The UN arms embargo against the Islamic Republic, which has been in place since 2007, expired on Sunday night. Iran could now also purchase large conventional weapons systems.
The Islamic Republic is actually in a severe economic crisis and President Hassan Ruhani’s government probably has other things to worry about at the moment, including the 30,000 people who have died as a result of the coronavirus. Nevertheless, the Iranian ruler was delighted to be able to announce an important diplomatic success to his compatriots in the ongoing dispute with arch-enemy the USA: Washington had previously failed in its attempt to extend the conventional UN arms boycott.
At a press conference in Washington last week, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made it clear why the US would have liked to extend the embargo: “Iran poses a significant threat to the entire region. This was recently made clear by the Iranian missile attack on Saudi oil facilities last fall. And also by the ongoing shelling by Yemeni Houthis from Saudi territory. Missiles, drones and other weapons are being used – supplied by the regime in Tehran.” Pompeo took the opportunity to reiterate the US position that anyone who nevertheless supplied weapons to Iran would have to expect US sanctions. Washington is referring to the so-called “snapback mechanism” of the nuclear agreement negotiated with Tehran in Vienna in 2015. This allows all sanctions to be reinstated if a state party to the agreement determines that Iran is violating its provisions. As Tehran is demonstrably doing this and the USA has repeatedly stated this, Pompeo declared that all sanctions were back in force. However, the vast majority of UN Security Council members, including Germany, France and the UK, took a different view. The USA is not entitled to do so, precisely because Washington withdrew from the treaty in May 2018 and is therefore no longer a state party. “Now our country could buy weapons wherever it wants,” said Ruhani Donald Trump and his administration had “achieved nothing apart from big words.” Brief review: Due to suspicions that Iran was secretly seeking to build a nuclear bomb, the United Nations banned all member states from selling arms in 2007 with a unanimous decision in the UN Security Council. In June 2010, an explicit ban on the supply of heavy military equipment also came into force. This included, for example, major weapons systems such as fighter aircraft, combat helicopters, tanks and ground-based air defense systems. The international nuclear agreement of 2015 then promised Iran an end to the arms boycott. In return for Iran’s restraint in its nuclear program, the agreement provided for a reduction in international sanctions. This included the end of the arms embargo, five years after the nuclear deal came into force on October 18, 2015.
The Trump administration, which took office in 2017, criticized the nuclear deal as inadequate and withdrew from the agreement two years ago. Since then, the US president has tried to force Iran to make further concessions with economic sanctions – to no avail. In the summer of 2020, the remaining international parties to the nuclear agreement – China, Germany, France, the UK and Russia – finally rejected the US demand to extend the arms embargo indefinitely. Its end is therefore “a memorable day”, wrote Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad Sarif on Twitter. Until the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was a good customer of the international arms industry. But even before the UN embargo, many countries no longer wanted to supply the Mullah regime with armaments. Since then, the Shiite theocracy has had to rely on the longevity of the weapons it bought back then and on its own production, which is becoming ever more efficient – thanks in part to dark detour channels for spare parts. This is particularly noticeable in the air force (IRIAF), where American F-14A Tomcats from the 1970s are still flying, but are now being overhauled in the country (up to eight per year) and equipped with weapons that were not previously intended for aircraft. The numerous “new developments” of fighter jets that will always remain Northrop F-5s are also almost legendary. In addition, there are still many F-4D to -E Phantom, Russian MiG-29A and Su-24K, Chinese F-7 and ex-Iraqi Su-22. The Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) have – parallel to the IRIAF – their own squadrons with Su-25, which were temporarily handed over to Iraq in the fight against IS. Overall, this is where the greatest pent-up demand exists, and there have long been rumors of alleged interest in Su-30s and Su-35s. Tehran is also interested in the Russian S-400 air defense system in order to better protect itself against possible or expected American or Israeli attacks. Iran already has the predecessor S-300 in its inventory. Moscow appears to be willing to supply the system and only a few days ago expressed its interest in expanding its arms cooperation with Tehran. In principle, China is also ready to supply the Iranian armed forces. However, Iran is unlikely to receive any technology from Europe for the time being, as the EU arms embargo will remain in force until 2023.
