In Vienna, the US Chairman of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation highlighted the global threat posed by MANPADS in the hands of non-state groups.

During a Security Dialogue under the current US Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on February 17 in Vienna, a call was made to the OSCE participating States to reduce the proliferation or use of illicit man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). The aim of this dialog was to use the expertise on the multidimensional threat posed by MANPADS, including the discussion on the non-proliferation of small arms in the fight against terrorism. The Security Dialogue provided an overview of the impact of MANPADS proliferation on European and regional security. Panelists highlighted recent evidence that non-state armed groups are using technologically advanced systems and that older systems are also widely deployed in the immediate OSCE area. These developments call for a renewed focus on this threat. There are several non-state groups in possession of MANPADS in the OSCE region, and several recent uses of MANPADS have taken place in conflict zones. So-called MANPADS – one-man shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile launchers – were first developed in the 1960s to help armed forces in close air defense against military air attacks. However, in the hands of terrorists, criminals and other non-state actors around the world, they pose a serious threat to commercial and military aircraft. Since 1970, terrorists and other non-state actors have hit dozens of civilian aircraft with them, including passenger planes. “This is not a theoretical threat,” said Matthew Schroeder, Senior Researcher at the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey: “Large aircraft have been lost to MANPADS attacks, and more could be lost in the future if we abandon our efforts to keep these weapons out of the hands of, or deny them to, non-state actors.”

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Modern MANPADS can be used to engage targets at altitudes of up to 25,000 feet.

Karen Chandler, head of the US Interagency MANPADS Task Force, noted in her remarks that “successful MANPADS attacks have resulted in a catastrophic loss of life. More than 1,000 civilians have been killed in the 65 MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft since 1973. While 90 percent of these took place in conflict zones, the portability of these systems and proliferation to non-state actors is also a concern for civil aviation outside of crisis zones.” Although 2021 marks the 13th consecutive year without a MANPADS attack on a civilian airliner, Ms. Chandler warned that the U.S. services “continue to see reports indicating that non-state actors are still attempting to acquire and use MANPADS. Some of these groups have also successfully used them against U.S. military equipment as well.” She called on states to “maintain multiple international efforts.” Arnaud Borde from the French Civil Aviation Authority underlined this urgency and emphasized: “MANPADS are becoming more and more sophisticated and the deployment distances are getting longer and longer. With newer systems coming onto the market, the missiles can reach targets up to 25,000 feet. And MANPADS threats now go beyond traditional airport-centric security.” Borde discussed various mitigation strategies, including gathering and analyzing intelligence information, regularly assessing potential targets, adapting flight procedures or even warning and decoy equipment for particularly sensitive aircraft or especially vulnerable airports. He emphasized that these strategies exist and should be implemented by a variety of stakeholders, from state operators to private aviation companies. One state operator that has already responded to this issue is the Austrian Armed Forces, which has had its three used ex-British C-130Ks retrofitted with appropriate self-protection systems for the often unplanned missions to crisis areas (Militär Aktuell reported). From the German arms export report on conventional weapons from 2019: “Shoulder-mounted air defense systems (MANPADS) – such as FIM-92 Stinger (USA) or the Russian Strela and Igla variants including Chinese or Iranian variants – which are classified as light weapons, pose a threat to both civilian and military aviation due to their high relevance to terrorism. Experience shows that deficits in the management and security of state weapons and ammunition stocks in the countries concerned are a major source of illegal transfers.”

Further information: Wikipedia offers a list of MANPAD attacks on military and civilian aircraft. Here you can find information on the Russian 9K38 Igla family and here the RAND report on the topic from the year 2019.