On the illusion-free classification of the term “warmonger”, which is frequently and often reproachfully used in Europe against supporters of Ukraine: China has made it clear, as openly as rarely before, that it has an interest in the war in Ukraine lasting as long as possible.
The aim is to bind the Europeans in Europe, prevent the focus of US military capabilities on China, secure hegemony in Asia and pressure US President Trump to make decisions that would have a negative impact on NATO-allies.
In a statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry in July Beijing used typically ambiguous bureaucratic rhetoric: “It takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly pointed out that there is no simple solution to complex problems. Although there are still major disagreements between the parties involved, it is better to talk than to fight.”
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This metaphor, aimed at temporal delay, suggests that China’s geopolitical interests are best served by a protracted war in Ukraine – including Xi Jinping’s support for Putin.
Four hours of “history lectures” with a clear message
This strategy was confirmed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a recent meeting with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. Wang said that China could not afford a Russian defeat in Ukraineas it feared that the USA could then shift its entire strategic focus to Beijing.
Various media reported on the four-hour meeting, which was described as both tense and intense. While Kallas made her first major diplomatic appearance in her new role, Wang rejected accusations that China was supporting Moscow militarily or financially. At the same time, he interrupted the talks several times to deliver historical monologues, much like Putin.
Ultimately, Wang Yi has stated relatively openly by Chinese standards what was previously only implicit: despite the official assertion that it is not a party to the war, China is China is Russia’s most important military and economic supporter. From Beijing’s point of view, the war in Ukraine clearly serves to pursue its own security and strategic interests – it is therefore not a disruptive factor, but a welcome lever.
Three main reasons: Strategy, economics, ideology
Empathy with Ukraine or respect for international law hardly play a role in Beijing’s thinking. Instead, China sees the continuation of the war as advantageous in the medium and long term. There are three main reasons for this:
1. strategic advantages:
The war is tying up a large part of the USA’s attention and resources. Some US strategists and President Trump initially demanded that the focus should be exclusively on China. In the meantime, however, a line has prevailed according to which the stability of Europe is in the vital interests of the USA.
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This means that Washington must continue to invest in the defense of Ukraine – directly or via European partners. And every dollar spent on this is not available for the Western Pacific or Taiwan.
In addition, Chinese strategists recognize the growing tensions between Washington and its European allies, especially with the Trump administration. The latter has recently repeatedly accused NATO partners of of “free-riding” and a lack of commitment. At the same time, the war in Ukraine is preventing European armed forces in the Indo-Pacific in the Indo-Pacific – something that Beijing expressly does not want with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea.
2. economic benefit:
Trade between China and Russia has intensified significantly since the start of the Russian invasion. In 2023, the bilateral trade volume rose by 26%, with Chinese exports to Russia increasing by 46%.
China is today the Russia’s largest energy importer. It is replacing large parts of the former EU trade relations, at least temporarily. Monthly Chinese exports to Russia rose from the equivalent of 3.4 billion euros to around 7.8 billion euros. Aluminum exports to Russia, for example, shot up by 56 percent in the first five months of this year. This increase is even stronger for copper (66 percent) and nickel (more than doubled). Last year, the total trade volume was worth more than 200 billion euros.
A significant part of this trade takes place indirectlyfor example via Belarus or central Asian countries. This creates a new supply chain structure that compensates for Western sanctions not just temporarily, but in the long term.
3. ideological component:
What is barely present in Europe’s post-heroic societies is a central component of state strategy in China: ideological confrontation with the West. In his speech to the 20th Party Congress (2020), President Xi Jinping recalled the ideological foundations of the CCP – from Mao to Deng to the “new era”. Xi explained: “China is increasingly exposed to threats from external forces that try to blackmail, contain, block and pressure us. We therefore uncompromisingly put our national interests first.”
The war in Ukraine binds the US and its allies and allows China to position itself less exposed in this global confrontation. If China can convince other countries that it offers a more attractive model for security and prosperity than the US, then the support of another great power like Russia is a useful ideological booster.