Compared to the outdated air force, Iranian industry has made considerable progress, particularly in the ballistic missile program – controlled by the IRGC’s economic empire – with the support of some states (such as North Korea or Pakistan). The country’s enemies in the Middle East, first and foremost Israel, which is repeatedly threatened with annihilation, but also Saudi Arabia or the UAE, as well as US bases in Qatar or Bahrain, are within range of hundreds of different Iranian missiles, with models such as the Fateh-110 reaching up to 300 kilometers, Qiam up to 800 kilometers and Sejil or Ghadr up to 2,000 kilometers, while the cruise missile Soumar can even reach up to 2,500 kilometers. In Washington and Riyadh, parts of Qiam were repeatedly presented to the media, launched from the territory of the Yemeni Houthis. Actually – assuming economic data – Iran could not afford to spend billions on weapons purchases and would probably have completely different, internal concerns. However, such rational considerations are likely to play a subordinate role, or rather the regime could earn the necessary funds for purchases abroad by exporting its own weapons, as this is also permitted again with immediate effect. And Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro – who is still holding on – is reportedly considering the purchase of Iranian ballistic missiles. The USA – regardless of the administration – will probably keep a close eye on such a transport and deployment in Venezuela (keyword: Cuban Missile Crisis). In any case, they continue to threaten all countries that conclude arms deals with Iran with sanctions. And that could well have an effect – state party or not.
In the hope of a possible victory for Trump’s challenger Joe Biden, Beijing is counting on a subsequent improvement in its relationship with America and would not jeopardize a fresh start in relations by delivering a few aircraft to Iran. Relations with the USA are also important for Russia – keyword Vienna negotiations on New START (Militär Aktuell reported) – are ultimately more important than arms deals with the mullahs. In the medium term, however, the end of the embargo in conjunction with the rise to power of the Revolutionary Guard and other hardliners in the theocracy could trigger greater tensions. The influence of the IRGC and the arch-conservatives could continue to grow, especially after the Iranian presidential election in 2021. Modern foreign weapons in the hands of a more uncompromising regime would be a warning siren for Israel, the Gulf states and the USA. However, despite Tehran’s satisfaction, a new arms race in the Middle East is unlikely to happen – for the time being. Israel, as well as the Gulf monarchies – which have recently been approaching Tel Aviv purely by chance – already have far superior fighter aircraft fleets and missile defense systems such as Patriot or THAAD, or have already ordered the corresponding equipment. Just recently, Abu Dhabi expressed its desire for F-35 “stealth fighters” – regardless of cost. Both have perceived Iran’s striving for power and the mullahs’ missile program as an aggressive provocation, indeed as an existential threat, for many years. Also because the Iranian leadership supplies militant Palestinian groups such as Hamas with weapons as well as the Lebanese Hezbollah – against both of which Israel repeatedly attempts to prevent their armament with military strikes and intelligence operations. It is therefore no wonder that Prime Minister “Bibi” Netanyahu sided with Trump when it came to extending the UN arms embargo. And Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has long felt challenged as a regional Sunni superpower – but his country has already taken precautions before his time with THADD and more than 150 F-15SAs. Nevertheless, there are concerns that Iran could use its new freedom to further arm the Houthis as a proxy – in order to damage the reputation of its royal family with new attacks.
So whatever funds Tehran can spare over the next few years for at best a moderate modernization of its arsenals are out of all proportion to the 111 billion US dollars (around 94 billion euros) in military equipment that the administration of US President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Barack Obama has sold to Saudi Arabia in seven and a half years. That is much more than the military budgets of entire countries in the region and beyond, but it is also equivalent to 13 percent of Saudi Arabia’s gross domestic product. And the USA buys three billion euros (2.5 billion euros) worth of armaments for Israel from its manufacturers – every year. It is more than unrealistic to weigh all this up in Su-30s (12 units usually cost around half a billion US dollars/0.4 billion euros) or S-400s (around 200 million US dollars/170 million euros per battalion with seven to eight launchers).
