment, which would soon land in front of their damaged positions. Within two hours, however, an overwhelming American superiority secured the complex. The German artillery fire from the rear at Brecourt Manor ceased, and Jahnke prepared to board a landing craft. Destination: a prisoner of war camp in England. This is exactly how it should have been on all the beaches.

Attempted later reinterpretation

In his official on-scene assessment a few days after D-Day, Col. Walter Todd, Deputy Chief of Operations of the U.S. 8th Air Fleet, stated, “The immediate beach areas and fortifications showed little evidence of bomb damage, as was to be expected in view of the extra precautions taken to avoid dropping bombs too short under cloud cover. Areas behind the bridgehead, however, extending between 300 and 400 yards (note: 270 to 360 meters) and up to three miles (note: up to five kilometers), showed clear signs of concentrated bombing. The main contribution of these bombing raids was the demoralization of enemy troops and the interruption of signal and transport links to the rear, which made it difficult to deploy immediate reserves.”

However, the latter was not their mission, or their “main contribution” as Todd put it. The task was to destroy the German beach defenses and kill or at least incapacitate their crews.

One reason for the subsequent official ignoring of this massive air operation may have been the realization of how much it ultimately failed. 1,300 Lancaster and Halifax bombers were practically unable to take out ten coastal artillery batteries in their sectors that morning. Instead, Allied warships had to fight these positions for hours until the German gun crews ran out of ammunition. Ultimately, it was the firepower of the US Navy and the Royal Navythat took out these installations.

Meanwhile, 1,400 “Liberators” and “Fortresses” also failed to seriously damage 45 defensive positions. Of the almost 3,000 tons of bombs dropped by the 8th US Air Fleet along the beaches of Normandy, only a few hit German soldiers or their weapon positions directly. Although many defenders must have been temporarily in shock or disoriented, enough German gunners and infantrymen remained operational – which resulted in correspondingly high, avoidable losses among the Allied landing troops.

A significant part of the responsibility for this failure lies with a handful of senior staff officers at 8th Air Force headquarters. While they had presumably considered the wishes of the infantry commanders and the fate of the landing soldiers, they changed the plan not for operational reasons, but out of fear of negative publicity in the US if their own troops were accidentally hit. This caution is understandable to some extent, but to subsequently justify the change by claiming that the commander-in-chief had agreed to it, in conjunction with Todd’s own statements after the landing, indicates a certain sense of guilt about the consequences.

Nobody wanted to be associated with this decision later on. Some of those involved were decorated and went on to enjoy remarkable careers. The heads of the Western Allied military leadership were also politically and medially prominent figures who now had to bring the war to a conclusion.

Immediately after the landing, a grueling battle of attrition began in Normandy, which lasted until “Operation Cobra” two months later. German elite armored divisions put up particularly fierce resistance to the British. For example, on July 18 during Operation Goodwood, 400 British and Canadian tanks were destroyed and 5,500 soldiers killed – the largest tank battle in British history. Caen did not fall on June 7, as planned, but on July 20.

Against this backdrop, there was no interest at a higher level in initiating investigations against high-ranking officers for the losses at Omaha Beach, especially as the invasion was ultimately successful. Today, numerous local museums, memorials such as the monument to the 1st US Infantry Division and the US military cemetery in Colleville-sur-Mer tell the rest of the story.

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