Weakened Russia – old territorial issues
The Chinese Communist Party – the army is sworn to them and not to the state – and President Xi Jinping are unlikely to be dissatisfied with the continuation of the war in Ukraine. They have more to gain from an ongoing conflict than from a quick peace agreement.
A US analyst on Russia recently aptly stated: “The war in Ukraine may be a drain on the West’s resources and on the economies of developing countries, but it suits Beijing’s interests well. China has gained power over Russia while paying minimal economic and diplomatic penalties. So China could stay the course.”
It is true that Moscow has not yet become a complete supplicant in Beijing – as some Western commentators like to portray it. As a nuclear power, Russia still has influence, including on bilateral relations. However, this influence is no longer as strong as it was before the invasion, which was unexpectedly protracted from Moscow’s point of view.
The longer the war lasts, the longer Russia’s economic and geopolitical recovery will take. Regardless of the outcome. The decline in Russian power and influence is an advantage for China in both Europe and Asia.
Old wounds and new maps
In this context, texts appear in China – not prominently, but regularly – that cultivate a historical “wound”: the territories once lost to Russia. The easternmost part of Siberia, for example, belonged to China as “Outer Manchuria” until 1860. In two treaties, the weakened empire – paralyzed at the time by the consequences of the Opium War, among other things – had to cede this territory to the Russian Tsarist Empire. It covers around 910,000 square kilometers and is located in a strategically important region with access to the Arctic, which China lacks today.
Could China now regain access to these regions directly or via a pseudo-republic such as “Siberia”? The possibility has not been ruled out. Beijing seems to be counting on Russia being weakened by the war in Ukraine to such an extent that such a step appears feasible.
The so-called “Arctic Silk Road” also plays a role in China’s geopolitical calculations. This is a sea route across the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic. Although China’s application for a permanent seat on the Arctic Council was rejected, Beijing is still actively working to exert influence.
In 2024, for example, attempts were made to acquire land in northern Norway in order to gain a foothold in the sparsely populated regions. Such a footprint, or a return to Outer Manchuria, would give China strategic access to the Arctic Ocean. And thus into the Arctic Council.
Russian mistrust and silent alarm bells
A recent episode shows that Russian authorities are well aware of the threat posed by China: a few years ago, Chinese companies attempted to build a drinking water pipeline from Lake Baikal to north-east China. Russian provincial governors are said to have approved the project until Moscow intervened and stopped it.
The headquarters of the Russian domestic intelligence service FSB, the Lubyanka, also has a department that deals exclusively with China. The 7th Counterintelligence Service (D.K.R.O.) regards China as a threat in its own right.
An internal report leaked to the New York Times by the cybercrime group ARES warns of intensive Chinese espionage activities. According to the report, Beijing is trying to intercept Russian military technology, poach dissatisfied or poorly paid scientists, recruit Russians with Chinese spouses and conduct espionage in Ukraine in order to analyze Western weapons technologies.
The FSB also sees a strategic risk of Chinese academics preparing long-term historical claims to Russian territory.
In 2023, the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources published a new official map new official map that caused a stir. In it, the island of Bolshoi Ussuriysky, on the north-eastern edge of Russia, is marked as Chinese – although it is divided between Russia and China according to the valid border regulation.
This highly official map, used at universities, schools and in the media, shows China’s expansive ambitions more openly than ever before.
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Pretty much best enemies?
Russia expert Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told the New York Times: “Putin believes he can go much deeper into this Chinese embrace. Right now it’s worth it, but it’s not risk-free. And we also see that there are people within the system who are skeptical of this approach.”
The FSB dossier lends credence to the theory that China, with the right approach, could permanently destabilize parts of Russia and possibly secede. Despite smiling summit meetings in gold-clad halls, mistrust prevails on both sides.
China allegedly carries out lie detector tests on returning agents, monitors the 20,000 Russian students in China and remains vigilant. What is currently only visible in dossiers, card symbols and individual actions could one day turn out to be a strategic reality.
