On the fringes of the “Vienna Congress on the Future of Europe“, political scientist Professor Carlo Masala spoke in a major Militär Aktuell interview about the war in which Europe finds itself, upcoming crises and his latest book.
Mr. Professor, the Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014, but has only been recognizable to everyone in this comprehensive form since 2022. But why is there a war in Ukraine?
War is raging in Ukraine because the Russian leadership is pursuing a determined project to expand its power. This project is coupled with a view of history that is based on the assumption that Ukraine is an artificial state that should never have existed. This denies Ukraine all state sovereignty.
That sounds like a comprehensive project.
Back in 2021, Vladimir Putin published a famous essay (-> on the role of history in the current war), which he repeated in abbreviated form in several speeches. In it, he accuses the Bolsheviks and Lenin of a series of mistakes that – in Putin’s view – led to the part of Russia that is now Ukraine acquiring a kind of state sovereignty.
So we are dealing with imperialism?
It is a neo-imperialist project that goes beyond Ukraine, because we are also seeing the delegitimization of the state sovereignty of the Baltic states. It remains to be seen whether this is also being pursued politically. However, the ideology and the rhetorical figures are the same.
So can Russia’s security interests be completely ruled out as a reason for the war?
This opinion is also being discussed, yes. Clarifying this issue is important because then we will have the key to dealing with Russia. It cannot be denied that until February 24, 2022, the day Russia declared war, the security argument was very much to the fore. Interestingly, however, this changed afterwards. Empirically, we can observe a number of events that suggest that the security argument is merely a pretext and that we are essentially dealing with a neo-imperialist project.
For example?
Three points: Ukraine’s rapprochement with NATO cannot, in my opinion, be established empirically. Since the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, where the then German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy, among others, prevented Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO immediately, nothing has changed in terms of accession. Further examples can be found in the territories occupied by Russia since 2022, where children are kidnapped, streets are renamed and libraries are burned down. If it were a security argument, then there would be no need for Russification, just a cordon sanitaire, a stabilized buffer zone, between NATO and Russia.
And thirdly?
Russia now has an even bigger problem: the 1,380-kilometer border with the newest NATO member Finland.
When or where will this “neo-imperialist project”, as you call it, come to an end?
The end is where the Russians see the possibility of the end. That means: if we assume that we get a permanent stabilization of the front, then I think that will be a good opportunity for a tactical pause by Russia. After that – nobody can say when – an attempt could be made to conquer the rest of Ukraine.
So where is the spatial limit?
On a territorial level, the border lies with the Baltic states. They are a potential object of Russian desire. But it will probably not go beyond that. I think it is rather unlikely that Russia would try to attack Poland in order to conquer territory there.
“I think it is rather unlikely that Russia would try to attack Poland in order to conquer territory there.”
No matter who wins the US presidential election in 2024, it can be assumed that the USA will be preoccupied with itself due to social divisions – the threat of civil war has often been heard in the USA. This is the perfect time for Russia to expand its territorial borders, isn’t it?
Instability is possible, yes. The election of the president will be important for Russia. If the elections are even decided by January 2025, potential chaos could be exploited.
In what way?
I don’t think we will see a major offensive. At the moment, it would be too much for Russia to take advantage of a phase of instability in the USA to advance directly towards Kiev. However, it can be assumed that there will be no additional help from the USA for Ukraine in this chaos. If Europe is not in a position to massively increase its own aid by then – which I have to assume – then Ukraine will find itself in a similar situation to today: Ukraine will run out of ammunition and personnel. We will then certainly see attempts at offensives, even if they will not be extensive.
But the offensives will secure territory, for example in the south of Ukraine?
Exactly. We are already seeing the shelling in Odessa, which will be intensified. The attempt will then be to take everything from the Donbas to Odessa, hold it and then gather forces. If you read General Valery Gerasimov (note: Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) carefully, this becomes clear. He says: The military will only be deployed if the hybrid war does not lead to the desired success. And Russia obviously needs a tactical pause.
What effect would such an operation have in concrete terms?
On the one hand, this would result in a stabilization of its own conquests. On the other hand, Ukraine would no longer be able to survive on its own. This could be followed by a hybrid war until the country’s own forces have regenerated, at which point it might dare to take a second step.
