On October 26, 1955, the Austrian National Council passed the federal law on “perpetual neutrality according to the Swiss model”. However, while Austria is desperately “fighting” for every single jet, Switzerland is about to embark on a multi-billion anti-aircraft missile and fighter aircraft procurement program. In addition to the Eurofighter Typhoon T3/4 from Airbus, the Rafale F4 from Dassault, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet III from Boeingthe F-35A Lightning-II from Lockheed-Martin and in an SP counter-proposal the M-346 from Leonardo.
What had been discussed for a long time reached its preliminary climax at the end of last year: after the Swiss National Council’s security policy committee had already approved a comprehensive concept by the Federal Council for the procurement of modern fighter aircraft and the resurrection of long-range ground-based air defense (project name “Air2030”) weeks earlier, the concept was also approved by both chambers (National Council and Council of States) in a final vote on 20 December. This marked the start of the deadline for the “traditional” collection of at least 50,000 signatures required to protest against the project, which was achieved by the Swiss Social Democrats (SP) and their “allies” by April 10 (Militär Aktuell reported).
However, contrary to what one might expect, the SP is not fundamentally opposed to the procurement of interceptors and active airspace surveillance. However, it believes it will be able to convince voters in the upcoming referendum on September 27 with its counter-proposal, which is half as expensive. As with all referendums, there is a referendum bookletpublished by the government and containing neutral information on the “pros” and “cons” of each position. The initial situation
Airspace is of strategic importance in economic, international law and military terms. States must ensure the safety of the airspace above their territory, whether in an alliance or as neutrals – both in the day-to-day operation of an air police force in peacetime and in the event of tensions and possibly in armed conflicts. If the airspace over a country’s own territory cannot be actively controlled at all times and continuously, regular or irregular opponents can fly in and, for example, the country’s own ground troops cannot be deployed with any prospect of success. A potential enemy would fight them from the air and prevent them from fulfilling their mission or protective function. This is why (for the foreseeable future still manned) aerial warfare assets are militarily relevant today and will continue to be so in the medium term, and this applies to both conventional and so-called hybrid conflicts (electronic warfare, drone warfare, etc.). At least in Switzerland, a large majority of people see it this way or in a similar way: at the height of the Cold War, the Swiss “air force” had 493 jet aircraft and a total of 900 aircraft (!) in service. Figures that would have been hard to convey to the population in neighboring Austria, which was much closer to the former Warsaw Pact states, and were also never politically conceivable. Whereby the latter is probably also due to the fact that Switzerland did not have to experience a world war on its own territory and Swiss neutrality is also much older than Austrian neutrality and is also self-chosen and self-declared. In light of this consensus, which still exists – as Swiss TV journalists recently confirmed to the author – the government has chosen the following volume from four options for the NKF (“New Combat Aircraft”) as the basis for the “Air2030” package that has now been presented: Replacement of the current fighter aircraft fleet of 26 Northrop F-5E/F Tigers and 30 F/A-18C/D Hornets with 36 or 40 new fighter aircraft as well as a significant increase in performance on the ground-based air defense side, at a cost of around 8 to 8.5 billion Swiss francs (7.4 to 7.9 billion euros).
The (remaining) candidates
First things first, Saab’s Gripen-E could well cover the Swiss “job”, which is not overly challenging by international standards, but for the Swedes, Switzerland is apparently a latent “minefield”. While they were “shot down” at the ballot box in 2014 with the Gripen-E – even though it only existed as an “NG” demonstrator at the time – as a selected bidder, they have now been eliminated in advance because they were unable to come to Switzerland for a week-long flight evaluation in mid-2019 with one of the three Gripen-Es now flying as test aircraft. Although their aircraft was now very real, it was “too new” for the Swiss. This is because their official side – armasuisse is in charge of the NKF project – demanded that all candidates must already have been introduced or have a “certain level of operational maturity”. This was also communicated to Saab from the outset. Saab, in turn, says that they have always communicated since the beginning of 2019 that the latest of the samples available for selection for Switzerland was still in the manufacturer test program for Sweden (60) and Brazil (34). A new demonstrator with e-cockpit and sensors was rejected by Switzerland.
This January, the second request for proposals for the new fighter aircraft and new ground-based air defense systems was issued to the government agencies of the manufacturing countries. Process leader armasuisse expects the new offers from Germany (Airbus D&S for Eurofighter Typhoon T3/4), France (Dassault for Rafale F4) and the USA (Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet III and – perhaps somewhat surprisingly at first glance – Lockheed-Martin for the F-35A Lightning-II) during August. This second request for proposal is based on the analysis of the first round of offers, the findings from flight, simulator and ground tests, as well as audits of the operators of the evaluated fighter aircraft. In the search for the “most advantageous offer for Switzerland”, the documents submitted had to contain the following elements: 1) The price for 36 or 40 aircraft, including defined logistics and armament as a binding starting point for the detailed negotiations with the selected candidate after the type decision.
2) Offers for cooperation between the armed forces and the procurement authorities of Switzerland and those of the potential supplier country.
3) Offset projects that are planned or have already been initiated.
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