Is it more likely that there will not be a major offensive?
The risk would be too great if an advance were to be made towards Kiev under the current conditions. In the USA or Europe, such a movement could still come into force now, which would put the Russian army in too much trouble. Putin thinks in long historical cycles. He does not need to succeed quickly. The problems in Ukraine, which are likely to become even more apparent in the winter, offer Russia a gateway to destabilize the country and then possibly take over the entire territory at a later date.
“Putin thinks in long historical cycles. He doesn’t need to succeed quickly.”
Keyword “hybrid war”: Is Europe also at war with this war in Ukraine?
Yes, of course. We are at war, you have to say that clearly. Not in terms of international law, but Putin is also waging this hybrid war against us. For months, Putin has been talking about a “war against the West”, less frequently about a “war against Ukraine”. It is a war against a model of society that the West represents. And that means we are at war with Putin.
But we don’t have to agree with him.
I believe that we are operating on two different levels in the discourse: On the level of international law, “the West” is obviously not at war with Russia. Putin, on the other hand, is operating on a rhetorical level, where he simply declares us to be a party to the war. This discourse is simply not coming together.
Does this correspond to the “great confrontation between the global South and the global North”, to which army colonel Markus Reisner repeatedly refers?
I think the fault line is more complicated. At its core, it’s about a new international order, we have the same opinion (-> Interview with Colonel Markus Reisner). But what we are experiencing is a confrontation over a new world order. We can see that the liberal world order as we have known it since 1945 is under attack on many fronts, and not just militarily. We have been in this battle for a long time, but now it is reaching its climax.
Can you imagine that the actors were in collusion, or …?
I don’t believe that this has been agreed, but a certain consensus has been reached. A lot of strategic vacuums have now arisen because the USA is so tied up with the Russian war, while at the same time looking at Israel and Hamas (-> Iran’s major attack on Israel failed) and so on. Other states are now pushing ahead because they think they can act relatively risk-free, as the USA has neither the capacity nor the political will to deal with other sources of conflict.
What kind of Europe could prevent the spread of the Russian war? What would this Europe ultimately have to be like in order to make a difference?
We need a Europe with a stronger political will and a stronger will to assert itself in order to stop Russia. Europe has imposed an insane number of sanctions against Russia, but is neither able nor politically willing to close the political loopholes that exist in every sanctions regime. Germany’s increased exports to Kyrgyzstan are a good example. We all know where the goods are really going.
“What else needs to happen that is more dramatic than February 24, 2022, for Europe to finally see that it needs to react to such developments with more unity?”
Is there any hope for change at all?
The political science concept of “critical juncture” is a piece of the puzzle for me personally. It looks at major changes and events and their consequences and counter-reactions. This begs the question: what else has to happen that is more dramatic than February 24, 2022, for Europe to finally see that it needs to react to such developments with more unity? The only answer I can think of is one thing that I don’t want to see: Putin reacting militarily against Europe.
In your new book “Warum die Welt keine Frieden findet” (Brandstätter Verlag), you write that we need to learn to understand wars. Could this make it clearer to people what wars mean and what needs to be done now, in the current situation?
With this idea, I am arguing for two things: one is to accept wars as a recurring momentum of conflict between two social groups. This also means accepting that wars cannot always be prevented. They can be prevented, but not always. Understanding wars also means getting an idea of how to react in wars so that they can possibly end. Nevertheless, this will not unite Europe. But it would free Europe from the idea that it is only ever a question of diplomacy and economics to prevent armed conflicts. In the case of the war against Ukraine, however, the will to go to war was so strong that it could not have been prevented.
With information from Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) that is accessible to all of us, we can also observe the war in Ukraine on a deep, tactical level on a daily basis. This results in a relatively clear and up-to-date picture of the situation, which may well differ from the opinion presented in other media.
Of course, you can’t generalize, but I would even extend the statement: this also applies to executive agencies, i.e. to what services report to their own governments about the situation. In this war, some services only worked with what you might call “red sources”, i.e. sources close to them. Executives did not want to see it. And the media didn’t see it. But the war was visible in advance. We could have reacted to all these Russian attempts much earlier. Whether that would have averted the war or not is another question. But a wider range of instruments could have been deployed much earlier to prevent the Russians from invading Ukraine.
Detached from the politicization of the term “neutrality”: Is there a form of state neutrality that can exist and also have an active effect in the current structure of crises and wars?
In my opinion, neutrality would not mean not providing assistance to a state that is clearly under attack, even in the lethal area. Austria does provide assistance, but in the non-lethal area.
So does Austria find itself in a kind of vacuum with its neutrality?
Neutrality is a political and international law category. If international law – as in the war against Ukraine – is relatively clear, why does neutrality mean staying out of the conflict? Conversely, in the event of an attack on Austria, it would be perfectly legitimate for Austria to expect to be defended – provided the attack is not of a pre-emptive nature, for example because Austria is about to attack another country. Why doesn’t Austria help to defend Ukraine if the same thing is at stake here? This does not mean that Austria does not stay out of other conflicts that are not so clear-cut. It then decides on a case-by-case basis. But when the case is as clear as it is in Ukraine, I believe it is important to show political leadership.
Is Austria a special case in the middle of Europe?
The Austrian armed forces already work very closely with NATO as an “advanced partner” (-> Austria participates in NATO meetings; -> 25 years of NATO partnership for peace). Not in the same way as Sweden and Finland, but still. However, this is not reflected in the political discourse. Weapons are transported to Ukraine via Austrian territory. Austria is investing in air defense in case of a possible missile attack (-> The Austrian army relies on Skyranger towers; -> Austria plans to participate in Sky Shield Initiative). Why, if the country is neutral? (-> Guest commentary by former Defense Minister Werner Fasslabend: Is Sky Shield compatible with Austria’s neutrality?) Neutrality thus becomes political folklore. Austria’s relations with NATO are ultimately so close that it can no longer be said that Austria is neutral. Austria is a quasi-member of an alliance.
Then there is also the EU and the mutual assistance clause.
Yes, that is still to come. Austria is currently the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (-> Austrian becomes highest general of the EU). More honesty would be the answer.
This would give us a form of neutrality to build on after all.
Exactly. Neutrality doesn’t mean that we stay out of everything. It means staying out of conflicts that are not unambiguous and clear. In fact, that applies to most conflicts; the aggressor and victim are not always easy to identify. But in the case of Ukraine, it is relatively clear who the aggressor and victim are. The point is: Austria has made the decision. Since Ukraine – as a victim – has already been helped, lethal means such as ammunition or individual systems can also be made available.
What is the ultimate role of civil society, which must gain an understanding of war in terms of spiritual national defense?
Taking Germany as an example: the mistake of the previous “turnaround” was (-> Is there now a threat of a “turnaround light”?) was to focus on the Bundeswehr and its equipment. But it was not understood that ultimately, even a fully equipped Bundeswehr cannot fully fulfill its mission in the case of alliance defense if society does not support it. If society is not prepared to pay the price that the Bundeswehr would have to pay if it were to become a federal state, then everything will collapse after a few weeks. That is why society must become resilient, i.e. able to defend itself. We are at a crossroads right now. We have to realize that states like China and Russia have been waging a hybrid war against us for years. If we have societies that do not understand the necessity of the cost of defending liberal democratic societies, then the armed forces will not be able to fulfill their missions. To stay in the context of Germany, this is the real “turning point” we need.
“We have to realize that states like China and Russia have been waging a hybrid war against us for years.”
Does that mean we have to take care of a defensible peace?
Yes, definitely. But I always hesitate when it comes to the term “defensive”, as it relates very much to the military part. I would rather say that we need resilient societies that won’t collapse in the event of an attack on critical infrastructure. So the question must be: How can we guarantee the central functional capabilities of social life even if we are attacked, including by non-military means? In concrete terms, this means telling people that war does not only take place with weapons in Eastern Europe. We have already had cyber attacks on German municipalities and explosives have been found next to NATO pipelines. Extremist parties are also being financed and disinformation campaigns are being carried out. Politicians need to address this more clearly, even if things are already changing. But one thing remains central: without resilient and robust societies, we will not be able to win this war.
